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Aviation History
1969
1969 - 2947.PDF
FLIGHT International, 9 October 1969 565 Concorde costs probed Further extracts from the examination by the Committee of Public Accounts Below we continue extracts (see pages 524-525 of "Flight" last week) from the evidence given by two senior Ministry of Technology officials, Sir Ronald Melville, Secretary (Aviation) and Mr J. A. Hamilton, Director-General, Concorde Programme, into the increases in the cost of the programme. They were being questioned on the rise from £450 million in 1966 (plus £50 million contingencies) to £730 million. THE CHAIRMAN, Mr Boyd-Carpenter, questioning Sir Ronald Melville: If half a dozen of us in the world of aircraft operating commercially get together with a view to putting a new aircraft into the air, and we design and we foot the bill, that is one way of approach. But in this case the half a dozen are getting together and someone else is likely to meet the ultimate bill. Do you not see that this helpful part on the one side can be dangerous on the other side too? Sir Ronald Melville: I think if they operated in the kind of way you imply they might, it clearly could be. But what I think we cannot possibly do is to place ourselves in a position that we are spending these enormous sums of money in building an aircraft which we know the airlines will not accept. This would be an intolerable situation. . . . The important thing at the moment is the renewal of the options. You remember that there are 74 aircraft taken out on option by 16 airlines, and these options were all due to expire last December. These options have, with one or two minor exceptions, now all been renewed. But the firms are not yet in the position of negotiating contracts to purchase, and until more is known about the technical performance of the aircraft it would be quite unreasonable to expect any body to sign up on a definite contract. . . . Mr Hamilton: What has happened is in fact a con tinuing improvement in the standard of equipment in subsonic aircraft, and the airlines tend to take the attitude, "If we are going to operate this aeroplane, we must be able to operate it in conditions which are similar to those for subsonic aircraft." Within the years since the first negotiations and discussions were held with the airlines there has been a great improvement in the "standard of auxiliary power units in subsonic aircraft. The debate that goes on between us and the airlines is centred on the fact that the weight penalty for Concorde is very much more severe than it is for a sub sonic aircraft. In the case of the auxiliary power unit, we have not yet fully accepted the requiremens of the airlines and this debate tends to' take some time. I should make it clear that we do not lose all these battles, not everything the airlines ask for is agreed to without question. Q. Can you not say at some stage, "Here we rest on these things which we cannot compromise on?" We are in effect almost at that stage now. Q. Is there any doubt in anyone's mind that the major modi fications now being carried out will not meet the payload performance target? Is everyone quite happy that the payload/ range performance will be met by these major modifications? Mr Hamilton: There is still a considerable uncertainty about the exact payload that one will carry on the Paris to New York stage. This simply arises because even with the most accurate results we can get from ground facilities in relation to a supersonic aeroplane, there will be a doubt until we can get full-scale flight-test measurements. All we can say is that the most probable estimates that we can make at the moment give a payload of 20,0001b from Paris to New York. Q. So we will not really know the answer to the 64-dollar question until we have the production prototype aircraft actually flying? 1 think one can put it this way. When we have had performance results from the prototype aircraft we shall be between 80 and 90 per cent sure of the answer, with the remain ing 10 per cent to come from the pre-production aircraft. Q. We are therefore reaching the stage when there must be a doubt in a lot of people's minds as to whether in fact the aircraft is a commercial proposition. Is it not rather worry ing that since these two aircraft have flown you have not now received a lot more not provisional orders but options to purchase? Is it not that they are beginning to wonder whether in fact this aircraft can be so modified to meet the requirements that the airlines really want? Sir Ronald Melville: No, Sir, I do not think it is surprising at all. The airlines of course know very well all that I have told this Committee and a great deal more because they are closely in touch with the firms. We never expected that any more options would be taken out by anybody until the aircraft has proved itself technically; it has not yet proved itself technically, and until it has done I do not think we would expect any more options to be taken out. Q. You mentioned your uncertainty and doubt about getting the payload right. You mentioned also that the percentage pay- load on which you were operating was 6 per cent, and I think you quoted the figure of 20,0001b? Mr Hamilton: Yes. Q. Reduced from 25,0001b? No. Q. It went from 20,000 to 25,000 and then down to 20,000? May I explain this? The payload at entry into service, that is when the aeroplane first goes into service, is 20,0001b and the aim is to increase that to 25,0001b about two years after the aircraft is first in service. Negotiable assumptions Q. So the uncertainty and doubt is about the 20,0001b. What figure would you estimate the uncertainty will reach? Is this figure of 20,000 not negotiable at all? That is your absolute minimum? 1 do not think that the figure of 20,0001b is negotiable to any great extent. What are negotiable are the assumptions that the airlines will use in assessing the regularity of the aeroplane, that is to say, the number of occasions on which an aeroplane would not be able to fly across the Atlantic because the temperature is too high or the headwinds are too high. Sir Ronald Melville: With a full payload. Mr Hamilton: With a full payload. Perhaps I could put that a little more clearly. The total fuel weight in Concorde is about 90 tons. Of that, something like 17 or 18 tons is what is classed as a reserve; this is partly for the safety and partly in order to ensure regularity, to ensure that when the headwinds are a bit higher than have been specified the aeroplane can still fly with the full load. At the present time the regularity of Concorde is slightly above that of subsonic aircraft. It is about 98 per cent Sir Ronald Melville: The specified regularity. Mr Hamilton: That means that on 2 per cent of occasions during the year it would have to make an intermediate stop, either at Shannon or Gander; discussions are going on all the time to see if this amount of fuel can be reduced. But if the 20,0001b payload is reduced, then the revenue of the aeroplane goes down in proportion. Q. So you need 90 tons of fuel to carry less than 10 tons of payload across? Yes. Q. What was the delivery date originally promised? The delivery date at the time of the last estimate, in 1966, was 1971. Q. And now when is it? 1973. Q. It does look as though, if one got this 15 per cent redesign, plus the pay and price increases of the sort that are mentioned here, then one could be reaching something like £1,000 million by the time of completion. I would not be out of the way on these figures? Sir Ronald Melville: Well, I have not done that calculation. Q. We have had £90 million additions due to pay and prices since January, 1966, in three years, so it is not too difficult to
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