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Aviation History
1993
1993 - 1210.PDF
DEFENCE ANALYSIS LESSONS FROM THE GULF A US survey commissioned to look into the impact of US military aviation on the 1991 Gulf War throws a fresh perspective on what seemed at the time to be dramatic advances in air combat Operation Desert Storm demonstrated the poten tial of air power and some of its limits, according to Dr. El liot Cohen, who served as di rector of the Gulf War Air Power Survey, an independent study group commissioned by the US Air Force to examine the impact of US military avia tion in the 1991 Gulf conflict. The survey, commissioned in August 1991, cost the US tax payer about $5.8 million. It includes ten reports classified "secret" and an unclassified summary. The survey con cludes that US air power was not the "military-technical rev olution" which some advocates claimed it to be. If such a technological revo lution is under way, says Cohen, a strategic studies pro fessor at Johns Hopkins Uni versity, Washington DC, "...it is only in its early stages. But there are glimmerings of some thing very different ahead, in the role played by space-based assets, the unified command- and-control apparatus and the routine precision of air attacks. "A great deal of organisa tional and doctrinal prepara tion would be needed to make the promise of such a revolu tion a reality," he writes. After careful examination of the evidence, "...some of the aspects of the war that seemed most dramatic at the time ap pear less so than they did in the immediate after-glow of one of the most one-sided cam paigns in military history", Cohen concludes. "True revolutions in war may take decades and require not merely new technologies, but new forms of organisations and behaviour to mature. But as we consider the war, some signposts of change surely stand out," he adds. Cohen says that there were new technologies which gave the air campaign its distinctive character. They included the effective use of laser-guided bombs and Texas Instruments High-speed Anti-Radiation Mis siles (HARM). Air refuelling was also con sidered to be a critical factor, as was the use of the Lockheed F.117 stealth fighter. Cohen says that the HARM limited Iraqi forces to using short-range air defences, while the F.117 was used to hit strategic targets, paralysing enemy air-defence systems from the outset of the war. The USA and its allies com mitted about 1,760 combat and 747 support aircraft, with the USA providing about four- fifths of each. The USAF de ployed slightly more than one- quarter of its tactical aircraft, with the US Marine Corps, US Navy and US Army committing much higher percentages. In terms of armaments, two- thirds of the USAF's laser- guided bombs and its Maverick missiles were shipped to the Gulf, with about half of these weapons being consumed. Facing the Coalition force was "a third-rate opponent", with badly trained pilots. By the time of the Coalition's ground offensive, air power had destroyed or physically disabled more than half of the armour in front-line divisions, one-quarter in the Republican Guard divisions. Coalition air forces probably suppressed the Scud missile launch rate by 30-40%, but "...we have no hard evidence of the destruction of mobile Scuds from the air", Cohen adds. Coalition forces clearly con trolled the airspace, with the Iraqi air force either destroyed, grounded or sheltering in Iran. Nearly 400 of 600 Iraqi aircraft shelters were destroyed and 33 aircraft shot down. The naming of a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) responsible for plan ning and executing theatre air operations was controversial. USAF Lt Gen Charles Horner exercised his authority through the daily air-tasking order. "The daily air-tasking order became a subject of contention. The [US] military services and Coalition forces accepted the need for a single author ity... [but] they had, to varying degrees, reservations about Gen Horner's authority to se lect the targets and prescribe the flight operations for the many elements of the Coali tion's air forces," says Cohen. Before the war, commanders had planned to confine bomb runs from medium altitude to daylight. After three days of combat, and the loss of several aircraft, commanders restricted bombing missions to 10,000- 15,000ft (3,000-4,600m), which is above the reach of anti-aircraft artillery. This reduced bombing accu racy and required higher weather ceilings for visual bomb runs. About half of the attack sorties into Iraq had been diverted to other targets or were cancelled because of weather-related problems. The role of the Boeing B-52 bomber was highlighted in the survey. The B-52 was estimated to have been used to drop nearly one-third of the bomb tonnage in the war "becoming one of the most sought-after aircraft by the ground com manders for strikes against Iraqi ground forces", says Cohen. Use of the B-52Gs from Barksdale AFB, Los Angeles, helped to open the air war. Carrying conventionally armed air-launched cruise mis siles, the B-52s were used to hit communications and power plants deep inside Iraq. The round-trip lasted over 35h, the longest air-combat mission in history, and the occasion of the first use of conventional air-launched cruise missiles in combat. While Operation Desert Storm was successful for US air power, it would be dangerous to consider that future wars will be fought in the same way. Thus, care must be exercised before applying the lessons of the Gulf War to future battles, he concludes. BY RAMON LOPEZ • "The B-52 was...used to drop nearly one-third of the bomb tonnage in the war, 'becoming one oj the most sought- after aircraft...for strikes against Iraqi ground forces." FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL 26 May - 1 June, 1993 19
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