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Aviation History
1979
1979 - 1822.PDF
1744 FLIGHT International, 2b May 1979 Perhaps the main reason why the stretched 747 has taken so long to emerge, and why it is still uncertain in its status, is the hidden stretching that has already been carried out by the simple process of putting more seats in the aircraft. Boeing's standard layout, with economy seats on the upper deck, is now 442 seats, compared with the 360-370 seats in the layouts accepted when the aircraft entered service. The first-class passengers lose their upper- deck lounge, and ten-abreast seating replaces nine-abreast; the passenger is presumed to accept it in the interests of low fares. So far very-low-fare and high-density demands are being met by the standard aircraft, and the demand for the stretched aircraft is not vast. Better utilisation of space aboard the aircraft is the subject of a great deal of work at Boeing, as it is with the other manufacturers. It is an area in which a little thought will yield two or three extra revenue seats—a very quick and attractive pay-off for the customer. For example, Boeing has added capacity by making the upper deck optional for economy-class seats (and is studying a tube-type escape slide for the upper deck of the stretched aircraft) and is looking at a split-level aft galley for the stretch as well. The split-level galley puts the otherwise wasted roofspace of the 747 to some use, locating some storage areas beneath a raised working area. It replaces some of the mid-cabin galleys, allows a tidier and more flexible internal arrangement and is worth eight to 12 revenue seats. An incidental advantage is that cooking smells are at the back of the cabin, where they are likely to be dumped overboard by the normal operation of the air-conditioning system. Eleven-abreast seating, mercifully, appears to have died a death. For one thing, it was difficult to refit compared with the fairly simple change from nine abreast to ten; for another, airlines seem to be happier reducing seat pitches, on the grounds that such a change is less obvious to the passenger. There has thus been a fair increase in passenger car riage by 747 due to increased seating densities. There has also been a gradual increase in utilisation rates across the fleet, possibly with the increasing cost of new aircraft and the consequent realisation that flying hours are vital. But 747 sales still look healthy—and Boeing cannot afford to see demand fall away in the coming critical years. McDonnell Douglas knows this well, which partly accounts for the timing of its move on the stretched DC-10. This has been under study for many years, but the flow of the market has reached a point where a suc cessful blast-off is very important to the commercial arm of McDonnell Douglas. Exclusion from the 200-seater short/medium-range market is one reason. More important, the DC-10-30/40 has not been looking too healthy despite a good flow of orders. The intercontinental DC-10 appears to have been taken in a pincer movement between the 747 and the TriStar. Three or four years ago, it looked as if the DC-10 might become a highly popular multi-purpose aircraft, cheaper and less risky for the airlines than the 747 and offering acceptable economics on a very wide range of sec tors. However, operators found in practice that the DC-10 could not compete with a rival's 747 service unless the traffic was too thin to support the larger aircraft. Some operators chose to use the DC-10 as a transitional type, developing a route to the point where a 747 could take over; clearly, there was little growth potential for McDonnell Douglas in this market. All-DC-10 operators such as Air New Zealand began threatening a switch to 747s in pursuit of lower costs; Trans International is the first actually to do so. While the 747 appeared to be gaining ground at the top end of the market, a new threat appeared in 1976 in the shape of the TriStar 500. McDonnell Douglas fought long and hard to win the vital British Airways order that launched the TriStar 500 (vital, because it was earlier than any other requirement of similar size) but failed; and the TriStar, with a considerable amount of help from British Government finance, has proceeded to penetrate the 707/DC-8 replacement market, which the DC-10 would otherwise have picked up unopposed. By stretching the DC-10, McDonnell Douglas not only moves clear of Lockheed's market sector but protects the top end of the DC-10 market from the impact of the 747. The stretched aircraft also takes full advantage of tradi tional "stretch" economics, gaining more than 25 per cent in its passenger capacity for a seven per cent increase in gross weight. Of the proposed DC-10-60 family, only the inter continental, 26 • 7ft-stretched DC-10-62 will offer the full 5,000 n.m. range of the DC-10-30/40. The DC-10-61, stretched by 40ft and using the DC-10-30 wing and under carriage, is a US domestic aircraft; it should offer much better economics on these routes than the long-haul- optimised 747, which seldom attains the utilisation it needs on transcontinental flights. The DC-10-62 is the long-haul leader of the family, with extended wingtips (7ft each side), active ailerons for load alleviation and a four-wheel centre bogie replacing the twin-wheel unit of the -30/40. (The A300-type trailing-edge flaps studied for the -62 last year have been found un necessary, and the stretch is now planned with standard flaps.) All the DC-10-60s would have new systems on the flight deck, new avionics and other improvements such as electrically signalled spoilers. Longitudinal stability augmentation, tested on the original DC-10 but never certificated, will be used for the stretched aircraft to in- >- page 1753 McDonnell Douglas has studied DCI0 stretches for some years and is currently looking for substantial launch orders before go-ahead. The Boeing 747 has eroded DC-10-30 sales because of superior and seat-mile costs, and a stretch would allow McDonnell Douglas to hit back at the competition. The new versions will be allocated -60 type numbers and offer fuselage extensions of 26 • 7ft (-62) and 40ft (-60163)
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