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Aviation History
1980
1980 - 0874.PDF
836 FLIGHT International, IS March 1980 Letters Two-crew cover prohibitive? Sm—There appears to have been over-generalisation on the subject of a flight engineer as the third crew member. The case comes under two main headings: (1) practical useful ness of a flight engineer on a flight deck and (2) the added safety of an extra pair of eyes/hands. • Usefulness of a flight engineer. It is possible that some of the larger state-owned airlines are able to bear the cost of permanent down-route maintenance facilities and only re quire a system manager for the panel. But for the majority in the industry, where restrictive practices are also much less in evidence, a flight engineer with a proven practical background can save the employer thousands of pounds by getting the aircraft home when it might other wise have sat in the sun for a day waiting for help. SIR—In the article Braking action: how good is "good'"! (Flight, Febru ary 23), Colin Gordon makes two very ill-informed and unjustified state ments about the attitude of airline pilot associations to runway friction measurement. The British Air Line Pilots Associa tion (Balpa), nationally, and the Inter national Federation of Air Line Pilots Association (Ifalpa), have done an immense amount of work on the sub ject over the past ten years. In fact Ifalpa has been in the forefront of an international effort in the Inter national Civil Aviation Organisation (Icao) to obtain satisfactory wet run way certification, which is at the root • Safety point of view. Few will argue that an extra pair of eyes monitoring the normal procedures is not an advantage. So how do you put a price on the flight engineer's value when things go really wrong? All the electronics in the world are likely to be more of a hinderance than a help after a severe lightning strike or electrical fire, for example. While two pilots can get on with the job of fly ing a crippled aircraft, the flight engineer can, perhaps, get rid of some of the smoke and reinstate some of the systems. At today's rates this must be the cheapest form of aviation insurance going. I suspect it will be the brokers who will have the final say—the insurance for a three-crew aircraft that has been reduced to two crew may well prove to be prohibitive. S. ROBERTSON-FOX c/o The Excelsior Hotel, Manchester of the problem. In the United Kingdom, Balpa last year visited both manufacturers re ferred to in the article and had one specific meeting with the CAA Air worthiness Division on the subject. There is no evidence that airline pilots or their professional association in the UK, as Colin Gordon suggests, are holding back research into achiev ing a direct relationship of measured runway conditions to aircraft per formance. The British Air Line T. N. STAPLES Pilots Association (Technical 81 New Road secretary) Harlington Hayes, Middlesex UB3 5BG RAF requirements SIR—As a former NCO pilot, may I be allowed to comment on J. Powell's remarks (Flight, January 26). Pilot magazine's French correspon dent also mentions (February 1980) that their NCO pilots "have the repu tation of being the best 'plane-drivers' in the Armee de L'Air." Coincidence? Surely not. The underlying reason is surely motivation. It is important to realise that the RAF offers the commissioned aviator "flying and a career." The essential difference was that for the NCO pilot flying was his career and he could, and usually did, devote himself en tirely to it. The current drastic shortage of RAF pilots (created by the inability of the Service to effectively manage its most valuable asset over the years), could be alleviated by the re appearance of NCO pilots. And if my pay as an NCO pilot was anything to go by, they would be cost-effective too. Spalding, Lines D. R. SMITH SIR—As a former member of the lower classes, I must say that I have great sympathy with J. Powell's letter. I would point out, how ever, that even to be a sergeant in the RAF you have to be well edu cated, fit, capable of assuming responsibility, quick witted and quite handsome—but preferably not from the lower classes. Nato Headquarters D. R. SEARLE Brussels (Wg Cdr, RAF) SIR—Perhaps I may be allowed to comment on J. Powell's letter. As a former senior non-commissioned officer (SNCO) pilot with a modestly successful career of 20 years and 5,000hr flying, I was always unhappy at the post-war RAF policy of requir ing all pilots and navigators to be commissioned. It is not true, however, to imply that SNCO pilots were better than others. From my experience as a QFI and squadron commander, and from service in the aircrew selection boards. I know that SNCO pilots went through the same selection and train ing process. They were no better or worse than any other pilot. However, to control the crew of a large aircraft on the ground or in the air, to lead battle formations of tac tical aircraft, to make battle, weather and technical decisions all call for the same qualities as those required for commissioning. British Airways has also always insisted on commission- able material for its pilots. You don't control a 747 with a dozen or so crew and 300 passengers just because you can fly the thing. Mr Powell sees life from too narrow a point of view. 24 Ross Way wc CDR J. G. ROBERTS Northwood Middx Twin Otter safety SIR—Your comment on the de Havil- land Canada Twin Otter (Flight, January 26) that "fatal accidents to six of the type are more than a statis tical exception" carries no justification and begs a rebuttal. First, we find there are some in accuracies in the table "Fatal acci dents: commercial general aviation." These are as follows: there were six fatal Twin Otter accidents worldwide in 1979 but were not as stated. In addition, there is one aircraft missing. The October 28 accident in Mexico was wrongly identified as a Twin Otter (it appeared to be a King Air 200 from media photographs). A Colombian accident on December 20 is omitted. Also the table assigns the cause of the September 30 accident to the propeller control failure. This crash is still under investigation. No conclusions have been promulgated. In a de Havilland study on Twin Otter accidents, the 1979 worldwide fatal accidents rate (based on seven accidents) was calculated as 0-959 fatal accidents per 100,000 flying hours. While there are no comparable (worldwide) figures for similar air craft, a reasonable comparison may be made with US air taxi operations (which include US commuters). The Twin Otter rate is significantly lower than the National Transportation Safety Board rate of 1-32 fatal acci dents per 100,000 flying hours for US air taxis. The National Transporta tion Safety Board has completed a similar study of Twin Otter acci dents in the US only, and this con firms the de Havilland figures. The Twin Otter is frequently operated in the most extreme en vironmental conditions. Our studies show that the Twin Otter has emerged, nevertheless, with a better- than-average safety record. I. GILCHRIST DHC Manager, Technical Support No brakes on research
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