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Aviation History
1983
1983 - 1664.PDF
WORLD NEWS Did Korean 747 ignore Soviet fighters? SAKHALIN The loss of a Korean Air Lines Boeing 747 with 269 people on board has led to a major diplomatic row. The United States accused the Soviet Union of deliberately shooting down the 747, while, as of September 1, the USSR maintains that its fighters intercepted the Boeing but it ignored their "offers of assis tance, signals, and warnings", and continued en route. The USSR has neither admitted nor denied shooting down the 747. The 747 was operating KAL's KE007 service from New York to Seoul via Anchorage, where a stop was made to take on a fresh crew and refuel. The 747 departed Anchorage for Seoul at 1400 GMT on August 31, with Capt Chim Byong-in in command. The flight plan was to follow a Great Circle route flying south west to make landfall over Hokkaido, northernmost of the main Japanese islands. On this route, Soviet airspace is to the north west of track. At some stage in the flight KE007 appears to have drifted north wards, and apparently was following a parallel course to that intended. Two hours out of Anchorage the 747 was picked up by the Soviet air- defence radar system on the Kamchatka Peninsula. Both the Kamchatka Peninsula and the neigh bouring Sakhalin Island are major Soviet military areas, housing a nuclear submarine base, a surface vessel port and at least two airfields, one housing a regiment of Tu-22M Backfires, the other with MiG-23 Floggers. Naval Aviation Pacific Fleet forces in the area include Tu-16 Badgers, 11-38 Mays, and probably Be-12 Mail flying boats. As a major military base, the area is closely monitored by the USA using both satellite reconnaissance and electronic intelligence- gathering ships. US Secretary of State George Schultz says that the 747 was first noted by Soviet radar at 1600 GMT (0100 local), about to enter Soviet airspace in the region of the IT**' Kamchatka Peninsula. The aircraft crossed the peninsula and continued over the Sea of Okhostk towards Sakhalin. The 747 was intercepted by up to eight fighters. This suggests that the aircraft was intercepted at an early stage of its intrusion and then followed by a succession of fighters. At 1812 GMT, according to the USA, a Soviet fighter pilot reported visual contact with the 747 at about 30,000ft ("at 10,000m,"). By then the aircraft had overflown Sakha lin and was over the Sea of Japan. At 1826 the pilot of the fighter, understood to be a MiG-23MF Flogger B, was said by US sources to have been cleared to fire by his Ground Controlled Intercept (GCI) station. According to the USA, he then reported: "taken aim and fired.. .the target is destroyed, I am breaking away". At 1830 an intercepted radio message, presumably from the GCI station, reported the target "at 5,000m"; at 1838 radio contact was lost. Japanese fishermen in the area noted a large explosion at or around this time, about 0330 local. Soviet search and rescue aircraft reached the crash site about one hour later and reported a fuel slick on the surface of the sea. No survivors were reported. Unconfirmed reports indi cate that at 1825 KE007 requested Japan Oceanic Control's clearance to climb to 35,000ft. No reason was given for this request, and clearance was given. Internationally understood procedures are used by fight ers intercepting unidentified radar contacts. It is usual for the fighter to be radar- directed by a GCI station. The controller will position the fighter in the intruder's 6 o'clock low position at a range of around 5 n.m. The fighter pilot will identify the intruder on his own radar and gradu ally increase speed to close for a visual inspection. The fighter will then report the aircraft type, nationality, operator, registration, height, course, speed, and position to the GCI station, which decides on further action, consulting higher authority if needed. Meanwhile, the fighter will drop back. The procedures for fighters to turn an intruder out of restricted airspace or to force the intruder to land, are also internationally recognised. To signify that the intruder has been intercepted the fighter will overtake and posi tion in front and to the left of it, in clear sight of the cock pit. By day the fighter will rock its wings and make a slow left turn on to the desired heading. If the intruder understands this instruction it will rock its wings and follow the fighter. By night the fighter will flash its landing lights and then turn left; the intruder TASS reports incident 1 h$ ftV> tf>i Tv',"-'h> a: eiiv> TASS ftiaob the following -5i?r*"M.»l I'll Sopi>v*»V5f I "An u entered the airspace of the Soviet Union over the Kamchatka : I -~rxs.i,& from the direction of the Pacific Ocean mid then for the second time violated USSR airspace over Sakhalin Island on the night of August 31/ September I. The aircraft did not have navigation lights, did not respond to queries. and did not contact the dispatcher service (ATC). "Fighters of the anti aircraft defence, sent to the ?ive it 'jssihl»iiK.e -it 'iirfVui-.g it 'O the ne the intruder aircraft did not react to tin- signals and warning fighters and continued in the direction oi the Sea of Japan." FLIGHT International. 10 September 1983
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