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Aviation History
1989
1989 - 0115.PDF
INTERNATIONAL Week ending 21 January 1989 Number 4148, Volume 135 ISSN 0015-3710 <g^ REED IN THIS ISSUE BMA crash investigation latest 727 checks ordered 747-400 certificated Final Intelsat V poised T-45 performance "inadequate" Plessey turns tables on GEC Airlines worldwide stand by CFM56 Indians freeze fighter design Bell flies bearingless rotor Safer 1988, says US safety board Reagan's last budget will be trimmed US bomb threats increase Britannia takes over Orion Leopard makes steady progress Hughes expands into training Shorts losses reach £142 million Soviets set Mars timetable Bond buys Arriels for S-76 helicopter test Soviets orbit laser target Tornado exceeded limits 2 2 3 4 5 6 11 13 14 16 17 20 21 22 23 24 25 28 31 32 Simulating the battle zone 34 US fighter pilots sample a new combat simu lation system. Iceland's coastal watchdog 38 We describe the work of the Icelandic Coast Guard. Firespray 42 A water-mist extinguisher could virtually elimi nate airliner cabin fires. 1988: bad for schedules 49 Airline safety and security come under exam ination. Letters 58 Straight and Level 62 Front cover: The Icelandic Coast Guard's SA.36SN Dauphin II performs a variety of duties. Flight photograph by Janice Lowe. OUR VIEW_ An abused gift The only good thing to come out of an aircraft accident is experience which, hopefully, will prevent a similar or identical accident from happening again. The principal distiller of that experience is the inspectorate which investigates the accident. The vital links in passing that experience on to those on the ground and in the air are the formal opinions and reports of that inspectorate, and the recommendations and directives which arise from them. The system is, in general, efficient, honest, and unbiased wherever in the world the incident may have occurred. Even traditionally secretive countries increasingly see the need to report on accidents and their causes in the interest of improved international safety. Increasingly, this information is not saved up until the inspectorate has finished its deliberations, months or even years after the event, but is made public as quickly as possible, as each stage in the investigation is passed. Serious problems, or potential problems, have always been passed to operators as they became known or suspected, but this industry should not have the privi lege, where other industries do not, of being its own monitor. The people have a right to know, and lawmakers, rule- makers, and politicians have a right to be appraised of the various details as they become clear. • Recent events, such as the crash of the British Midland Boeing 737, have raised very real fears, however, that such infor mation is in danger of being hijacked or discredited by a combination of vested interest, over-hasty judgement, and a lamentable desire of the popular press to find instant scapegoats. The end result might be that the trend to more open interim reporting is reversed, and that inspectorates may revert to holding on to their findings until they are complete, and can be presented in a watertight and unequivocal manner. The British Midland case is a classic example of what can go wrong. At each stage, as investigators have released their interim findings, the popular press, "experts", and vested interests on both sides of the Atlantic have leaped to new conclusions. Those conclusions have mostly been contradictory from one day to the next. Those conclusions have in many cases been unequivocal and absolute, ignoring the careful qualifications which the investigators have, quite rightly, included in every one of their state ments. Those conclusions have jumped from unrealistic commendation to unjust condemnation. Far worse, many of these instant judgements have come from people or organisations from whom the industry and the public have every right to expect far better. Such judgements apparently satisfy the demands of today's newspaper reader or television watcher for a black- and-white conclusion. They may also soothe the bruised egos of those whose actions may have been called into ques tion, and they may satisfactorily transfer—albeit only briefly—the spot light of attention on to some other suspect. What they do not do is advance the cause of safety, or of public confidence in the industry, or of greater knowledge. In short, they act against the aims of the investigators who have made so many strides in speeding the flow of informa tion to those who need it. There is no doubt that the aviation industry, its regulators, and customers need a rapid flow of information after an accident, and need accurate inter pretation of that information, in order to take precautions which may prevent another occurrence. There is no doubt that some of that interpretation must come into the category of "best guess" rather than absolute certainty. It there fore becomes the absolute responsibility of all those charged with passing on that information and interpretation to do so with care. Speedily available, readily available post-crash information is a precious and fragile, gift from which this industry can derive great benefit. If it is lost or damaged because of the selfish actions of an irresponsible few, the only good to come from a crash will disappear. FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL, 21 January 1989 1
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