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Aviation History
1994
1994 - 0923.PDF
EUROFIGHTER 2000 severe pressure, with a 10,000-plus cut in its workforce already being implemented. A reduction in its anticipated work on the Eurofighter project would inevitably see further job cuts. DASA is already understood to be reviewing its position on exactly when DAI will be transferred to BAe Warton. Under the revised programme structure, the aircraft was scheduled to have only lOh flight time at Manching before mov ing to join DA2 in the flight-test pro gramme at Warton. This would leave DASA personnel at Manching with a considerably reduced workload and the company is now considering keeping the aircraft at Manching for a longer period, to provide work for the staff. Officials within BAe say: "We don't see it as a problem. At least they are being enthusiastic about the project." With employment a key concern, DASA's "political card" is that the procure ment phase will have to be accepted by the new Ger man Government in the second quarter of 1995. The Eurofighter project is hardly awash with stalwart support among Bonn politi cians — least of all from defence minister Volker Ruhe, whose antics during the course of 1992 brought the project to the brink of collapse. In pursuing political support for the procurement of the Eurofighter, DASA, is arguing the advantages of employment and the industrial benefits. DASA con tends that any attempt to reduce German workshare will undermine its ability to shepherd the programme through a po tentially hostile parliament in 1995. The production-investment go-ahead would then be given to Eurofighter by the end of that year. REVISIONS ARGUMENT Among senior DASA management, there are those arguing that the whole concept of workshare allocation should be revised. These include Oscar Friedrich, managing director of the Panavia tri-national Tor nado consortium. Friedrich, on second ment to Panavia from DASA, argues that, as far as workshare is concerned, "...it is BONDS too early to try and fix it now". Friedrich is concerned that any downward revision of workshare would only aggravate poten tial German problems with the project. Friedrich, who may yet hold a senior position in a merged Panavia/Eurofighter industrial structure, maintains that it is unacceptable to try to establish workshare before "hard numbers" are available for the whole production run. He claims that, while Germany has stated that its production need is 120 Eurofighter 2000 finally became airborne on 27 March aircraft, this figure is likely to increase during the production run. Options being bandied about within DASA include the argument that workshare should be based on development funding. Wrapped up in the overall workshare issue is the continuing wrangle over system-design responsibility (SDR) and risk-sharing on the digital flight-control system (FCS). SDR for the Eurofighter FCS is held by DASA, with GEC-Marconi Avionics (GMAv) implementing DASA- supplied control laws. Problems with the FCS were the main cause of the three-year delay. BAe and GMAv are looking to take a risk-sharing role in the FCS — and thus a managerial stake in the FCS project — with the SDR being split. Any split of the SDR is being resisted by DASA, although it wants to spread the financial risk of FCS development. In a further twist to the dispute, DASA is now proposing that it should use elements of the FCS software developed for the Rockwell/ DASA X-31 high agility dem onstrator aircraft, rather than the original GMAv-developed Eurofighter software. Exactly how "portable" this software is remains open to dispute. GMAv officials claim that adopting it would be no easy task and would incur additional costs. They also reject suggestions that the delays to the Eurofighter FCS were pri marily because of GMAv problems. DASA declines to discuss the issue. Some sources claim that DASA's moti vation in floating the idea of making use of X-31 software is primarily politically motivated and is being used as a weapon in the struggle over the SDR for the FCS on the Eurofighter and also in the wider issue of arty threatened work- share re-jig. PROGRAMME DELAYS The delays to the Eurofighter programme have also presented at least two of the four nations with a "fighter gap", which US combat-aircraft makers have been quick to try to address. First delivery of the Eurofighter, or the European Fighter Aircraft, as it was then, was origi nally due in 1996-7. Now, the UK and Italy will not receive their first aircraft until 2000, while Spain and Germany will begin to take theirs in 2002. Italy anticipates an initial squadron to be operational no earlier than in 2005. Both McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed were looking to provide stopgap aircraft to Italy, a move only thwarted by the leasing of ex-RAF Tornado F.3 air-defence aircraft. In Spain, the USA has offered 40 second hand F-16A/Bs — ostensibly as gap-fillers. Both situations have sparked concern among the partner nations' industries. Had Italy opted for a US solution, then its position within Eurofighter would have been undermined. Spending money on a US aircraft to perform the same role, while funding a European combat aircraft, would have pro vided a difficult argument to push past politicians. The Tornados were leased effec tively at a "no cost" to either party. Blocking US inroads into Spain, especially in the shape of an inexpensive secondhand F-16A/B, will prove more difficult for the Eurofighter partners. Spain, unlike Italy, is not already a Tornado operator. "It is going to be a fascinating few months," comments one senior Eurofighter source, with a flair for under statement. Had the aircraft not been flown by 15 April, it could have been considerably more interesting, and unpleasant, for the project. a FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL 6 - 12 April, 1994 21
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