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Aviation History
1981
1981 - 2086.PDF
1996 FLIGHT International, 27 lum 1981 A320 on the rails ... Bill Sweetman sums up Paris 150-seater revelations THE effective launch of the A320, which only extraordinary intervention can now prevent from being trans lated into airborne metal in 1985, is seen by Airbus as following a logical commercial pattern. Political factors played a part in making sure that it came so far so quickly, but so did commercial considerations. Prominent among the latter was the speed with which McDonnell Douglas and Fokker were moving towards the firm order stage which Airbus has now reached. There is, undoubtedly, a great deal of French political will behind the A320, going back to the original de velopment of the CFM56 engine as an intended replacement for the JT8D. Combined with the suspended state in which French politics found itself dur ing the Paris Air Show, and the politi cal importance of the aerospace in dustry, this background made the Air France and Airbus announcements over the air show politically conven- able. This is not to say, however, that politics have influenced the choice of the A320 over the alternative pro jects, or its shape and specification. In one major respect it is already obvious that technology has produced a political problem for the French Government. Now that the bi-CFM56 dream aeroplane, which has been the apple of the politicians' eyes for so long, has reached an advanced stage, it is emphatically not a U-CFM56 but simply a twin-engined aircraft. The engine about which most is known, and on which firm offers (subject like the A320 to Government funding) have been made, is the Anglo- Japanese RJ.500-35. The GFM56-2000 is a design objec tive rather an a design. An 8 per cent fuel-burn cut won't leave much existing hardware in place; Pratt & Whitney is still hesitating over a com mitment to producing a scaled (which, translated, means new engine using existing technology) version of the PW2037. It is as true as it ever was that the choice of the A320 as AI's next project leaves more scope for new partnerships, or for changes in work- sharing arrangements among the existing partners, than the stretched TA9 would have done. BAe, which has an ambition to assemble and flight test the A320, was stung by AI president Bernard Lathiere's sugges tion that the most likely outcome is that arrangements will be identical to those for the A300/A310 produc tion line. But the who-does-what ques tion is not one of politics alone, or to be dictated entirely by the amount of money which each partner is likely to subscribe. The reason why Airbus Industrie is taking unchanged arrangements as the starting point for negotiations is summed up in one word: cost. Chester has a workforce skilled in making wings and similar heavy machined structures. Hamburg has a flourishing interiors department. Toulouse has developed the art of assembling aircraft by the unique Air bus method. It is argued at head quarters that neither Airbus nor the customers can afford to play "musical sub-assemblies" simply for political reasons. Anybody proposing a change in organisation will have to advance convincing economic reasons: final decisions can be expected by the end of the summer. It is clear that the French Govern ment has informally given its approval for the A320; although it is true that the "industrial launch" of the project has pre-empted formal decisions by the Germans, British and the other partners, the inter-governmental supervisory committee has been kept well-informed of the progress of Air bus thinking. The pace of events, in fact, is very similar to that surround ing the launch of the A310, when pre liminary sales agreements were signed with Lufthansa and Swissair before major questions like British member ship had been resolved. Final details of the A320 are not yet set in concrete, just as the design of the A310 was not immune to change (a slightly larger wing and more capa city) over the corresponding period. The way that the engine market shapes up in terms of performance and timescale will have some influ ence : AI executives suggest that it may be expedient to certificate a few months later than March 1986 (when the airframe could be ready) to take a little heat off the power suppliers. The spectacular announcements at Paris were as much a coup for Airbus Industrie as for the French Govern ment, and illustrate very clearly the way in which the authority and in fluence of the international organisa tion has increased since its formation. Surging sales over the past three years; the management organisation's energetic promotion of AI as Europe's sole heavy-airliner centre; the gravita tion of the partners' airliner talent to the A30O and A310 programmes; all these have played a part in expanding AI's authority and widening its dis cretion. But without the decisive leadership of Toulouse, where would Airbus be today? • • . and MDF-100 design ready within weeks FOKKER and McDonnell Douglas ex pect to have defined specifications for a new 150-seater within a matter of weeks, in time to offer firm prices and delivery dates to potential customers by the autumn. The aim of the two companies is to meet a schedule com petitive with the A320 or any new rival, to secure launch orders and to reach the point of go-ahead around the end of the year. The project team has now been authorised by the Dutch Government and the MDC corporate management to make firm offers to the airlines. The difference between the MDF- 100 project and earlier discussions be tween Europe and Long Beach is that, this time, both partners have a great deal to gain. Since the days of the MDC-D assault manoeuvres of late 1976, it has become clear that Long Beach's corporate chiefs in St Louis do not think the company can afford the full risk of a commercial pro gramme, and the customers know it. For Fokker, collaboration offers a number of advantages: MDC's entree to the US market is seen as essential, while — notwithstanding Amsterdam's confidence in the F.29—the American company's experience and track record in the management of large- scale commercial programmes must be welcome. For both partners, the MDF- 100 agreement represents an easier alternative to collaboration with some of the other candidates. Fokker- Boeing? Seattle always insisted on 51 per cent control of any programme, and still does. Fokker-Airbus? Un acceptable to the Dutch, with 100 per cent control in Toulouse. Fokker- Japan? Negotiations ever continuing, with a partner who lacks MDC's direct experience and resources. Now the Japanese have to decide within a few months whether to climb on board the MDF-100 as junior part ners, with a smaller stake and less in fluence than they would have had on the F.29. Both Dutch and American officials describe additional partners as "desirable, but not necessary," sug gesting that they would respond warmly to an offer of a 20-25 per cent stake from Japan. Fokker and MDC do not intend to set up an Airbus-type organisation, preferring to run the MDF-100 along the same lines as CFM International. A sm.ill joint organisation will be set up, drawing on the resources of both companies and co-ordinating sales ac tivities; workload and revenue will be split 50 per cent, and each partner will take care of its own costs. It is felt that a two-partner operation does not need the authority of an Airbus Industrie to run it smoothly, and the CFM experience tends to bear this out. The decision to have two assembly lines, despite an inevitable cost penalty, has been taken on political and commercial grounds. It reinforces the 50:50 split of responsibility and control; it sustains employment in Holland, and it maximises the market ing advantage which the "Made in USA" label gives the new project.
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