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Aviation History
1989
1989 - 0157.PDF
Above Even after a fuel fire caused this Trident tail section to fall off, the flames did not enter the cabin with the Save system running. Below Visibility is only slightly reduced by the spray D Accidents in which there was little or no pre-fire cabin damage—17 accidents/266 fire deaths • Accidents in which there was major pre-fire cabin damage (i.e. involving some probable loss of system coverage)—seven accidents/75 fire deaths • Accidents in which there was severe pre- fire cabin damage (i.e. major loss of system coverage)—16 accidents/268 fire deaths • Accidents in which there was extreme pre-fire cabin damage (i.e. very little like lihood of system function)—29 accidents/ 705 fire deaths. The data exclude fire deaths which would probably have been prevented by 1987- standard safety features. Significantly, accidents with severe or extreme crash damage tended to involve smaller aircraft types. Widebodies fared better, and could be expected to experience improved system functioning. The CAA says that the cost-benefit equation may be further improved because spray systems would reduce the likelihood of a total hull loss. A key factor in determining system cost is the duration of spray operation required. For certification an aircraft has to allow evacua tion of a full passenger load through half of its exits in less than 90 seconds. In a genuine emergency, evacuation can take up to five minutes. The Trident tests supplied water for three minutes, which should let fire-fighters reach an airfield crash site, and suggested that the benefits could extend up to five minutes. Earlier tests in a VC-10 indicated a required flow-rate for a narrow-body of 0 • 2gal of water per foot-run of cabin per minute—equating to 15gal/min in a Boeing 737. Using those figures, a 737 such as that involved in the fatal fire at Manchester in August 1985 would need to carry 45gal of water. A widebody is expected to require about lOOgal more. An obvious attraction is to be able to use the aircraft's potable water supply in the event of fire. Unfortunately this is often largely depleted in flight, and would not be available in a fire at destination. It seems essential to carry a dedicated supply sufficient to cover the minimum flow period, though a system which was additionally connected to the potable water would have an advantage in the early stages of a journey. The CAA is requesting industry feedback on what the minimum period should be. Once the onboard supply was exhausted, spraying could continue if airport fire tenders were able to connect into the system. Aircraft would have to have an adequate number of inlet points to allow for some being damaged. The distribution piping would have to be able to cope with high fluid flow rates, as w&uld the outlet nozzles. More problem atically, the external connectors would have to be standardised internationally. Fire officers suggest that fuselage inlets at the front, centre, and rear would suffice, and the FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL, 21 January 1989 43
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