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Aviation History
1966
1966 - 0024.PDF
20 FLIGHT International, 6 January 1966 AIR POWER AND THE SEA By Vice-Admiral Sir Richard Smeeton, KCB, MBE, RN (Retd) THE recent spate of correspondence in Flight causes oneto study the international affairs environment whichmakes it so important that the United Kingdom should re-assess the value of the sea and the relation of airpower to it. On the assumption that the "fire second" capability of the nuclear powers is such that the fear of inevitable retaliation deters both sides from beginning a thermo-nuclear exchange it follows that, although nuclear war remains the greatest threat to our survival, limited wars are more likely. We know that the Soviet Union is building a modern navy and merchant fleet. The importance of the high seas has not escaped the Soviets and they intend to become a maritime power. From the amazing expansion of the Russian aircraft industry at the end of and in the years since World War Two, we must conclude that they have shown a convincing ability to produce modern military aircraft and transports of all categories. Their ability in outer space is well known. The Soviets are showing zeal in laying a foundation for a worldwide market for their own products by almost giving away naval and air equipment to uncommitted countries. This action will no doubt be followed by intimate trade relations and further orders. What is the position of the Western Powers in this environ- ment? The first point is that we have a much greater stake in seaborne trade than the Communists, because they occupy a heartland and most of their intra-bloc trade is on internal lines of communication. The Western Powers are strung out around the periphery of this bloc and their lines of com- munication are, by force of geography, over the seas and the territories of foreign countries. Trade and commerce along these routes is the lifeblood of the Western World and of the United Kingdom in particular. For years we have taken the freedom of the seas for granted, but it will not necessarily remain free unless we show our determination to keep it so. Airspace has in the past been free but there are increasing signs of the denial of the right of overflying. All this means that shortly the Communist economy will be in a position to expand massively into our traditional areas of trade; their more ruthless labour policies will keep prices trimmed to ensure initial success. This economic and political expansion from the heartland across our lines of communica- tion and into our sources of raw materials is a threat to our standard of living and to our ultimate survival. On the assumption that nuclear war is unlikely and that we face serious economic and political difficulties, it might be argued that we need no military power other than a nuclear ability. This is very wrong, because it would be a tragedy if some circumstances arose in which our vital interests were affected and yet the only alternative to losing them by default was to start a nuclear war. Keeping the Lines Clear We need to show a military presence around the world on our vital lines of communication, a presence supported by the ultimate sanction of the deterrent. This is the old doctrine of seapower and trade protection but it is brought up to date by the need to deploy tactical air power around the world as well. We know that the surface of the Earth is 75 per cent water and that 100 per cent of it is covered by air. Because of the relative shortage of land it is difficult to provide a military presence around the world unless we exploit the uni- versality which the ocean and the air provide. Land bases overseas become fewer and fewer as more and more countries become independent; security of tenure in those we continue to occupy is unlikely to bs long, particularly when our policies are or appear to be contrary to those of the sovereign power. A base is only as viable as the local popula- tion chooses to make it. Military bases ashore in under- developed countries irritate the indigenous people and are self- generating targets for propaganda. Mobile sea task forces with tactical aircraft embarked can provide a military presence which is not offensive to un- committed countries, and which can demonstrate the deter- mination of the West to protect its interests by nipping in the bud disputes and situations which might grow into nuclear war. The Services would need to achieve a greater degree of uniformity in their equipment, a more stringent control of variations to specifications, and some thought towards the "exportability" of the equipment they demand. The military aircraft field is where these changes are most required. Aircraft are expensive and thought must be given to manned aircraft which can perform various roles on a basic airframe. Only in this way can we expect to get a big enough production run to make a new British military aircraft economically practical. The manned strategic bomber is going the way of the battle- ship and for the same reason—it has been overtaken by a more efficient and more accurate means of delivery, the ICBM. The decrease in manned bombers both sides of the Iron Cur- tain has led to a lesser emphasis on the purely defensive fighter, which now tends to merge with the ground-attack role. The fighter pilot needs to be less reliant on close ground control because the few very fast targets he may have must be intercepted at great distances, so he needs an autonomous radar system. On this basis we were right to buy the McDonnell Phantom because it could be in service before any British aircraft of similar performance. Something for the Seventies It should not be beyond Britain, perhaps in concert with Europe, to produce by the early seventies a new military air- craft with even greater flexibility than the Phantom and within an all-up weight of 40,0001b. Greatly improved power/weight ratios, variable geometry, and V/STOL techniques should all help to make this possible. Variants of such aircraft might cover the roles of interception, ground attack, and advanced training. The real urgency is for industry to be given a go- ahead on such a project before its skilled manpower is dis- persed either overseas or into consumer industries. From neither of these is it likely to return once it is lost. Once an order for production is given, the design should be frozen as far as safety permits, and work should progress around the clock until it is airborne. In this way only can we hope to break back into a market in which we were once supreme. In the large aircraft field we need to produce a British airframe adaptable to the following roles—commercial air- liner, military transport, freighter, tanker, and long-range maritime patroller; the last with special powerplants for low- altitude cruise. In the short-range tactical transport and anti- submarine roles we should look to the rotary-wing aircraft or hovercraft to provide us with the basic vehicle. Rotary-wing aircraft, VTOL/STOL, and hovercraft arc in their infancy compared to soptrsticated fixed-wing aircraft, but all three of them have unique characteristics which make them natural actors in the relationship between the sea and airpower. In the next few years we have an opportunity to re-establish a British military presence around the oceans and airspaces of the world, but it will not come about unless we appreciate the interdependence of the sea and air forces. Having done that it is no good being "single Service" about a matter of national safety. It is not a question of whether theRAFshouId take over the Fleet Air Arm or vice versa. It is not simply a dark blue/ light blue argument about carriers or land bases. It is how we can best deploy tactical airpower around the world. It is how we get the best defence for the money available. We need a three-Service strategy in which aircraft carriers have a vital place because they are British and because they are not vulnerable, in limited wars, to the political pressures than can incapacitate a land base overseas. Finally, and perhaps most important of all, this three- Service joint strategy must be based on vigorous and healthy aircraft and shipbuilding industries in the United Kingdom
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