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Aviation History
1987
1987 - 0044.PDF
LETTERS Britain's flying reserve: the pros and cons SIR—Your Editorial in Flight for the week ending March 7 makes a number of interesting points about the creation of a part-time component of the Royal Air Force. It covers much familiar ground. The flying squadrons of the Royal Auxiliary Air Force gave distinguished service in the past, and it is tempting to look to their renaissance as a way of tackling perceived diffi culties in manning the RAF's front line today. However, it is by no means clear from your piece just how this might be achieved—or be paid for. The use of reservist aircrew is already the subject of a trial on VC10 and Nimrod, and in flying training duties. We have looked carefully at the possibility of employing reservists in other roles, and are now clear about the scope for this, should conditions allow. However, two funda mental obstacles lie in the path of going too far along this road. The first is the degree of readiness that is required of air forces. The existing declaration of our front-line forces to Nato depends on the rapid reaction times that may only be achieved by in-place forces manned by regular crews who are immediately available. This posture contributes significantly to deterrence. Secondly, your Editorial glos ses over the question of paying for the "establishment of a true flying arm of the RAuxAF". It is not enough to suggest that the RAF has facilities which are under used at weekends: there would be many significant financial considerations other than that of fuel burn. Increased consumption of spares and aircraft fatigue life, and addi tional maintenance, are just examples of the extra costs involved. Modern front-line aircraft demand a training regime which is unlikely to be achieved without previous regular service, at least of the sort given by a short ser vice commission. Attractive though it may seem, service beyond the University Air Squadrons to "advanced training" would be a lengthy and costly affair. Even if aircraft in storage, or others "liberated from front-line commitments" were identified for use by auxiliaries, the costs involved would be very considerable. There are no cheap options if more aircraft are to be retained in service, no matter how the package may be wrapped up. There is genuine admir ation and respect within the regular Service for what has been—and is being—achieved by volunteer reservists, including the formed units of the RAuxAF. We are not blind to the advantages of employing reservists and, indeed, are doing so in ever increasing numbers in those areas where the contribution is cost-effective and the inevi table limitations of part-time service can be accepted. For the present we are able to man front-line aircraft from our existing regular manpower, and a healthy enhancement would be possi ble in time of war from those on ground duties who were recently in flying appoint ments. AIR CDRE SANDY HUNTER Director, Royal Air Force Public Relations Ministry of Defence Room 0357 Main Building Whitehall London SW1A 2BH SIR—As a former member of the old Royal Auxiliary Air Force, I found the leading article in your March 7 issue of interest. On a very recent visit to an RAF base in the UK I discussed with aircrew the reasons for premature voluntary release. In a nutshell, it was having their wings clipped and being "sent to the chair" for a number of years before returning to flying duties. Presumably the ground duties they take up have a direct bearing on defence tactics and strategy, and they are not wasted on general duties quite easily and probably more competently performed by an administrative officer. One senior officer quite correctly stated that aircrew knew the score from the outset. However, to a young man of 20, with all the learn ing curve of flying to assimi late, the "chair" at 30 is hardly likely to be see.n as a water shed in his career. There are two ways to keep flying: a Remain flying but sacri fice promotion prospects or b Move to civil aviation. As intimated in the leader, the benefits of civilian flying compared with those already enjoyed in the RAF are likely to be a disappointment. At what age can a pilot of 25 in command of a Tornado, who quits when 30, expect to move into the left-hand seat of an "up-market" airliner? It will almost certainly take more years than he would have spent on RAF ground duties. The foregoing merely pin points the situation. The real issue is what can be done about it? In this area, and to this neutral observer, the top hierarchy of the RAF seems inept. The RAF has a policy of recruiting pilots and then streaming them according to suitability for high- performance fighter/bomber aircraft or the sedate Nimrods, Hercules, VClOs, TriStars, etc. It does not take a genius to realise how crass it is to produce young transport pilots. They are the commer cial airlines' lawful prey. If a policy of accepting only high-performance pilots were to be introduced, they could eventually be converted to the other aircraft when, through age and physical change, they were no longer suitable to fly high-performance aircraft. They would still have many years of flying in them, but would no longer look quite so attractive to civil aviation. The question that remains to be addressed concerns the man who has been sent to the chair. He could be given parole at the weekend to fly with your proposed RAuxAF. He may even have to accept 48hr demotion to avoid under mining the command struc ture, but his frustration at not being able to fly would be largely negated. A RAuxAF forming part of regular squadrons would seem to be the best way forward. Nice as it may sound, the luxury of training unqualified personnel would ensure that such a renaissance would never take off. The only way would be to recruit ex-RAF personnel recently experi enced in the flying and servicing of the aircraft type. This may sound elitist, but the subject is the elite. 40 The flying of military trans port aircraft by civilian trans port pilots would surely be unacceptable, owing to the conflict of interest which the long hours would bring. This is supported by the fact that pilots of the then state airlines were not permitted to join the old RAuxAF. In any case it is reasonable to assume that, in an emergency, the Govern ment would have enabling powers to obtain all the air transport they needed from civil sources. The extra fuel burn makes one wonder why the RAF, or perhaps more accurately, the Treasury, gives this such high priority in their economics. The fuel must surely be bought at best bulk wholesale prices and without tax. If for book-keeping exercises there is tax, it is no more relevant than a public utility charging itself for its own services. It is accepted that it takes £3m to train a pilot and, therefore, a further £3m to replace him, but it would be interesting to see a breakdown of the figures. One could then ascertain how much can be contributed to retaining a pilot in the RAF or as an active reservist. The obvious savings would stem from the lower number of trainees that would be required for pilot replacement. The equation would be complex. Perhaps the RAF has constructed, or may consider constructing a mathematical model to evaluate the whole concept of a RAuxAF as proposed in Flight on a cost-benefit basis. D. G. COLBORNE 1871 Azalea Drive Lawrenceville Georgia, 30245 USA SIR—Congratulations on your admirable editorial "Per Ardua" of March 7, in which you so cogently argue for the re-establishment of flying squadrons of the Royal Aux iliary Air Force. Most of the arguments are well sum marised by yourself, but a few additional points need to be clearly stated. First, it is economically wasteful to train aircrew, especially fast-jet pilots, and then for the RAF to lose their skills after eight- or 12-year FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL, 4 April 1987
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