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Aviation History
1989
1989 - 1928.PDF
Challenger/Regional Jet comparison Dimensions Fuselage length (ft) Wing span (ft) Weights Typical operating empty (lb) Maximum take-off (lb) Maximum payload (lb) Maximum fuel load Performance Range with design payload (miles) Take-off field length—s.l./ISA (ft) Landing field length* (ft) Approach speed (kt) Vm„/Mmo (KtCAS/Mach) Maximum operating altitude (ft) *Landing field length and approach speed quot CL-601-3A 600 64-3 24,685 43,100 4,815 16,665 3,947 5,400 3,300 135 365/0-85 41,000 CL-601RJ 800 70-3 29,900 47,250 12,100 9,400 1,005 5,200 5,050 127 335/0-85 37,000 ed for "typical landing weight". Wing area grew, and, in the absence of a possible General Electric engine, Avco Lyco ming came up with the 7,5001b-thrust ALF502L. The aircraft finally flew after a rapid devel opment programme in late 1978, but was to suffer a troubled infancy. Donald Lowe, current president of Canadair but then running Pratt & Whitney, puts it down to the decision to install a new engine on a new airframe. "The decision was made because Federal Express [which had ordered 25] really wanted the Lycoming," Lowe says he suggested that Canadair take the GE engine, "or else they would have trouble for the first two or three years until the engine got debugged". The subsequent advent of the Challenger 601 with GE power and winglets has vindi cated the decision to modify the aircraft further, and 1989 sees Canadair raising production to meet demand for the third year running. Three years ago, Canadair was bought by Bombardier, and chairman Laurent Beaudoin said it would not be possible "to make a Cadillac from a wheelbarrow", but that the company would continue to be good at what it was best at. FULL-BLOWN COMMUTER Nine months later, at the 1987 Paris Air Show, Canadair boldly displayed a model of a stretched Challenger it was proposing for the regional airline market. The Challenger had been designed to public-transport standards, and Donald Lowe planned to develop a full blown commuter jet for around $250 million, a quarter of the cost of an all-new design. He also reckoned to get other aircraft out of the investment—two stretched Challengers: a down-market ($10 million-$12 million) model, and a longer aircraft, fitting in just below the Gulfstream TV. A stretched Challenger with equal plugs fore and aft of the wing and grossing at 43,0001b, based on the existing wing and powered by Rolls-Royce or General Electric, was planned before the prototype first flew in 1978. That does not mean, however, that Canadair has not done its homework now for a 1990s commuter that could be a pioneer in a whole new sector of the airline industry. How did Canadair arrive at the Regional Jet (RJ)? Programme manager and executive vice-president Robert Wohl says that, for 20 years, the airline business has been driven by the market, technology, and regulation, but that most recently it has become capacity- and infrastructure-limited. Major airport hubs and related air-traffic control have reached, or are approaching, saturation, and Wohl sees a vicious circle developing. "The infrastructure needs large aircraft to generate efficiencies," he says, "but those aircraft are choking the hubs. Making aircraft larger while reducing service frequency detracts from the service required, and could impact on hubs' ability to accept feederliners, which is one of the essential hub-and-spoke con cepts." The manu facturers must break the logjam, he says. "Since modern jets start at 100 seats, we said 'Let's look smal ler'. Does a 50-seat jet market exist? Is the 500-mile radius of the turboprop based on real dis tance between city pairs, or is turboprop speed limiting the operating radii? Does a jet make sense between 400 and 1,000 miles? Do passengers prefer pure jets? Will airlines fly spoke-to-spoke?" The more Canadair asked questions, the more convinced it became that a market existed. The RJ team, led by development and marketing vice-president Eric McConachie and marketing director Tom Keough, visited Twelve rows of double-seat units at 31 in pitch give 130 airlines in North America and Europe and secured purchase agreements covering more than 50 aircraft before the programme was formally launched, just over two months ago. Airline reaction has been used to verify the rationale behind the RJ, and in some cases to modify it. Canadair has found (perhaps to its surprise) a marked difference between Euro pean and North American airline require ments. Operators in the USA and Canada want a 48-seater with relatively small galleys, but more space for baggage and wardrobes, while European airlines are asking for at least 50 seats and more galley capacity, but with less need for passenger baggage space. The manufacturer argues that higher capi tal costs are more than offset by the jet's increased productivity over normal stages. Passenger appeal is said to be a growing issue. Interlining passengers are thought not to want to transfer to aircraft driven by "old-fashioned" propellers. Canadair claims that, beyond an hour and a half, passengers are increasingly irritated by turboprop noise. Onboard space and convenience similar to those available on a jet is expected, says the company, which points out that turboprop manufacturers, claim "jet-like" characteristics for their aircraft, underlining the greater appeal of such machines. everyone an aisle or window seat Canadair says that the average age of the US fleet is more than 13 years, and that many One-Elevens, F.28s, and DC-9s are now 20 years old with attendent high maintenance costs. Noise, long a political hot potato in many US cities, is seen as an increasingly important factor with Stage III standards beginning in 1994. Moreover, deregulation in Australia and Europe in the early 1990s is expected to produce US-like changes in the air-transport structure. Canadair sees the RJ opening up new routes which are uneconomical for existing larger jets and unrealistic for short-winded turboprops, re-opening routes long aban doned by more expensive jets, or replacing turboprops on routes where the jet's greater speed makes a significant time difference. The manufacturer talks of a market for 1,000 aircraft in the 1990s (incidentally, the same market size originally foreseen by Cana dair for the Challenger business jet). 50 FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL 17 June 1989
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