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Aviation History
1975
1975 - 0095.PDF
FLIGHT International, 16 January 1975 51 AIR TRANSPORT First UK hijacking: questions raised A LONE hijacker seized a British Airways One-Eleven on January 7 during a domestic flight from Manchester Ringway to London Heathrow. The hijacker at first de manded to be flown to Paris but after landing at Heathrow allowed the passengers to leave and asked for a ransom of £100,000 plus a parachute. The aircraft remained at Heathrow for nearly eight hours before flying to Stan- sted. At one time it seemed that the hijacker had been persuaded that he was being flown to France, but it now appears that he knew all along that he was on the way to another airport in England. At Stansted the hijacker, a 29-year-old Iranian called Saeed Madjd, unsuccessfully tried to escape. Found to be carrying only a toy pistol when arrested, he has since been charged with demanding money with menaces; more serious charges are likely to be brought at a later date. At first sight, the United Kingdom's first domestic hijack ing was a "straight-forward" affair during which the crew displayed exemplary coolness. It has, however, raised a number of important questions about security at British Airports: whether it is a wise policy to use delaying tactics which place the lives of the crew at risk, and whether to use for security messages radio frequencies that are readily accessible to the press, the public and, potentially, to other hijackers. Would the procedures used have been successful against a politically backed, determined group of well armed terrorists? The hijacker was allowed to board flight number BE 4069 at Manchester without being checked. It now appears that until last week it was British practice to screen only 50 per cent of domestic passengers (except on routes to Belfast) although all international passengers have been screened. The degree of searching of inclusive-tour and charter passengers depends on the destination and type of passenger; many in any case already pass through inter national gates and are treated as international passengers. Before the hijacking of BE 4069 there had been four hijackings of British Airways aircraft, all involving VClOs or Super VClOs. In September 1970 a VC10 was forced to fly to Dawson Field in Jordan and blown up; in July 1971 an aircraft was hijacked to Libya; March 1974 saw a pilot being forced to Amsterdam where the airliner was set on fire; last November armed terrorists boarded a British Airways flight at Dubai and forced the pilot to fly to Tunis. Although last week's hijacking was the first such incident on a UK domestic flight, it followed the un successful attempt by Leila Khaled to hijack an El Al 707 as it approached Heathrow in September 1970. The Department of Trade is responsible for the security of British airports and provides the Secretariat of the National Aviation Security Committee (NASC) which was established in 1971. Several other Government departments are involved, including the Home Office, through the use of police, and the Ministry of Defence, because of the need for the Army, and they are represented on the NASC to gether with the airlines and some interested unions. In general, DoT delegates the responsibility of general airport security to the relevant airport administration; in the case of Heathrow this is passed to the Metropolitan Police, while at other BAA airports the British Airport Authority Constabulary is involved. At Manchester and other local authority airports general security is the re sponsibility of the local police force. The DoT passes to the airlines the task of searching passengers but pays the cost. Both airport authorities and the airlines act on the advice, direction and guidance of the DoT which, following the hijacking, were modified last week to require the searching of all domestic passengers DoT aviation security advisers visit UK airports at regular intervals and, in fact, called at Manchester eight times in 1974, the last visit having been in the final week of December. At UK air ports magnetic metal detectors backed up by body searches by security personnel are used for passenger screening; X-ray devices are used only for baggage. Widely reported accounts of the conversation between the captain of the One-Eleven, Capt Harry Lea, and the Heathrow control tower indicated that he became angry at the delaying tactics of the authorities, which he believed were putting the lives of his crew in peril. A policy of wearing down hijackers with endless negotiations appears to have been agreed by the NASC, on which the British Air Line Pilots' Association is represented. It apparently follows a study of other recent hijackings and seems to have been adopted by Commander Christopher Payne, head of the Airport Division of the Metropolitan Police. At the height of the drama he was in touch with the Prime Minister who was in a special operations room established in Whitehall for emergencies. Also involved were the Secetary of State for Trade, Mr Peter Shore; Mr Clinton Davis, Under-Secretary in the DoT; Lord Harris, Minister of State at the Home Office (Home Secre tary Roy Jenkins was away); and Mr Hattersley, Minister of State at the Foreign Office (Mr Callaghan, the Foreign Secretary, was also out of the country). During the hijack ing the Ministry of Defence put the first, limited phase of its "top secret" contingency plans into operation at Heathrow and a small number of soldiers were flown to Stansted by RAF Hercules. Assessing the situation Bialpa believes that whatever tactics are used to wear down a hijacker, it is completely wrong to remove com mand responsibility from the aircraft captain. He is the only person capable of making an on-the-spot assessment of the breaking point of the hijacker—and of the crew- arid he should have an overriding right to make rapid decisions, according to the pilots. Balpa feels very strongly about the broadcasting of radio messages, which it says is irresponsible. It seems likely that the next meeting of the NASC will consider this problem; Balpa is to study reports of the hijacking of BE 4069 to see if representa tion should be made to the Department of Public Prosecu tions. Like all air safety questions, the problem of radio transmission security is a function of time and money. The Wireless Telegraphy Act (1949) forbids the reception of unauthorised broadcasts, of which aircraft communica-
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