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Aviation History
1967
1967 - 0335.PDF
FLIGHT International - March 1967 331 Spaceflight I Command module of the Apollo 204 spacecraft in which NASA astronauts Virgil Grissom, Edward White and Roger Chaffee died on January 27 was removed from its Saturn I servicing tower at Cape Kennedy on February 17 APOLLO ACCIDENT: SECOND REPORT A further report on the progress of the Apollo accident in- vestigation was given on February 14 in a memorandum to Mr James E. Webb, NASA Administrator, from Dr Robert C. Seamans, Deputy Administrator. The full text of the memor- andum is as follows: — "On February 10 I met with the Apollo 204 Review Board at Kennedy Space Centre to discuss their progress in the investi- gation of the Apollo accident. "The Board now has 21 panels established and operating, each with a specific assigned task, each chaired by a Govern- ment employee, and each reporting to a specific Board member. A detailed Review Board activity schedule has been established and is reviewed daily to ensure that milestones are being met or that scheduled adjustments are made as early as necessary. This permits close co-ordination and integration of all the necessary activities, analyses, and studies. "In order to speed up the investigative effort, the Apollo 012 spacecraft is being mapped in detail, using a three- dimensional co-ordinate system to which all physical space- craft elements can be referred. Complete photographic coverage is being maintained, colour film being preferred since it permits more ready identification of components and their condition. Each photograph is cross-referenced to the master grid. "The Board has implemented a data control system that permits a visual display, against a time-line background, of each step of the investigation. As spacecraft systems are examined and as their utilisation in the 204 test is established, these are noted and colour-coded; at a glance, one can deter- mine whether a system might have caused the accident or has proven to be non-contributory, and also whether a particu- lar analysis is still underway or completed. This method of data control focuses on the critical areas requiring the greatest attention. "1 reviewed at some length the work and procedures of the panel that is investigating the origin and propagation of the fire. While their work is far from complete, I am satisfied that the procedures they are following are well worked out When this work is completed, it will give us as clear a view as can be obtained from the evidence. The panel has begun by examining each possible combustible within the spacecraft, its distribution and characteristics, and its proximity to each possible ignition source. Such combustibles include both solids and liquids. At each step of spacecraft assembly, panel members are <% carefully removing both damaged and undamaged materials for microanalysis which.m turn, permits the identification of the material that was burned. This allows a reconstruction of the final location of all combustibles in the spacecraft and will point up irregu- larities in this distribution if any exist. The physical evidence thus far examined points to the following:—• "First, it appears the fire had considerable variation and directionality, since damage in the spacecraft indicates differences of intensity and timing. For example, an aluminium tubing handle has a hole burned through it indicating a temperature at that point of at least 1,400°F, while its nylon hinge within two inches of the melted spot is relatively undamaged, indicating a temperature there of less than 500°F. "Second, there is evidence that the fire may have had more than one phase, but this is difficult to prove since the last phase would obscure the evidence of the earlier. One hypothesis, supported by the cabin pressure history, assumes a small, low-grade fire whose heat was at first largely absorbed by the spacecraft structure and that was burning at the time of the first crew report; that fire may have continued for as long as ten seconds. A more intense fire may have then developed, causing the rapid increase in cabin pressure. This fire was probably then extinguished by the depletion of oxygen. "Other peculiarities require further analysis. These deal with the ruptures in the spacecraft and the role of the fire in burning through into the space between the inner and outer hulls. "At this time, there has been no determination as to the source of the ignition itself. "Additional information relating to the progress of the accident has been identified and is being analysed. A recording from an onboard bio-sensor that appears relatively undamaged is in the process of being read-out at this time. Additional work to interpret all background sounds on a high-fidelity recording obtained over the S-band link is being carried out in the hope of gaining further information on the course of the fire. I also reviewed with the physician who heads the medical analysis panel the condition of the personal effects, suits and equipment of the crew as well as data available on their actions during the course of the accident. It is now clear that all three suits were burned through, though the extent of suit damage varies; the command pilot's received the greatest exposure to flame and the pilot's the least. "Spacecraft disassembly is proceeding with great care; for example, a false floor with plexiglass viewing ports has been installed to permit continued examination without the danger of disturbing physical evidence. Current plans are for the final removal of the spacecraft to the industrial area by the end of this week. Detailed plans for the continued disassembly of
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