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Aviation History
1992
1992 - 0298.PDF
DEFENCE France considers Mirage 2000-5 BY GILBERT SEDBON IN PARIS The French air force is con sidering the purchase of up to 40 Dassault Mirage 2000-5 combat aircraft equipped with the new Thomson-CSF RDY multi-target, lookdown/ shootdown radar. As a second option the air force is also looking at a major retrofit of two earlier generation Mirage 2000 squadrons of the 2e Escadre de Chasse (Cigogne) based at Dijon, central France, replacing their Thomson-CSF RDM radar with the more ad vanced RDY. The question of whether to make new acquisitions or up grade existing aircraft is being reconsidered. The air force turned down the Mirage 2000-5 in 1991, mainly because of a budget squeeze, but also with an eye to the new generation Rafale combat aircraft. It now fears that Rafale may not be available be fore 1997. Dassault Aviation has been pressing the French air force to buy the Mirage 2000-5 in the hope of giving it domestic credi bility, as a prerequisite for achieving a sale overseas. The Mirage 2000-5, with its new radar and upgraded avion ics, plays a central part in Das sault's sales campaign in Finland, the United Arab Emir ates, Malaysia and Pakistan. The French defence ministry's arms procurement division ap pears to have come to Dassault's rescue. The Delegation generate pour I'armement (DGA) chief Yves Sillard said recently that the possibility of the French air force buying the Mirage 2000-5 cannot be ruled out. The French Government is also considering retiring older Mirage 2000 fighters from the air force to offer them for sale or lease in eastern Europe and south-east Asia, say government and industry officials. The pro posal under discussion concerns two to three squadrons — 30 to 45 aircraft — and comes in response to heavy lobbying from Dassault, Thomson-CSF and en gine-maker Snecma. The French government is studying a request from Paki stan to purchase Mirage 2000s. Pakistan's prime minister Nawaz Sharif, during a recent two-day visit to Paris, secured a French pledge to sell 40 Mirage 2000s to the Pakistan air force, but under stringent financial condi tions. Sharifs meetings included one with Serge Dassault. Although Dassault Aviation insists there are no negotiations, the Pakistan industry officials maintain the stumbling block is payment. Pakistan has in the past 20 years, bought 80 Mirage Ills from France and has more re cently acquired Australia's age ing Mirage Ills. The Pakistani Government have been pressing for permission to purchase of the Mirage 2000, in the wake of a refusal by the USA to supply General Dynamics F-16s be cause of the Pakistani stance on nuclear weapons. • The French air force holds the hey to future Mirage 2000-5 sales AX programme may co BY GUY NORRIS IN LOS ANGELES The cost of the US Navy's AX programme could be double or even treble that of the A-12, the cancelled medium-attack air craft that the AX is designed to partially replace, according to General Dynamics (GD) director of signature and advanced engi neering, Keith Jackson. Revealing new details of the abandoned programme, Jackson says around $4 billion had been spent on the A-12 when, shortly after it had passed its final criti cal design review, it was cancelled by US defence secre tary, Richard Cheney. Compared to this, projected spending on the AX runs to beyond $12 billion including around $3 bil lion described as the pro gramme's "range of uncertainty". "The A-6 is still obsolete and GD reveals classified Declassified details of the General Dynamics (GD)/ McDonnell Douglas A-12 Avenger II, cancelled suddenly a year ago, have been revealed. The revelations are signifi cant given that much of the technology derived from the A-12 will form part of a GD team-bid for the up-coming AX competition for the US Navy. GD director of signature and advanced engineering, Keith Jackson, says: "At the time of the termination on 7 January, 1991, the drawings for the first aircraft were 99.2% released and 87.8% of production tools were complete or available' Approximately 50% of the parts for the first two aircraft were complete, including many large, complex composite 'big bones', the primary area where manu facturing development had proven to be more difficult than anticipated." Eight of the General Electric F412 engines were under test at the time, wing skins were com plete as was software for the first aircraft's vehicle manage ment system. Despite the fact that, at the time of cancellation, the aircraft was expected by Naval Air Sys tems Command (Navair) to be almost 8,0001b (3,628kg) over weight at best and final offer (BAFO), Jackson says the per formance estimate of the A-12 was "...in every case, to meet or exceed, in some cases substan tially, either these initial Navy performance projections or the contract specification values". The A-12 empty weight in creases were estimated by GD to be "...somewhat less than 6,0001bs (2,721kg) heavier than initial contractor projections at BAFO", but performance was retained; "...mainly because night control technology com pensated for weight growth and because aerodynamics did not suffer at all". Compared to the least of the full-scale development (FSD) specification value and Navair estimate at FSD start, GD be lieves the aircraft's design mis sion radius was 19% better than the Navair estimate at the start of full-scale development. Maximum speed was 5% bet ter and specific excess power 10% better while sustained g remained roughly equal. Mini mum wind-over-deck launch speed was around 3-4ft/s (lm/s) better than target. The A-12 was to be a large carrier-based aircraft with an unfolded span of around 21m and a length of just over 11m. With wings folded, span was reduced to around 11m giving a deck spot factor (a measure of space taken up by the aircraft on the carrier) smaller than the Grumman A-6 and the F-14. The A-12's planform shape consisted of three straight edges and a wing sweep of 46.5°, and was selected because of its low radar cross section. GD says a variety of vertical tails were tried and rejected because of radar signature penalties and, in 12 FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL 12 - 18 February, 1992
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