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Aviation History
1974
1974 - 0514.PDF
FLIGHT International, 28 March 1974 396 MRCA Some difficulties arose with the tripartite government- supervision procedures, where there was a desire to see each contract far more closely defined than might have been necessary on a national programme. Government officials have been involved with the minutiae of contracts to an unprecedented extent in an effort to ensure fair work-sharing. Experience with MRCA may show the in- advisability of such detailed supervision in the contract- definition stage of future projects. Under the Panavia ITP procedure, suppliers receive regular progress payments, together with milestone awards, and extra payments can be negotiated if there are additional commitments. Panavia emphasises that it has never adopted a hard attitude towards suppliers, but has always been prepared to discuss the renegotiation of contracts for justifiable reasons such as an increase in raw- material costs, or the appearance of unforeseen technical or commercial difficulties. The long delay in the hardening of ITPs into actual contracts has been due to the difficulty of establishing equitable industrial arrangements which not only satisfy the spirit of the programme, but also allow individual governments to secure work in areas in which they particularly wish to establish competence. Contracts which do not need government approval are about 85 per cent completed, and those which do need government assent, 50 per cent. Panavia feels that it is now reaping the rewards of its deliberately thorough pro cedures in the preparation of ITPs several years ago. The main difficulties have rarely been technical, and have usually arisen from legal considerations (for example, the differences in warranty law between the countries) and procedural differences. MRCA equipment is categorised under four headings: GFE, or government-furnished equipment, comprising the RB.199 engine and the Mauser gun; areas of new develop ment in which individual governments wish to become involved as a matter of policy; programmes in which Panavia is required to keep the governments informed of its intentions concerning particular equipment, and to justify the measures it proposes, although formal govern ment assent is not required; and, lastly, items for which contracts can be issued without notifying the governments. This system is slow and fairly cumbersome, but is prob ably the only acceptable alternative to direct allocation of work. It has proved quite difficult to operate, especially where national interests clash. Firms were frequently reluctant to commit themselves to a choice of partners FOR THE NEXT FOUR YEARS OR so the main job of Panavia and its opposite number, Namma, will be to steer MRCA through the most comprehensive flight-test programme yet undertaken for any European military aircraft. In a development effort centred initially on Warton, Manching and Caselle, and later embracing the acceptance establishments of the three countries, nine prototype and six pre-production MRCAs will take part in a closely integrated test schedule. Only in the later stages will this diverge to investigate the special requirements and equipment, particularly weapons, of Britain, West Germany and Italy. Four of the prototypes will be based in Britain, three in Germany and two in Italy. The task of the Manching-based first prototype, P.01, will be to assess handling and stability and to explore the initial flight envelope, a job which will be taken up and extended by the second and third prototypes, P.02 and P.03, due to fly from Warton around July and Septem ber. In addition to aerodynamic and structural testing, the first three aeroplanes will clear the "housekeeping" systems—hydraulics, electrics and air-conditioning, for example—and some investigation of the fly-by-wire CSAS (command stability-augmentation system) and autopilot will also be carried out. P.03 will also be the first dual- because they naturally did not wish to be deprived of work simply because their partners had failed to secure contracts. So industrial agreements tended, initially at any rate, to be little more than loose associations in principle. In Panavia's opinion the most satisfactory negotiations were those which took place between companies which had formed deep associations with partners for the purpose of making firm bids. Firms bidding for contracts, and their prospective partners, were initially investigated and graded in a very formal system of RFPs which covered commercial and technical aspects separately. In most cases the Panavia recommendations were accepted by the three governments. The need for collaboration between companies was set out in some detail in the RFPs. Sometimes Panavia was obliged to stipulate that certain partner combinations should not be proposed, since this would vitiate plans already made for one or both of the companies to take on other work. The wishes of individual governments were also made known in these RFPs. Panavia's philosophy was to concern itself, so far as possible, with the selection of single contractors and leave the complexities of work- sharing to them. The airframe company felt that it was in business to build aeroplanes and not to organise industrial agreements. Without doubt the most contentious decision in the equipment-selection stage was the award of the attack- radar contract ;o Texas Instruments. The reason given for the choice of an American supplier was that the cost of developing a European radar would have been much greater than buying what was virtually an "off-the-shelf" system. The costs of the American and European sub missions have not he published, but the disparity would in any case have diminished in importance by the nature of the financing involved. Outright purchase from an off shore source is a one-way flow of money, but 80 per cent of the expenditure on a European system would have found its way back into the three exchequers. Industry and government officials have argued to Flight that the relatively high cost of the radar (which would undoubtedly have gone to a British-led consortium) would have deprived the United Kingdom industry of participation in many other areas of the project. A few people have even sug gested that the technical risk was too great to justify the choice of European equipment. However, 'the feeling in Namma, Panavia and the ancillary industry is that, while the contractor-selection procedures could have been improved, the method is basically the right one, and represents an advance over all previous management methods. control prototype, conversion training being an important aspect of initial service operations, beginning in about four years' time. Simulation has been extensively used to demonstrate the handling characteristics, particularly for the first flight. The performance of the RB.199 engine, tailor-made for MBCA and with less than 40hr operation in the Vulcan flying test-bed, also calls for early investigation, and one of the prototypes has been earmarked as an engine- development vehicle, in addition to its other tasks. With the first flight of P.04, the fourth prototype and second German MRCA, the test programme begins to be concerned with measuring the performance of the aircraft as a weapons system; this aeroplane will be the first to carry a comprehensive avionics installation. The first Italian aeroplane to fly will be P.05. Apart from the first few flights of P.01, in which a BAG pilot will be teamed with an MBB observer, the early flying will be done with one-man crews. German pilots will take over P.01 after half a dozen flights or so. Later trials will concentrate on three aspects of weapon delivery: the performance of the navigation system, both normal and in reversionary mode; the accuracy of the weapon-delivery system; and the behaviour of the aircraft The flight-test programme
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