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Aviation History
1973
1973 - 0077.PDF
FLIGHT International, 11 januarv 1973 49 ... YEAR I960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972* 1970 1971 1972* Kilometres Flown 3 110 3 120 3 240 3 430 3 700 4 100 4 480 5 280 6 000 6 710 7 010 7 070 7 150 n. a. n. a. n. a. Hours Flown 8.6 8. 0 7. 8 7.9 8. 2 8. 7 9.3 10. 2 11. 0 11. 8 12. 1 12.2 12. 3 n. a. n. a. n. a. Passengers Carried 106 111 121 135 155 177 200 233 261 293 311 329 360 383 407 448 Passenger- Kilometres Millions 109 000 117 000 130 000 147 000 171 000 198 000 229 000 273 000 310 000 351 000 382 000 406 000 460 000 461 000 495 000 561 000 Tonne-Kilometres Freight Mail Excludes USSR 2 040 2 360 2 770 3 110 3 760 4 800 5 700 6 530 7 920 9 760 10 460 11 480 13 700 610 720 810 860 910 1 100 1 530 1 890 2 350 2 510 2 750 2 560 2 380 Includes USSR 11 940 13 110 15 530 3 140 2 890 2 730 Performed Total (Passengers + baggage, Freight, Mail) 12 340 13 470 15 100 16 960 19 780 23 450 27 510 32 620 37 770 43 350 47 780 50 520 57 500 56 690 60 430 68 800 Average number of Passengers per aircraft 35 38 40 43 46 48 51 52 52 52 55 57 64 n. a. n. a. n, a. Kilometres flown per passenger 1 030 1 055 1 075 1 085 1 105 1 125 1 145 1 170 1 185 1 195 1 230 1 235 1 280 1 200 1 215 1 250 Kilometres flown per hour 360 390 420 435 450 470 485 520 545 570 580 580 580 n. a. n. a. n. a. ANNUAL INCREASE OR DECREASE (-) 1960-61 1961-62 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70 1970-71 1971-72* 1970-71 1971-72* 0% 4% 6% 8% 11% 97. 18% 14% 12% 4% 1% ' 1% n. a. n. a. -7% -3% 1% 4% 6% 7% 10% 8% 7% 3% 1% 1% n. a. n. a. 5% " 9% 12% 15% 14% 13% 17% 12% 12% 6% 6% 9% 6% 10% 7% 11% 13% 16% 16% 16% 19% 14% 13% 9% 6% 13% 7% 13% ' Excludes USSR 16% 17% 12% 21% 28% 19% 15% 21% 2 3% 7% 10% 19% 18% 13% 6% 6% 21% 39% 24% 24% 7% 10% -7% -7% Includes USSR 10% 18% -8% -6% 9% 12% 12% 17% 19% 17% 19% 16% 15% 10% 6% 14% 7% 14% 9% 5% 8% 7% 4% 6% 2% 0% 0% 4% 4% 12% n. a. n. a. 2% 2% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 3% 0% 4% 1% 3% 8% 8% 4% 3% 4% 3% 7% 5% 5% 2% 0% 0% n. a. Checks—help or hindrance Pilot's point of view WE ARE BECOMING quite successful at the process of breast baring; let me hasten to direct your thoughts to the field of incident reporting and investigation. Recent years have seen an improvement in general acceptance of the principle that disclosure of operational errors can pre vent accidents, and that admitting mistakes at any point in the manufacture, maintenance, regulation and opera tion of an aircraft is a healthy process to be encouraged. Such a statement of intent often brings verbal agree ment, but can actually lead to a minimum of actual progress. Our stripping process has barely begun, and would scarcely raise the eyebrows of the insurance equivalent of Lord Longford. It would be too bad if the true and honest reporting of aircraft incidents and acci dents became defined as indecent in the sense that any restrictions, commercial or legal, were placed on the free interchange of information. Unfortunately, censorship is severe, and dissemination is slow and imperfect, despite the apparent willing noises to the contrary. Let me concentrate on the flight deck and a few of the known problem areas, so as to reveal the depth of a situation that many suspect, but of which few seem to have accurate information. Crew drills are most often com pleted with the use of a written check list, for normal and emergency operations. There are also usually some areas requiring memorisation of drills that need to be completed without delay. One would imagine that attempts would be made to create a climate of efficient self-criticism on the flight deck, and that this would be most effective when set up by an airline management basically sympathetic to the many pressure situations that pilots have to face. Pressure is not created by the pilot, of this be quite certain, unless he is at fault. I am not saying that the pilots on the flight deck of a modern complex aircraft are never at- fault, and I suppose that they make about the same total number of errors of judgment as do other groups of workers involved in an activity where personal action can affect survival. Crew training and co-operation are often tied down to a very detailed and rigid formula, set out in flight manuals, and carefully practised in line operation, under supervision. Some airlines, however, deal with this type of activity in a haphazard way, being content to print much paper, without any route training, and to allow the newcomer to find his feet by contact with what, hopefully, is already an efficient, operation. Between the two extremes of policy there have evolved endless shades of crew dpi, monitoring, training, qualifica tion and activity. The outside of an aircraft is no guide to what happens on the flight deck. The radical differences in operating procedures for similar or identical types have to be seen to be believed. It seems to me that the greater the complexity of involved duty transference and splinter ing of vital monitoring, the harder the task is made. Yet some operators are wedded to procedures which are found
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