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Aviation History
1988
1988 - 1017.PDF
INTERNATIONAL Week ending 23 April, 1988 Number 4110, Volume 133 ISSN 0015-3710 IN THIS ISSUE World News Air Transport Defence General Aviation 13 Spaceflight 16 Avionics 18 THE BATTLE FOR BERLIN 19 Mark Blacklock probes the reasons for some US Majors' interest in operating into West Berlin. AIRBUS: TIME FOR CHANGE? 22 Airbus Industrie's success is creating prob lems for the partner companies. J. M. Ramsden investigates. LIGHTNING TAKES LEAVE 28 Janice Lowe provides a photographic tribute to a retiring fighter. EXTENDING SHUTTLE'S REACH 30 Nasa's orbital manoeuvring vehicle and its missions are described by Andrew Wilson. Industry 33 Letters 34 Straight and Level 36 Published in association with Airline Business by Reed Business Publish ing Ltd, Quadrant House, The Quadrant, Sutton, Surrey S1V12 5AS, England, '?'. Copyright Reed Business Publishing Ltd. 1988 Founded 1909 Second-class postage paid at RAHWAY, New Jersey, and additional entries Postmaster: Send Address Corrections to "Flight International", c/o Mercury Airfreight International Ltd. Inc., lOBEnglebard Avenue, Avenel, N.J 07001. Editor David Mason Associate Editor Peter Middleton Assistant Editor Tom Hamill Air Transport Editor David Learmount Air Transport editorial John Bailey, Ian Dormer Defence Editor Mike Gaines Defence editorial Eric Beech Technical Editor Graham Warwick, BSc General Aviation editorial Ian Goold, Alan Postlethwaite Photographer Janice Lowe Production Editor Philip Jarrett Art Editor Colin Paine Layout Alison Collins Technical Artists Ira Epton, Tim Hall, John Marsden Washington correspondent Julian Moxon (202) 547 2624 Israel correspondent Arie Egozi 03 945326 Paris correspondent Gilbert Sedbon (I) 4825 5261 US West Coast correspondent Norman Lynn (408) 778 0889 West German correspondent Stefan Geisenheyner 061 21 526894 Publishing Director Murray Johnstone Editor-in-Chief J M Ramsden Advertisement Sales Manager Joanna Macpherson Assistant Advertisement Manager Nicholas Wilcox Senior Advertisement Sales Executive Anne Williams Sales Executive Nick White Advertisement Production Howard Mason. Simon Smith Advertisement Sales—France Pierre Mussard, 18,20 Place de la Made leine, Pans 75008, France Telephone: Paris 42655014 Telex:: 215334F BtSPRSF Vice-president US Sales John Tidy, Reed Business Publishing, 3700 Campus Drive, Suite 203, Newport Beach, CA 92660. Telephone: (714) 756 1057 Telex 238327 Sates Director (East Coast) Clfve Richardson, Reed Business Publishing, 205 East 42nd Street, New York, NY 10017. Telephone: (212) 867 2080. Telex 238327 Sales Director (Mid-West & Canada) Gene Glendinning, Reed Business Publishing, Cahners Plaza, 1350 East Touhy Avenue, P0 Box 5080, Des Plames. Illinois 60018 Telephone: (312) 635 9920. Subscriptions Manager A Walden Telephone: England (0444) 441212 (Details of UK and overseas subscription rates and agents are available on request) Telephone: 01-661 3315 (Display Advertisement Sales) 01-661 6373 (Classified) 01-661 3267 (Advertisement Production) 01-661 3321 (Editorial) Telegram/Telex 892084 REEDBP G Facsimile (Group lll/ll|. Telephone: 01-661 3840 E.E3 Member of the Audit Bureau of Circulations Front cover: American Airlines is one of several US majors seeking access to West Berlin, planning 13 flights a day between Berlin and Frankfurt using its 727-200s. See pages 19-21. FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL, 23 April 1988 EDITORIAL Approaching disaster Few would have expected an experi enced captain to land a public transport aircraft on a taxiway exactly in the path of another aircraft which was legitimately making its way along that taxiway on the reciprocal head ing. Yet it happened at the world's second busiest international airport. And it was only fortuitous that the two aeroplanes, a British Island Airways BAC One-Eleven and a British Airways Boeing 737, were not left in a tangled heap of metal and bodies following a head-on collision. The incident is fully reported on page 4. Briefly, the One-Eleven was on approach to Gatwick at night shortly after the main runway (08R) had been closed for repairs. The normal taxiway, which serves as an emergency runway in Gatwick's case, was designated the active runway (08L), and its runway lights were switched on. A second, narrower, taxiway to the left of 08L came into use as the active taxiway, and the 737 had just been cleared on to it, taxiing west, when the errant One-Eleven made its approach and landing on to that same taxiway. An air traffic controller spotted the conflict and warned the 737 captain, who took the appropriate action by turning right on to the grass. Clearly safety was monumentally compromised. The inquiry will apportion blame to those who are deemed to have transgressed, and that will be followed by the appropriate punishment. The One-Eleven pilots will no doubt take the predominant share of the blame. It happens that the pilots concerned were among the most experienced. They were a line-check captain of 30 years experience, and a pilot of some 20 years experience being checked out in the left-hand seat before promotion to captain. The line- check pilot was operating in the role of handling pilot. Whether this level of experience should make it less acceptable that they should have made a serious mistake is debatable. The important question is, were there any other contributing factors to this near catastrophic incident, which could have been avoided? It has to be asked whether the devel opment of an international airport of the size of Gatwick, with only a single runway, was ever sensible in the first place. Gatwick is now approaching capacity, and any unexpected event, or planned main tenance activity, which causes the closure of the customary runway, can insert un usual considerations into the pilot's pro cedures, thereby marginally increasing the possibility of something going wrong. How far the Gatwick set-up contributed to the problem is something which the incident's investigators should consider. They might also consider whether the air traffic function was carried out sufficiently well, when an aircraft was allowed to approach on a line some 90 metres offset from the actual designated runway centreline. The tower controller who ordered the 737 off the taxiway has received much praise for his prompt action. Was the approach radar controller at fault in failing to note that the aircraft was on finals in an offset position? And if so, was that a contributing factor to the incident? Were the instructions to pilots to deal with the variation generated by the change of runway absolutely clear? The safety of the aeroplane and its passengers remains the responsibility of the captain, so tech nically there can be no excuse. But one can envisage a sequence of thoughts which could lead to the aberration of this misplaced landing. If the Gatwick runway goes out of action at 2200, the corrupted logic would read, we are instructed to land on the temporary runway to the left of it. There in front of us is a perfectly well lit runway, clearly the main runway, and to the left of it a less well lit length of concrete, clearly the designated temporary landing strip. That must be where we are meant to land. We have no idea whether the sequence of thoughts that went through the pilots' minds is like that, but it does illustrate the kind of decision process which lures its victims into error as surely as the Sirens lured sailors to their doom. It used to be called the human factor. Error is of course inevitable, and in this profession it is also frequently fatal. The priority is to stop the inevitable error becoming fatal—to survive the mistake. The key to this incident, as to so many, is that it was not the result of one single factor. The fact of Gatwick's single runway; the fact that its alternative runway is at least as long and appears slightly longer; the confusion in the minds of the pilots about which piece of concrete constituted the active runway; and the fact that in those unusual circumstances they were carrying out an unusual flight operation in the form of a check ride. When two or more unusual factors are present, the chance of a problem arising is not the aggregate of those factors; it is their multiple. A veteran pilot told us recently of the old philosophy. It has a measure of merit, even if it is an expensive luxury for today's crowded skies: "Every approach is an approach to a go-around. If everything is 100 per cent right, then you can afford to convert the approach to a landing."
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