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Aviation History
1973
1973 - 0149.PDF
FLIGHT International, 18 January 1973 AIR SAFETY Although it is too early to draw conclusions from the TriStar crash it does nevertheless give cause to hope that the structure of the wide-body jets absorbs an impact better and more progressively than did that of earlier aircraft. Having said that it has to be admitted that the degree of structural disintegration which took place in this accident is such that little further consideration needs to be given to passenger escape facilities. The same cannot be said of conventional jet designs about which several independent bodies- notably the Air Safety Group in London, have growing misgivings. There is a feeling that the prepared evacuation exercise to satisfy the require ments of airworthiness authorities is scarcely representa tive of the circumstances surrounding an actual emergency aircraft evacuation. In attempting to draw a logical line between the approach and landing phases of the flight I have regarded passage of the outer marker on an instrument approach as the demarkation point. Thus in general impact with high ground has occurred in the approach phase and crashes short of the runway in the landing phase. The two phases tend to lead to consideration of different possible causes; for instance investigation of a high-ground impact is likely to centre on air traffic instructions and their possible misinterpretation and sector minimum safe altitudes, while accidents which occur short of the runway lead to consideration of such matters as "ghost" glidepath propagation and the adequacy of visual references in judging the final approach. In both the accidents which 1 have categorised as taking place during an overshoot there was an element ol increased cockpit workload because of the circumstances of the overshoot. The Viscount near Clermont-Ferrand had made an approach under very adverse weather conditions and the captain had made his decision to divert; the accident occurred shortly after the diversion had been started. In the case of the TriStar the overshoot was 93 initiated because the crew had not received a positive "nosewheel locked down" indication. It seems that fault analysis may have been taking place while the overshoot procedure was being flown, possibly distracting the crew. Three collisions involving passenger fatalities occurred during the year, of which two appear to have been in visual conditions when one or both aircraft involved were relying on "see-and-be-seen" for avoidance. The third accident involved an aircraft taking off in poor visibility striking another aircraft on the ground. Each of the accidents under consideration raises a different aspect of air safety and there are few common underlying causes which can be attributed with certainty. Perhaps it is no longer even valid to look for a single prime cause of an aircraft accident for the BEA Trident inquiry has demonstrated clearly the number of contribu tory components which combine on just one occasion to cause a disaster. In some cases comparatively small warning signs make themselves known but it is ail-too easy to dismiss them as being insignificant in themselves. The present study of fatigue and flight time limitations is among the first in the United Kingdom to treat the subject in depth. It seems to be becoming widely acknowledged that crew fatigue has been a factor in past accidents and yet it is too easy to treat the subject as one having a greater industrial than safety emphasis. Incidents and defects seem on occasion not to be seen in their true light either. Regardless of the means by which reports are made it appears to me that airworthiness authorities simply do not have the resources to progress, analyse and learn from defect and incident reports. In an atmosphere which becomes increasingly polluted by product liability claims for damages, manufacturers may genuinely be reluctant to introduce modifications or to change recommended procedures for fear that this is taken as an admission of some previous error or shortcoming. Government safety and airworthiness authorities have an obligation to make forceful recommendations which they cannot fulfil unless they have all the necessary facts and the ability to study them in depth. One reason which is commonly heard for not reporting SCHEDULED PASSENGER FLIGHTS (AIRCRAFT BELOW I2.500LB, 5.680KG) Date Jan Feb May Dec 20 12 20 22 27 24 Connair Millardair Sun VaMey Air Hawaii General Air Air Guadeloupe TRAINING FLIGHTS Feb May Sept Dec 10 30 26 30 5 Bangladesh Delta Garuda Spantax Egyptair Aircraft Queen Air (VH-CMI) Twin Otter Queen Air Beech 18 Twin Otter (D-IDHC) Twin Otter DC-3 DC-9 (N3305L) F.27 (PK-GFT) DC-3 (EC-AQE) B.707 (SU-AOW) AIR TAXI AND EXECUTIVE AIRCRAFT Jan Feb May June Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 6 18 18 12 19 2 24 29 28 22 6 10 7 17 IS Air London Tandy Corp. Olympic Carolina Aircraft Ross Pan Nusantara llford Riverton Inter City Flug Vodavia United Air Service Linea Aerea Taxpa Firma Aerosimport Air Pyranees Metro Air System Zantopp Aztec Learjet (N658TC) Learjet (SX-ASO) L.I8 (N2IIL) Queen Air Navajo Beech 18 HFB320 (D-CASY) Learjet (HB-VAM) Volpar (ZS-PRA) NAR 680 (CC-CEO) Navaio (SE-FHL) Porter (F-B III) Beech Learjet LOSSES DUE TO HOSTILE ACTION Jan June Oct 26 15 2 Jugoslav Air Trans Cathay Pacific Cambodia FREIGHT AIRCRAFT April June July Sept 6 14 20 13 20 8 Avensa Viking International Satco Aero Flecha Austral Aerotranportes Entre Rios Servicios Aereos Virgen DC-9 (YU-AHT) CV-880 (VR-HFZ) DC-3 (XW-TDA) C46 (YV-C-EVF) Skyvan (N725R) C46 (OB-R-653) CW-20 (CC-CDU) CL44 (LV-JYR) CW-20 (CP-959) Location Alice Springs Gore Bay Idaho Hawaii Heligoland St. Martin Dacca Fort Worth Kemajoran Madrid Beni Sueif Stansted Victoria, Texas Antibes Florida Albuquerque Java Winnipeg Blackpool Innsbruck Johannesburg Chile Ronneby Angouleme Kentucky Detroit Hermsdorf Pleiku Kampot San Fernando, Venezuela La Crosse, Wisconsin Peru Santiago Chile Bolivia Fatalities Crew 1 1 1 1 2 1 5 4 3 1 6 2 2 2 1 1 | 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 4 10 2 2 | 4 3 5 I Pass 6 3 4 7 6 II — — — — 1 7 » — 7 8 1 8 5 — 1 6 7 3 10 — 23 71 7 — — 2 — — Total Occu Crew 5 4 3 ' 6 6 2 2 2 | 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 5 10 2 2 1 4 3 5 ? pants Pass 6 5 > 7 10 II — — — — 1 7 — 7 8 1 8 6 — i 6 • 7 3 10 — 23 71 7 — — 2 — — 7 Notes Phase T/O ? ER ER T/O App L App T/O T/O ER App L App ER/E T/O L T/O . T/O App ER App T/O > T/O ER ER .',: App/E, J- T/O % L ER ER ER t Circumstances Structural failure after engine fire Cause and phase not announced Structural failure after engine fire Crashed in sea in thunderstorms Crashed in sea Suspect electrical failure Weather below minima Crashed in sea. Positioning freight Engine failure Overran runway on take-off abort Hit mountains. Positioning flight Cause and phase not announced Details not yet available Crashed into fuel store. One killed on Bomb Bomb .Hit by mortar shell on approach Scheduled Scheduled Hit mountain Hit mountain Aircraft not located Details not available. 3 Pass injured ground
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