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Aviation History
1974
1974 - 1669.PDF
FLIGHT International. 24 October 1974 525 AIR TRANSPORT HS.146—what went wrong? A "Flight" analysis by BILL SWEETMAN ON JULY 17 Hawker Siddeley Aviation indicated to the British Department of Trade and Industry that it could not continue work on the HS.146 feederliner under the terms of the contract signed in August 1973. Owing to preoccupation with the impending general election no official response was forthcoming. On Tuesday of last week Hawker Siddeley announced that all work on the HS.146 would cease from Monday and that about 250 redundancies could be expected. As we went to press the British Government had made no explicit comment on the HSA decision. (See World News, this issue.) Beaction from the trade unions, however, was unequi vocal in its condemnation of the company's policy. The executive of the confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions (CSEU) called for "immediate imple mentation of the Government's declared policy of public ownership, to ensure that all jobs are safeguarded." Stronger reaction came from the Hatfield division of the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW), which has pledged its members to a "work-in" involving both design and the construction of the HS.146 mock-up. The divisional organiser accused HSA of "political black mail . . . the company has told the Government to provide extra money if it wants to save the project." Delegations from the CSEU and AUEW were to visit Mr Anthony Wedgwood Benn, the Secretary of State for Industry, to press their case last weekend. When Hawker Siddeley first submitted the HS.146 project to the British Government in October 1972 it was the company's first request for funding of a jet feederliner in more than ten years of studies. It was also the first new civil aircraft launched by the Hawker Siddeley board since 1956. The commercial failure of the Argosy—the most practical of aircraft—still haunted the company. Hatfield's first jet feederliner project was the DH.126. This was a "grown-up 125," but was held down by the absence of a suitable powerplant. The larger HS.136 and a long line of rear-engined twins from both Hatfield and Woodford followed the DH.126 across the drawing boards. The last twin was the Trent-powered HS.144, but the Trent's other application, the Fairchild-Fokker F-228, had fallen by the wayside and Trent development remained incomplete. Hawker Siddeley was also doubtful that a twin-Trent aircraft would be big enough. The 1960s had seen Hawker Siddeley change from a f virtually 100 per cent aviation concern to an electrical/ industrial conglomerate with only 35 per cent of its capital in aerospace. The group had no ambitions towards "aviation for aviation's sake" and there was no question of tying the development of the new feederliner to that of a new engine. While Hawkers waited for a launch window between 1962 and 1968 Fokker-VFW had put the F.28 into produc tion, an aircraft not too remote from some of the British company's ideas. Sales of the F.28 seemed sluggish, however, supporting the view that a new approach to the elusive "DC-3-replacement-replacement" market was called for. The new feederliner, in Hawker Siddeley's opinion, had to bring jet comfort and speed to HS.748/F.27 routes at a seat-mile cost 15 per cent lower than that of the turbo- props. It would have to be as quiet as or quieter than the turboprops and hence considerably quieter than the small trunk jets like the One-Eleven, DC-9 or 737. It would also have to use the same runways as the turboprops. Above all it was the company's belief that the feeder- finer should also be a freighter which shaped the HS.146. Centre-of-gravity and loading considerations ruled out rear engines and sill-height requirements meant a high wing. As the right number of seats appeared to be 70-plus the aircraft was too big for two M45s or TF34s. It was the announcement early in 1972 of the 6,5001b-thrust Avco Lycoming ALF 502 which started the company thinking of a four-engined aircraft, despite the possible drawbacks of such an arrangement in terms of dispatch reliability and cost. The HS.146 was offered to the British Conservative Government in October 1972 as a business deal. Later, Sir Arnold Hall said that the Hawker Siddeley Group could have financed the project itself. "But we were not pre pared to put all our eggs into one basket and I felt it my duty to protect the company's capabilities and growth in all categories of our business." If HS.146 went down it was not to take the rest of the group with it. Hawker Siddeley was asking the Government for £40 million at January 1972 prices, adjusted in accordance with the general price level. By August 1973 the figure had reached £46 million. The sum was roughly equivalent to half the non-recurring costs: research, development and education and tooling. It was stressed that HSA was not asking for launching aid, but for an investment, recoverable by a levy on sales. The Government was to invest in the private company as a banker would invest, sharing risks and the profit. The nationalised airline was not to be persuaded to order. The negotiations went on. On the sidelines were Rolls- Royce with the refanned Spey-67 and BAC with the One- Eleven 700, but Hawker Siddeley's predictions of 420 aircraft sold by 1982 seemed to offer richer, longer-term rewards. A proposal for a twin-Spey HS.146 was rejected on the grounds that it compromised the concept of the jet feederliner. It was in August 1973 that the signing of the contract was announced. Minister for Aerospace Mr Michael Heseltine said that Hawkers would "bear full responsibility for any cost overruns not attributable to movements in the general price level." At the same press conference Sir Arnold Hall agreed that the firm would bear overruns, but, he said, "there aren't going to be any ... Our concern has been to exploit our deep knowledge of this market." He expected sales of 1,200 aircraft in the HS.146 class by 1983, but, as he told the conference: "We have no orders because we have not yet sought them. We don't believe in selling things we haven't got." He announced the start of a worldwide sales campaign. Not everybody was pleased about the HS.146. Fokker- VFW described it as "a means of finding employment . . . designed for a special market for which a successful European product already exists, namely the F.28." Hawker Siddeley had made no secret of their belief that below a certain size projects should be directed by a single national prime contractor. Some other European opinion considered that the HS.146 was a wasteful competitor for the F.28, but Hawker Siddeley pointed out that the HS.146 was ten
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