FlightGlobal.com
Home
Premium
Archive
Video
Images
Forum
Atlas
Blogs
Jobs
Shop
RSS
Email Newsletters
You are in:
Home
Aviation History
1969
1969 - 0148.PDF
J 32 FLICHT International, 23 January 1969 Triumph—and frustration Roland Beamont and TSR.2 Wg Cdr Beamont at debriefing after TSR.2's maiden flight. September 27. 1964 By STEPHEN HASTINGS, MC. MP ROLAND BEAMONT has divided his book* into three sections: the first is a record of his war experiences; the second deals with his career as the chief test pilot of English Electric and traces the main stream of British aeronautical advance post-war to I960, through the Canberra, the P.l and the Lightning; the third recounts the story of TSR.2. The theme is part memoir, part a resounding record of tech nical success, part a solid affirmation of confidence in the achievements and potential of the British aircraft industry. It also carries a grim warning. "Bee" Beamont's career is already a legend, both as wartime fighter ace and as a supremely gifted test pilot. He writes fluently, and he could easily have filled his book with the story of his battles over the Channel; of the lonely, moonlit strikes into occupied France which he initiated; and of his victories over the FW 190 and the Me 109 in German skies, ending with a forced landing and capture in the Reichswald Forest. This part of the story is notable not only for his physical triumphs in the air but also for the moral courage he so clearly developed and deployed during the war—the firmness with which on one important occasion he dealt with incipient misgivings and complaints from his junior staff about his chosen tactics; and his blunt and uncompromising defence of the merits of the Typhoon before an audience of exalted and almost uniformly hostile officers (a stand which probably saved this fine aircraft for the RAF). He emerges a natural commander. His decisions and opinions, once taken, are unshakeable; and, as the book progresses, one is increasingly impressed with the effect of these qualities at the highest levels of tech nological decision. For there come moments in the building of aeroplanes when for all the minute and exhaustive precision of calculation involved, for all the testing accomplished, the decision to go ahead becomes a matter of sheer human deter mination. Bee Beamont has known many such moments and the consistent success of his judgment bears witness not only to his technical shrewdness but—perhaps more significantly—to his burning faith. It shines through his pages and throws into stark contrast the misjudgment, the mixed motives and the shifty, chicken-hearted incompetence of those in official life, in journalism and politics, even in the senior ranks of the RAF, which have hampered, frustrated and reduced our potential during the period of unprecedented and predictable growth in, and dependence upon, aviation. Thus far the work is both readable and exciting, although at times its author ascends into technical terms which it is hard for the layman to grasp, as though he were writing for principally the initiated. If this be his intention he is wrong, for the book merits the widest possible public. But probably the most significant aspect of his general theme is the final section in which he deals with the admin istration of post-war aviation policy and finally with the drama of TSR.2. It is a formidable indictment. Looking back at a critical span of years during which he has probably been as well placed as any to assess these matters, Beamont identifies three main sources of disruption: first the decision by the Chief Scientific Adviser to the Government, Sir Ben Lockspeiser, to recommend against the practicability of supersonic flight—a setback which granted several years of serene and unchallenged advantage to the United States air craft industry. Secondly the 1957 White Paper, that astounding *Phasnix into Ashes, by Roland Beamont, DSO, OBE, DFC. Illustrated, price 42s; William Kimber, 6 Queen Anne's Gate, London SW1. flight of Wellsian imagery which condemned the manned air craft to complete obsolescence only 50 years after man first ventured into the air; which again destroyed the rhythm and logic of research and development and which was eventually contradicted by a Government tender for the most sophisti cated manned aircraft project yet envisaged, the TSR.2. Finally. Beamont cites the round of wholesale destruction almost glee fully prosecuted by the present Socialist Government. Down went the Hawker Siddeley 681, the Hawker P. 1154 and finally, in circumstances of what can fairly be described as unparalleled duplicity, the TSR2. The force of this tragedy, as recounted by Beamont, caused no surprise to me as a layman who did his best to chronicle the history of TSR.2; and his matter-of-fact style enhances the degradation. Historians should (and, I believe, will) record this murky affair as the aberration of the decade. It is super fluous to rehearse Beamont's arguments. They are concise and incontrovertible. If ever a great nation was wounded from within by little men for dubious motives then Britain was through this welter of intrigue, misjudgment and mischief. The author believes that our system of aircraft procurement lies near die heart of the trouble, and that the trouble will continue until "a procurement system is established capable of giving sound advice to the Government ... of producing firmer specifications and reliable contracts, and, above all, one capable of convincing our elected representatives in Parliament of the necessity for air power." Many will agree with him; but let no one delude himself that since the sad events which the book describes we have found the answer. We have not, and the partnership between Government and industry which Beamont advocates remains to be established. The forthcoming report of the Select Committee on Science and Technology on defence R&D may serve to show whether the lesson has yet been absorbed. For too long the aircraft industry has allowed itself to be pilloried by inexperienced and sometimes malicious critics (some in high places) without riposte, on the grounds that to reply would upset the chief customer—the Government. I have always felt this attitude to be mistaken, and Beamont's book will do much to right the balance. One scarcely needs to look further than the eulogistic reports of American test pilots on the aircraft he flew. Towards the end he points out the long time lag before these aircraft reached major export ' sales. The Canberra, still earning £8 million abroad in 1967, dates in concept from 1945; and the Lightning won the biggest single British export contract of all time 17 years after inception. He is right to describe with irony the speech of a Minister of Technology who takes public credit for these massive overseas sales while ignoring the almost total absence of advanced design on our drawing boards today. It would be wrong to conclude this commentary without alluding to Mrs Beamont's role. One senses the quiet fortitude with which, despite illness, she has borne the constant uncer tainty and risks of her husband's splendid flying career and sustained him in the duty he so single-mindedly pursued. This is the season of honours. Baronies and knighthoods have showered in profusion—and doubtless worthily—upon successful businessmen and exporters. We may justly reflect that Roland Beamont, who for so long and so selflessly risked life and limb to perfect exports worth so many millions, has more than merited his CBE. I recommend this book unhesitatingly, not only to those directly involved in aviation, but to all interested in the future of this country.
Sign up to
Flight Digital Magazine
Flight Print Magazine
Airline Business Magazine
E-newsletters
RSS
Events
