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Aviation History
1973
1973 - 0078.PDF
50 AIR TRANSPORT FLIGHT international. 11 January 1973 f.27s of Lade, the transport wing of the Argentine Air Force are now operating regular services to the Falkland Islands (see news item below) to be impracticable by their crews, and which are aban doned in times of stress. For an example let me take the appalling variation in one airline of the crucial altimeter check before final approach is started. This is scheduled with the final landing checklist, at a time when the aircraft is about to enter the most critical flight phase, and when crew monitoring duties should be most carefully observed. You may be forgiven for thinking that this appears to be the ideal time for such a cross check, just before com mitment to the landing. Why are so many pilots not com pleting this survival item? Because, I suggest, it is called up for attention at a time when their attention is rightly caught by the phase of flight and the need to monitor many other situation displays. An efficient altimeter check requires that the subscale setting on the instruments (usually three) be adjusted and that the actual readings be cross-checked. When information from the radio altimeter is available, a further and more confusing cross check may also be involved. Some airlines still persist in using QFE for landing, which involves a further resettling of the sub- scales at low altitude. The average time from glideslope interception to touch down is about 3min, and it can be less than 2min. During this phase we have the need for one pilot to fly the aircraft manually or to operate the autopilot to achieve the correct flight profile. This is a full-time task for one man. Another man should carry out all selections to bring about con figuration changes, and he should assume the vital task of monitoring IAS, configuration, power, systems, height and geographical placement. He must call whenever safety appears to be threatened by any divergence from good operating practice, and if any discrepancies occur in the information display. He must also be ready to take action to recover from an unsafe condition if the handling pilot does not respond before such action is too late. The latter decision is one that faces every co-pilot and often causes much confusion amongst young and inexperienced pilots, who may have to set their judgment against that of a pilot with 20 times their experience. Much more training and guidance in this field would improve basic safety. In essence, all the items that call for the strictest and most meticulous flight-deck discipline, such as that alti meter check, must be completed before the aircraft gets too low, say less than 1,000ft above ground level. Due to the high workload and the general monitoring requirement, it is my contention that this particular check is often poorly organised and inaccurately observed, and it is my opinion that all changes to altimeter settings should be finalised before glideslope interception—any cross check being com pleted at the time of resetting. This would mean divorcing the altimeter check from the final landing check, as the latter is completed in many airlines only after the under carriage has been selected down on glideslope interception. I have gone on at length on this one problem to illustrate how the allocation of flight-deck duty by procedural devices can produce overload. On the same subject, one wonders just how many pilots have ever reported the occasions when they have not done a proper altimeter check in all its essential detail, and where, after landing, an error has revealed itself? Our own self-critical faculties may need stimulating on the basis that unless crews let airlines and regulatory authorities have some more information we may be stuck for another 20 years with today's stupidity. The study of flight-deck "spot" workload in various typical situations is long overdue, but it should be under taken by those who are airline pilots themselves. Let us have the facility and the finance to set this house in order. MAINLINER FALKLAND AIR SERVICE A REGULAR weekly service is now flown between Comodoro Rivadavia in Patagonia and Port Stanley in the Falkland Islands by F.27s of Lade, the transport wing of the Argentine Air Force, which already has a semi- commercial network in the less developed areas of Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego. The airfield near Port Stanley was built in only six months, and completed last November, by an Argentinian military construction team working in some of the worst weather the islands have experienced in the past 20 years. The 2,300ft, 700m, run way, which is now being extended to about 2,600ft, 800m, is made of interlocking aluminium strips and provides an exceptionally smooth surface. Because of the restricted length of the Port Stanley runway the F.27s operate under a considerable weight penalty, carrying a maximum load of 22 passengers, plus a limited volume of mail and freight. Even so, this represents a tremendous improvement on previous trans port to the Falklands, which depended on an irregular shipping service from Montevideo, latterly supplemented by a fortnightly visit by a Lade Grumman Albatross flying boat. The present temporary airstrip will be used only for some four years, after which the Argentine Air Force will roll it up for use elsewhere. At that stage the permanent airfield, which is to be built with British Government aid and which will have a runway some 7,200ft, 2,200m long, should be ready for use. The Pan American Concorde option is due to expire on January 31, although the chances of it not being renewed or renegotiated appear to be remote. The Boeing 727 production line is being re-established in the Renton hangar from which it was moved nearly two years ago to share a common line with the 707 and 737. Boeing took 117 orders for the 727 last year.
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