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Aviation History
1979
1979 - 1832.PDF
1754 FLIGHT International, 26 May 1979 love to sell some 500s to Aer Lingus, at the same time leaning on the Irish carrier's interest in outwork to pro vide a support service. Lockheed's experience with other young and rapidly expanding airlines has taught it the importance of keeping a close watch on such areas as inventory control at the main base and at the stations. But, says Smith, "small airlines are worthwhile—you've got to get started somewhere." The advent of the early peak in 500 deliveries, coupled with the extremely low rate of TriStar production in 1975-77, has faced Lockheed with a proportionally larger expansion task than that of either of its US rivals. Prob lems of supply and manpower are more acute than those facing the other manufacturers, but as yet, as with Boeing, Lockheed's worst problem is the need to assemble some components out of sequence, and the company is not yet faced with delivery delays. For the time being, then, it appears that the market can support all three contenders. But the present boom, as they are only too aware, cannot last for ever. None of the manufacturers is too keen to make a major invest ment in increasing production rate, in the knowledge that the present overpressure of demand is a passing phase. If the industry can resist the temptation to put on weight in the prosperous years, the transition to the next down turn in the cycle should be less painful than it was in the early 1970s. There is definitely some feeling that the problems of component supply are occurring because the subcontractors are taking the same attitude. In some areas, the only way to widen a supply bottleneck is to duplicate one critical process, which can often be a very expensive business. Bather than make a heavy investment to help the customer over a short-term peak, the suppliers are tending to average out the peaks and valleys of the industrial cycle. Supply problems may be helping the manufacturers, by preventing them from over-reacting to the market peak in the way which has been so nearly fatal before. Be-engining of DC-8s will also have a smoothing in fluence on the market, and in the longer term this could be beneficial. Only some of the DC-8-60s now in service will be re-engined; some of these will join the freight carriers, and all are likely to need replacement within the production lives of the current generation of aircraft. Some airlines will be able to stretch out their long-haul re-equipment programmes, helping to relieve the pressure on deliveries in the early part of the 1980s as noise regu lations begin to close the USA and much of Western Europe to the older jets. Whether or not the market will prove to be big enough for three aircraft in the long term, it is very possible —because Boeing is not easily deflected—that there will be a fourth in the ring by the end of this year. Following American's decision in favour of the 767. the domestic trijet 777 has been superseded by a true 5,000-miler very like a slightly scaled-down TriStar 500. But, says Boeing, "we've got them on block fuel and fuel per seat because of a more optimum fuselage/wing combination." Lockheed is now hoping that it can pick off the major 777 launch prospects and persuade Boeing that competing almost head-on with an established type is not worth while. Boeing estimates that it needs to sell 300-400 trijets, mostly in the 707/DC-8 replacement market, but many airlines are already committed to two wide-body long-haulers. TWA and Qantas are notable exceptions to the general pattern, and both are currently priority targets for Lockheed. But the 777 might also be fitted into a route system underneath the DC-10 to give an airline a three- tier long-haul fleet, opening up a very large market to the type; most airlines have managed to get used to the idea of a two-type long-range fleet without much trouble. The darkest horse in the race at the moment is the Airbus Industrie A300B11, mooted as a follow-on project to the A310. With the apparent demise of the Pratt & Whitney JT10D project, this 200-seater, four-engined air craft seems to lack a powerplant, unless the CFM56 can be made powerful enough. If this is the case, however, such an aircraft could combine competitive economics with the appeal of the wide-body fuselage. The 777, how ever, would pre-empt the A300B1I in the third-tier market. Manufacturing a long-haul airliner is one of the most imposing investments to face any company. The amount of development work which still goes on is testimony to the importance of maintaining that investment in com petitive trim throughout its production life. The 747 is the best illustration of how such a programme can nearly wreck an entire company, as happened in 1971-72, and how within eight years it can be the mainstay of the manufacturer's profits. There is a lesson for any aerospace company here, in that "break-even points" set at the time of launch are pure fiction in these days of inflation. The first consideration now is: can the company stand the non-recurring cost without actually running out of cash? The company must secondly be confident that the produc tion profits will be able to support a similar programme in 10 years' time. If you seek an explanation for the abundance of grey-haired people in the aerospace industry, look no further. F> The DC-IO-40 represents Pratt & Whitney's attempt to break into the long-range DC-10 market but has so far sold only to Japan Air Lines and Northwest 3» m III* •
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