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Aviation History
1982
1982 - 2432.PDF
US Air Force McDonnell Douglas F-4G Wild Weasels are able to locate and destroy enemy air defence sites. Similar lethal countermeasures could be used against C Simultaneously, the enemy must be prevented from obtaining detailed infor mation of friendly command and con trol, by eliminating stray transmissions for example, or by guarding key person nel. A survivable C3 structure is required; hardened or mobile command centres, remote antennas, and redundant, jam- resistant communications. All this is still some way ahead, but C'CM has been established as a goal for all US commanders, and its use in recent exercises has increased dramatically under the watchful eye of JEWC obser vers. It has been a relatively long haul from Vietnam, where the first use of electronic warfare saw a "tremendous reduction in attrition", says Larson, to the point where the Air Force, at least, has a C'CM capability, mainly directed against enemy air defences. The Soviet Union already has an inte grated EW strategy, regularly practised. "The Soviet radio-electric combat capa bility is awesome," says Larson, adding that the Soviet system makes it easier for his opposite number to introduce new ideas. The US democratic process of Congressional committees and annual funding rules out overnight change. "The Air Force is now at a fairly re fined state, and could employ C'CM on almost any kind of operation," says Lar son. "The Army is coming along very fast," he continues, and the two Services are now working together. There is still no direct communication between the Army and Air Force for C3CM tasking, however. "We're not currently wired up to do it properly," admits Larson: "we have to lay additional channels of com munication." Navy lagging The Navy is lagging in its use of C3CM, mainly because it usually oper ates well away from land and air forces, only coming into contact with other Ser vices when involved in cross-beach power projection. The Navy, heavily dependent on electronics, is also more vulnerable to electronic and lethal attack. The Marine Corps is a distant fourth, but now realises the potential of C3CM. JEWC was established in 1980 as an outgrowth of the Air Force EW Centre at San Antonio, Texas, itself set up in 1966 to develop electronic warfare systems and tactics for use in Vietnam. Phase one was the transfer of the all- Service MIJI (meaconing/intrusion/ jamming/interference) programme to the new unit. Meaconing is the inten tional transmission of false navigation signals. MIJI receives some 1,000 incident reports annually from US units world wide. Some are traced to equipment faults, others to unintentional interfer ence, but about 5 to 10 per cent are classified as valid jamming signals. Phases two and three of the JEWC build-up, now complete, and phase four to be completed by autumn 1983, add Service and civilian personnel to the initial cadre. JEWC tasks have increased accordingly. The Centre has developed electronic warfare doctrine for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force; analysed the vulnerability of the E-3 Sentry radar on the Awacs deployment to Saudi Arabia; developed communica tions countermeasures concepts for use by the US Navy against anti-ship Back fires supporting Soviet Mediterranean forces; and examined the survivability of Air Force and Navy fighters equipped with self-protection jammers, their detectability by optical and infrared sensors, and their vulnerability to anti- radiation missiles. JEWC is charged with ensuring that realistic electronic warfare training is included in all major exercises. To illus trate the importance of EW training, Larson refers to Comfy Sword, a ground- based jammer built from existing equip ment and used by the Air Force to introduce pilots to electronic deception. "Green pilots are particularly suscep tible to deception," says Larson, "and can be diverted, prevented from drop ping their bombs, or vectored completely off range" by Comfy Sword operators. There is a three-to-four-day learning curve, and then the pilots themselves begin to use deception against the ground jammer. The pilots learn to pre-brief in detail, devising finger-wagging sign language for use in the air. When they have to use radio, one member of a four-ship formation keys his mike, tying up the ground-based jammer, which automati cally intercepts and jams his transmis sion. Meanwhile the other three mem bers of the flight switch to a different frequency. Pilots learn brevity on the air, to minimise the chances of detection. Comfy Sword, and the large-scale Nellis Green Flag electronic warfare exercises, demonstrate repeatedly the urgent need for anti-jam communica tions. Without a countermeasures-resis- tant radio "the chances of being ren dered ineffective are very high," warns Larson. The situation is particularly serious in close support, where pilots deprived of radio contact with forward air controllers must rely on imprecise target designation methods such as smoke rockets. E US Army Sikorsky EH-60A Quick Fix communications jammers are among the sys tems available to detect and disrupt enemy command and control 1222 FLIGHT International, 23 October 1982
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