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Aviation History
1969
1969 - 0072.PDF
"Substantial savings for the airlines and the fare-paying public" were the result of competition between the Douglas DC-8 [seen below] and the Boeing 707 [above]" COMPETITION . larly on jet bombers and the first jet airliners, that his paper brought home the impact of contemporary competition in aviation. But before getting on to the B-36/B-52 and DC-8/707 contests, he referred to the Convair and Boeing bombers used by the USAAC during the last war. "As the clouds of the Second World War appeared on the horizon," he said, "the Air Corps purchased a prototype B-24 from Convair in direct competition with the B-17 procured from Boeing. . . . Both were procured in large quantities and were in direct competi tion for the same missions. Those aeroplanes had deficiencies, mostly different, and the Air Corps was a'ble to materially improve both models as the result of the competition. . . ." Development of the B-52, under the impetus of the B-36, provided a story on its own. "Let me tell you how competition helped us at Boeing to design the B-52," said Mr Schairer. "It was in the fall of 1941 that I first heard about intercontinental bombers. This was after President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill had met on a ship in the Atlantic to discuss the problems the United States would face in carrying on the war if Britain should fall. The two leaders concluded that the United States should develop the ability to conduct strategic bombing of Germany with aeroplanes based in North America. Immediately Boeing and Convair were asked to design bombers for this mission. In the competition that followed, Convair won with the B-36. "In 1945 the Air Force started a competition for the second round of intercontinental bombers. Boeing won with a large, unswept aeroplane with turbopropeller powerplants. The aero plane could not fly very high or fast, but it could fly a long distance and carry a large bomb load. It was in direct competi tion with the B-36, which was then flying and demonstrating its capabilities. Thus, the B-52 turboprop design proceeded in a climate of direct competition with the B-36. "By 1948 enough comparisons had been made to show that the B-52 was not sufficiently better than the B-36 to warrant quantity procurement. Air Force officers with whom we were working told many of us there was a probability of little or no production because of insufficient performance improvement over an existing design. The B-36 was plagued with engine and propeller problems. The turboprop engine and propeller under consideration for the B-52 seemed to offer little or no relief from these problems. . . . "Meanwhile, the medium borrfber competition had been held and Boeing had learned a great deal about optimising swept- back jet bombers, A plastic, three-dimensional graph made as part of our medium bomber studies showed the available trends of range, speed, and altitude for four-engine jet bombers with fixed thrust and payload. . . . "This set the stage for a weekend at Wright Field when about a dozen of us met in the Van Cleve Hotel and originated the eight-engine B-52 design by doubling the data for the optimum medium bomber as read off this plastic graph and by using the background information developed for it. We were fortunate to have this well-developed background and could not have come up with the design of the B-52 without it. Nor would we have done it without the competitive pressure of the B-36. . . ." The Boeing 707 series likewise sprang out of direct com petition, this time with the DC-8. "Pan American," Mr Schairer explained, "was anxious to buy an aeroplane which could fly across the Atlantic without off-loading and intermediate stops. The airline wanted its passengers to benefit from the increased service reliability and attractive performance that elimination of the en route stop would offer. "Our initial proposal to Pan American was for an aero plane which occasionally would have to stop en route. We were also proposing the commercial version of the J57 engine which was being highly developed in the B-52 and other appli cations. This airline customer asked, 'Why can't you put the J57 engine in the 707?' We carefully explained that the engine was not well-developed and that costs were too high. We afso had many other excuses—all consistent with our thought that a compromise aeroplane was necessary for domestic and overseas operators. "At this time, Douglas was offering the DC-8 and Pan American was actively negotiating with Douglas as well as with us. I will not forget the day Pan American's Frank Gledhill told us that Pan-Am had decided to buy 25 DC-8s. 'The Douglas Company told United Air Lines that the DC-8 would have a cruise Mach number limit of 0.82. United personnel then came to Boeing on one of their almost daily alternate visits between Boeing ond Douglas ond said to Boeing, 'Can't you give us the some 0.82 cruise Mach number offered by Douglas?' " nw«w»»ri SS-1^** "VI if MM
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