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Aviation History
1965
1965 - 0579.PDF
FLIGHT International. 4 March 1965 313 The captain's instrument panel in an NYA toeing 107 (see "NYA Relies on Decco" in "Flight" last week) is based on a vertical reference line of Lear LIFE "outside-in" horizon director, turn-and-$lip indicator and Decca Flight Log—surely the best installation yet achieved. The co-pilot has the second Decca system. Instan- taneous v.s.i. and rotorjengine r.p.m. gauge join the main cluster and the Lear director compass is removed to the left. The four-dial Decameter panel is to the right, behind the control column, and Decca receiver controls are on the left console. The New York Decca chain is operated by the New York Monitoring Corp, a wholly owned NYA subsidiary, and is also approved by US Coast Guard for use by shipping REPORT ON HEATHROW TAKE-OFF ACCIDENT THE stresses for the captain of a heavily loaded jet transport during take-off in difficult conditions are pin-pointed in the Ministry of Aviation's report on the accident to the Trans-Canada Airlines (Air Canada) DC-8F-54 (CF-TJM) at London Heathrow on November 6, 1963. The aircraft was on a flight to Montreal and the take-off, being made in foggy conditions at night, was abandoned. It over-ran the end of runway 28R (9,312ft) by about 2,400ft before coming to rest. Fires broke out in Nos 1 and 2 engines but did not spread, though there had been considerable loss of JP-4 fuel. Some minor injuries were sustained, but no one was killed. In the opinion of the investigators "the captain, in the mistaken belief that the elevator control system was defective, abandoned the take-off at a speed and position on the runway which precluded the possibility of bringing the aircraft to a halt in the runway length remaining." The conclusions were that there was no pre-crash failure of the aircraft, its engines, or equipment; that take-off was abandoned at a speed substantially in excess of V\ (137kt) although he was unaware that this was so; and that extension of the spoilers (in accordance with the drill for an abandoned take-off) would have made braking more effective and thus have reduced the speed at which the aircraft over-ran the runway. Nine minutes after the accident (at 21.15hr GMT) visibility was 50yd; at the time of the take-off before the crash the runway visual range on 28R was reported as 800yd. An earlier take-off had been abandoned on 28L after the aircraft had travelled 400-500yd because the captain could not see a sufficient number of runway lights. He was refused permission to take off from the opposite end (10R) and had to use the shorter 28R. The report describes the acceleration during the second take-off as normal, but the captain was worried because of the hammering of the nosewheel on the centre-line lights. He tried to move the aircraft slightly to the left, but the hammering did not diminish. At a speed of about 132kt he moved the column back to try to reduce the hammering and then again a little further back without result. Quick checks and further elevator movements were made, but the controls, he said, "felt as if they were disconnected; there was no resistance whatever." He then believed that there was a serious fault in the elevator system, closed the throttles, applied the wheelbrakes and attempted, without success, to select reverse thrust. Reconstruction of events showed that a period of not less than llsec elapsed between an indication of 140kt and the closing of the throttles. Intended rotation speed was 151kt. Among observations made by the investigators, one of important human significance is included: "This accident," the report says, illustrates the serious consequences that can result from a break- down in the control loop through a misinterpretation on the part of the human element. In this case the environmental conditions included the following:— "(1) The prospect that the take-off would be made near to maximumweight in fog at night on a wet runway; (2) a wait of half-an-hour for start-up clearance; (3) concern over the sufficiency of the runway visualrange on 28L; (4) the need for radar assistance to taxi to the beginning of the runway to be used; (5) misunderstanding between the aircraftand the tower over the extent of the centre-line lighting on runway 28L; (6) the abandoned take-off on runway 28L; (7) the refusal of permissionto take off on runway 10R [the reciprocal]; (8) anxiety about the mar- ginal runway length available on runway 28R; (9) the frequent R/Tinstructions and broadcast of runway visual ranges; (10) the difficulty of taxying in low visibility and the risk of taxying into obstructions or otheraircraft; (11) an implied request to expedite take-off on runway 28R because of a landing aircraft on final approach; and (12) the repetitiousthumping of the nosewheel on the centre-line lights which the captain was unable to stop. "Such factors individually are not abnormal in winter operations; cumulatively they may cause a high degree of stress, the effect of which will depend upon the sensitivity of the individual. In this case they may well have contributed to a build-up of tension in the mind of the captain, but the extent, if any, to which this influenced his actions cannot be determined." CONTINUED US HELICOPTER 8UB8IDY? IN the face of a Presidential demand and a Congressional directive to cut US helicopter airline subsidies to zero at the end of this year the Civil Aeronautics Board has proposed specific subsidy limits, on a descending scale, until 1970. The President's budget message to Congress in January included a recommendation (amounting to a decision) that helicopter subsidies for New York Airways, Los Angeles Airways and Chicago Helicopter Airways should be ended. The Department of Commerce, as the organization required to take appropriate action, last week moved a petition to the effect that the subsidies were no longer necessary. The CAB's proposal is that subsidies should be continued for the next five years but with a specific series of limits restricting the total to $13.5m. This would be apportioned in amounts decreasing from $4.2m in fiscal 1966 to $l.lm in 1970. In addition the board has proposed that the temporary certificates of New York Airways and Los Angeles Airways should be renewed on a permanent basis subject to the termination of subsidy by the end of fiscal 1970. The allocations for these two carriers would start at $1,860,000 for NYA and $1,565,000 for LAA in 1966 and end at $450,000 each in 1970. Chicago Helicopter Airways' subsidy would continue until December 11, 1966, when this carrier's temporary certificate expires. The CAB's move has been described as "courageous," but Aviation Daily points out that the board enjoys mounting support in Congress. After the Presidential decision was announced the president of the Air Transport Association of America described it as "unfortunate and untimely because the carriers are on the verge of significant breakthroughs in equipment and operating techniques."
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