FlightGlobal.com
Home
Premium
Archive
Video
Images
Forum
Atlas
Blogs
Jobs
Shop
RSS
Email Newsletters
You are in:
Home
Aviation History
1977
1977 - 1748.PDF
1656 LOCKHEED TRISTAR 500 a more radically new aircraft than the DC-10-30/40. As the long recovery began, Lockheed and Rolls-Royce con centrated on detail improvements to the TriStar and its powerplant, producing the heavier TriStar 100 and, eventually, the more powerful TriStar 200 certificated last month. As the TriStar 200 (then the L-1011-2) and its power- plant (the RB.211-22X, later the -524) firmed up in late 1974, a new customer entered the ring: Aeroflot, with a requirement for an 11-62 replacement. Lockheed had an advantage over its US competitors because its British powerplant was more likely to be made available for export than the US big-fan engines. Lockheed pushed the weight and fuel capacity of the TriStar up again and offered the TriStar 2LR (later the 250), the first long-range project since the Dash 8. By the time Congress torpedoed the Aeroflot deal— which would have seen TriStars and possibly RB.211s being built in new Soviet factories set up under Western guidance—the TriStar 250 had attracted some interest from airlines. Pan Am, TWA, Qantas and British Airways were beginning to be converted to the idea of a two-type long-haul fleet. But in mid-1975 nobody was in the mood to put money on the table for a new type even if their bankers would let them. The 707 was good for quite a few years yet and most of the airlines saw no need to order a replacement with a 28-month lead time. The one exception was British Airways, which had a number of reasons for deciding early on a 747 running- mate. Many of its long-haul narrow-bodies were VClOs rather than 707-320B/Cs, and although the VC10 has endeared itself to its passengers, it is less of a favourite with the airport communities to which its distinctive diaphragm-rattling growl is familiar. The British flag carrier was also heavily committed to the North Atlantic routes, on which the USA was (and still is) pushing for more gateways and diversification of traffic. The eternal triangle of Lockheed, Rolls-Royce and the British Government played a vital role. The DC-10-30/40 with GE CF6s or P&W JT9Ds was ruled out from the start as politically unacceptable—Rolls-Royce's traditional political muscle has increased rather than atrophied under State ownership. If British Airways wanted a 747 com panion, it would have to be specially developed with the RB.211 engine. Shorter fuselage needed British Airways was however adamant that it needed an aircraft with the same sort of long-haul performance as the 747Bs which it had on order. This would have taken the TriStar 250 beyond its feasible "stretch" with the exist ing fuselage, and the resulting aircraft would have had to move in the direction of the very much heavier DC-10-30, which has a bigger wing and an extra landing-gear leg compared with the medium-range aircraft. It was accord ingly decided to remove 242in from the fuselage and to fit another 22,0001b of fuel in the centre section. This was the initial TriStar 500, revealed in the last quarter of 1975. "The general reaction," comments Stu Smith, "was that we were about right." The British Airways order was vital to the TriStar 500, but it was scarcely less important to the TriStar pro gramme as a whole. By early 1976 it was becoming clear that Lockheed could not compete indefinitely with the DC-10 on an unequal footing. In the simplest economic terms, every DC-10-30 sold on a market in which Lockheed could not compete reduced the unit cost of the DC-10-10, the TriStar's direct competitor. Lockheed needed the 500 to stay in the airliner business. When McDonnell Douglas offered British Airways a Rolls-Royce-powered DC-10-30R it signalled the start of a pitched battle which lasted nearly a year. British Airways was already flying the TriStar 1, and Overseas Division was operating a pair of aircraft on a three-year transfer from FLIGHT International, 4 /une 1977 '- European Division. On the other hand, British Airways 1. crews were also operating the DC-10 on the interchange ,. with Air New Zealand, and pro-DC-10 feeling was running high in Overseas Division. MDC publicly alleged that high- J level political pressure was being applied to British Air- ways to buy the TriStar 500. British Airways chairman Sir Frank McFadzean responded by telling a McDonnell vice- ] president in no uncertain terms that such allegations would be counter-productive. But MDC won a tactical victory " when it sold British Caledonian two DC-10-30s off the ^ flight-line at 1977 prices. Finally, it was Lockheed's willingness to deliver TriStar "X 500s against the airline's TriStar 1 orders, placed before ^ the fuel crisis, that closed the deal. The airline compared the better seat-mile costs of the DC-10 with the com- .1 monality advantages of the TriStar, and the two aircraft t came out level. The TriStar, being smaller than the DC-10, ' could replace the narrow-bodies earlier. All in all, the j Tunnel model of the TriStar 500 before addition of the no/se-reducing j Frisbee fairing 1 contest was a very close-run thing. "It was important in % its own right as an order," comments Stu Smith: "But the fact that we were able to go ahead allowed us to talk about a 1979-delivery aeroplane. Our market assessment f gave us the credibility to go ahead when British Airways firmed up. It was credible to the bankers and the Emer- j gency Loan Guarantee Board." In the course of presentations to British Airways the I TriStar 500 grew back towards the standard aircraft, with an 80in fuselage extension and an 6,0001b increase in maximum take-off weight. Lockheed says that this is as ;, far as the existing aircraft can go with current technology, and this is why the aircraft-mile cost is well below that of the DC-10. "As a derivative aircraft," says Smith, "it's been stretched right out and it is operating at the peak of its efficiency." British Airways will operate the TriStar 500 as a 235- seater, passenger-service items having inevitably en- f croached on the nominal 246-passenger capacity. The ( TriStar's 5.260 n.m. range translates into Atlanta-London either way with a full, space-limited payload (3,722 n.m.), , or London-Los Angeles or Tokyo-San Francisco with full passengers. All cases assume 85 ner cent-probability winds. v. In most cases the TriStar 500 will go 5,000 n.m. either way without any effect on seat availability. "- British Airways sees the TriStar as combining the r payload-range of a 707-320B with the field performance of the VC10. Initially the 500s are likely to serve shorter routes—Tehran, the Gulf, Pakistan and possibly the Seychelles—as well as potential US gateways. T Most of the work needed to produce the TriStar 500 had been done by the time the project was launched, at L least as far as the structure was concerned. The beefing-up ( process which produced the 200 and the 250 study is carried a stage further in the 500. Strengthening is con- 1 fined to the wing and tailplane skins and the landing gear. . The high-lift system is mechanically unaltered, but flap
Sign up to
Flight Digital Magazine
Flight Print Magazine
Airline Business Magazine
E-newsletters
RSS
Events
