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Aviation History
1973
1973 - 0897.PDF
FLIGHT International, 5 April 1973 BCAL LONDON-MANCHESTER PRESTWICK-NEW YORK TIMETABLE 536-537 LONDON-LOS ANGELES Daily From June 2 Mon Wed Thurs Sat From June 1 Tues Fri Sun Mon Thurs Fri Sat Sun 1315 1100 1100 1145 arr 1230 dep 1605* 1500 1210 arr 1255 dep 1510 London (LGW) Manchester Prestwick (PIK) New York (JFK) 0750 0800f t 0715 dept 0630 arrf 0810 1115 2000* 0705 dep 0620 arr 1900f 1900f London (LGW) 1500 1445* Los Angeles (LAX) • 2030* Mon Thurs Fri Sat Sun Daily From June 2 Mon Wed Thurs Sat From June 1 Tues Fri Sun * Until April 29—one hour earlier, t From September 3—one hour later. Europe and North America, we have been one of the largest North Atlantic charter operators, therefore we know the market, with particular reference to the tourist element, and, although business traffic will undoubtedly continue to expand on the North Atlantic, the main growth is going to come from tourism. T' "Secondly, we have London as our European gateway from the United States and London is still by far the prime destination for passengers from North America to Europe. The third point which Mr Thomson emphasises is that BCAL is a private-enterprise airline "and our people are well aware that our success or failure in the market is something in which we have a very definite mutual in terest." Once BCAL gets passengers on scheduled or charter services "we keep them as BCAL customers." Mr Thomson believes that being a British flag carrier with a Scottish flavour and background will be of some assistance in North America from an ethnic point of view. "There are, after all, about 20 million people of Scottish descent in the United States." In 1962 about 2-65 million passengers were carried on charter and scheduled services on the North Atlantic. Ten years later that figure had grown to 13 million—an average annual growth rate of 17 per cent. Total North Atlantic passenger revenue generated in 1972 by lata carriers is estimated by Mr Thomson to be over $1,500 million. Why, with this remarkable growth rate and substantial revenue, have things gone so wrong on the North Atlantic? The BCAL chairman believes that the scheduled carriers put too much capacity into the market with the introduc tion of the 747, and certain airlines and travel organisers ignored regulations on the charter side and allowed easy entry into the market place for airlines prepared to quote uneconomic operating rates. The over-capacity problem on the scheduled side can be gradually, put right in time as the demand catches up with the.capacity, says Mr Thom son. But "if lata had given sufficient recognition to the developing low-fare market, for example with the introduc tion of Apex fares [advance-booking individual ticketing on scheduled services] the capacity demand situation would have been improved earlier. However, I believe that the charter problems are the most serious at this time." British Caledonian—in a unique position among major airlines in that its scheduled and charter traffic are of comparable volume—believes in the total airline market, be it charter or scheduled; its business is to transport people between places and there are no inhibitions about whether they should travel on charter aicraft or by scheduled ser vices. Says Mr Thomson: "Our one condition is related to profitability, and profitability is, in my opinion, non-existent on the charter side of the North Atlantic at the moment. Rates have deteriorated dramatically over the last few years. It is no exaggeration to say that quotations for charter flights in 1973 are in some cases 20 per cent less One of the BCAL North Atlantic advertising posters than they were five years ago; costs have not exactly stood still during that five-year period." BCAL supports the basic concept of travel-group charters and advance-booking charters (TGCs and ABCs) but feels three things are seriously missing from the conditions. 1) The airline wants a tariff floor on the operation of these flights; this view is supported by other European carriers, by the US supplemental carriers in their sub missions to the US Civil Aeronautics Board, and, Mr Thomson believes, by some of the American scheduled carriers. 2) BCAL believes there should be some form of capacity control on the operation of these charter flights—not to seriously restrict the development of the market, but as part of a total market strategy. 3) BCAL still wants some form of advance-booking group and/or individual fare on scheduled-service aircraft (part charters), which view was supported by the British Civil Aviation Authority but recently rejected by the US Civil Aeronautics Board. Mr Thomson says the core of the present problem lies in the fact that about 30 per cent of the market is un regulated in respect of tariffs and capacity, while the other 70 per cent is fully regulated. "The two sides of the market are too closely connected for this to be an unimportant factor." If it is accepted that the lowest fares —the charter rates—are uneconomic, "then the effect of this is bound to be felt right across the market onto the scheduled side. Bear in mind that only 30 per cent of scheduled-service North Atlantic carriage is now on a full-fare economy of first-class basis—all the rest are carried on some form of promotional fare. "I certainly do not see charterers volunteering to pay higher rates for 1974 to bring their part of the industry back into viability, and I do not believe that any rate war We're touching down at 3 fi•omAprins, -and no fooling! V
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