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Aviation History
1984
1984 - 0035.PDF
LETTERS Offshore diversions— the facts SIR—I refer to the Editorial in the November 5 issue of Flight, concerning offshore diversions for helicopters. Flight planning using offshore alternates is not new. It has been an integral part of Bristow's North Sea flight- planning procedures since the North Sea operations began in 1965. Because of its single-engine performance, the Wessex 60 regularly flight-planned using offshore alternates, a practice which continued safely until the aircraft was retired from service in 1981. In mid-1977 the SA330J Puma was intro duced into North Sea service and has operated safely using these principles since that date. It was natural, therefore, when the Bristow Tiger (Super Puma AS332L) was put into service in April 1982 that the proven policy of using offshore alternates should apply to the Puma. Before the introduction of the Tiger approximately 61,000hr were planned on the basis of off shore alternates. Since those early days of the Wessex, the number of offshore alternates now avail able in the various operating areas in the North Sea has dramatically increased. In the East Shetland Basin, for example, there are more than 20 offshore installations which can be used as alternates, and with modern navigational aids and vastly- superior airborne radar, plus the availability of reliable and accurate weather information from a large number of offshore installations, it is inconceivable that a helicop ter using an offshore alternate flight-planning policy should be put at risk by an unforecast change in the weather pattern. The latest generation twin- engined helicopters, such as the Tiger, Super Puma, and Bell 214ST, are all capable of landing safely on one engine at an offshore installation, and they also have a range in excess of 300 n.m. with full IFR reserves before the fuel load impinges on the maxi mum usable payload. This high standard of performance and the aforementioned factors, together with constantly improving pro cedures based on experience, make this method of oper ating a proven, safe procedure. The editorial comment about tail rotor failure is ill- informed and incomplete. The only tail rotor failure which is likely to allow continued flight is a control cable failure. All other failures, in spite of theoretical predictions to the contrary, lead to a fairly imminent forced landing. This tail rotor problem is, therefore, a red herring based on theory, not on experience and fact. It is high time that Flight and the technical press stopped maligning proven procedures and directed their energies to telling the world why helicopter safety is preju diced in airworthiness terms by the manufacturers, aided and abetted by the CAA/FAA. ALAN E. BRISTOW Bristow Helicopters Redhill Aerodrome Redhill Surrey RH1 5JZ Deja vu at Madrid? SIR—The second and recent tragedy at Madrid involving an Aviaco DC-9 reminds me of a similar "error of direction" which I witnessed not so long ago at Luton Airport. The similarity is uncanny in the fact that this outgoing flight also involved an Aviaco DC-9. On the Saturday afternoon in question, the runway in use was 26 (westerly departures). The DC-9 captain had been instructed to taxi out to the holding-point Alpha by ground control, before clear ance by Luton tower for back tracking and eventual line-up and hold at the 26 threshold. At the Bravo/Charlie taxi- way intersection the DC-9 continued ahead instead of veering left, towards holding- point Delta for Runway 08 (easterly departures). The captain was subsequently corrected by ground control, and the DC-9 trundled down the whole length of the runway for a correct line-up at 26.1 cannot help but conclude that apart from the weather— which was ideal for flights— the events leading up to this mistake were almost a carbon copy of the Madrid incident, i.e. the captain failed to follow the correct taxiway. Since the tragic event at Madrid I have wondered if the captains of the outward Luton flight and the doomed Madrid departure were one and the same person. If not, then the question arises just how proficient are Aviaco's pilots when negotiating taxiways at foreign airports? Naturally, the causes of the Madrid calamity were due in the main to bad weather conditions and abysmal ground control facili ties. At Luton there were no adverse flying conditions. So what was the cause of the Luton error? Ground control at Luton appears to be second to none, so one must assume negligence on the part of the captain. ROGER SMITH 1 The Pines Kempston Bedford MK42 7RF A reflection on Spanish ATC? SIR—Four Boeing 747s have now been destroyed on Spanish soil (Roval Iranian Air Force, KLM/PAA, and Avianca). This compares with four in the rest of the world. Notwithstanding the varying contributions by the aircrews to each of these accidents, I am left with a feeling that a more effective ATC may have prevented the accidents in Spain. One flight was allowed to fly into a thunderstorm. Another felt it had take-off clearance when another aircraft was on the runway, and as I write this letter the same tragedy has recurred at a Spanish airport. Preliminary reports indi cate that the altimeter setting on board the Avianca 747 was incorrect. How did that happen? In another accident, in the Canary Islands, a Dan-Air 727 flew into high ground after being assigned a hold that was not on the charts aboard the aircraft. The Spanish Government accident investigators will likely put the major blame on the unfortunate aircrews, as they have done in the past. While there is little doubt that the aircrews could have prevented these accidents, a properly equipped, trained, and vigilant ATC, aware of the fact that pilots are imper fect people like the rest of us, would also have had that opportunity. GEORGE HAEH 398 Pt McKay Gdns Calgary Alberta T3B 4V8 Canada A stool pigeon round our neck SIR—Your recent "Air Superiority" editorial (Flight, December 10) quoting BAe, described Namma as a "bureaucratic albatross". In doing so it paid that organisation a rare compli ment, because the albatross approaches perfection in terms of aerodynamic effi ciency. I suggest that your "spokesman", speaking on behalf of the erstwhile lame duck, meant to use the term "stool pigeon", and would remind him of S. T. Coleridge's description of the fate of those who kill the albatross. M. A. GAYNOR Wallberg Strasse 3 8011 Hohenkirchen West Germany IN BRIEF % The Men of the Mohawk Squadrons Association is trying to trace former colleagues of 40 years ago. Honorary secretarv Frank Robins (Unit 2, 89 "Gardenia Road, Gardenvale, Victoria 3185, Australia) would like information about them and the events of those times in India and Burma during the Second World War. WHAT'S ON January 18 Croydon Airport Society: Society meeting-talk on philatelic history of Croydon Airport, by Ewart Sanders; Aerodrome Hotel, Purley Way, Croydon: 8 p.m. January 19 RAeS/SLAET London Airport Joint Branch: Aerodynamic design and development of modern road vehicles, by Noel Watts, Ford Motor Company; 6-15 p.m.; The Cinema, BA Training Centre, Crane- bank, Heathrow Airport. January 25 RAeS: The European tran sonic windtunnel ETW: a cryogenic solution, by J. P. Hartzulker, ETW; 6 p.m.; 4 Hamilton Place, London W1; tel 01-499 3515. FLIGHT International, 7 January 1984 35
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