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Aviation History
1994
1994 - 2735.PDF
/*J^ J J I/Ji s-\ J Jj-\ —i J ^J J ^J DOUGLAS BARRIE/LONDON In late 1991, Lt Gen Dan Shomron, ex-Israeli chief of staff, and then chairman of Israel Military Industries, led a high- level delegation to China. High on the agenda for discus sion was probably the joint development of an advanced combat aircraft for the Chinese air force (PLAAF). The develop ment contract for the project was signed in 1992. The revelation that Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) is work ing on a single-engined multi-role fighter for the PLAAF, based on technology from the "defunct" Lavi fighter programme Flight International, 2-8 November), marks a significant change in the level of defence collaboration between the two states. Although at first glance Israel and China may appear to make strange bedfellows, defence collab oration between the two is not new. Previous programmes are thought to have included the PL-8 short- range infra-red-guided air-to-air missile, which is believed to be a licence-produced variant of the Rafael Python 3 missile. The marked difference is in die scale of the programme being undertaken and its potential polit ical impact both in the USA and throughout the rest of Asia. The original Lavi design was intended to give the Israeli air force an aircraft which was more combat-capable than the Lockheed F-16. Such an aircraft entering service in considerable numbers with the PLAAF would be likely to send China's neigh bouring states looking for advanced-combat aircraft, too. When die Lavi was originally cancelled there was considerable speculation diat Soudi Africa might continue the programme. The South African Air Force is believed to have considered this option, but settled instead for an upgrade of its IAI Kfirs (Cheetahs). The most likely Chinese "partner" for the Israeli company in the development programme would either be Shenyang Chinese tonic The Chinese air force is picking up the pieces of Israel's Lavi fighter programme. "The original Lavi design was intended to give the Israeli air force an aircraft which was more combat-capable than the Lockheed F-16." Aircraft, which was previously believed to have been working independently on a single-seat, single-engined delta-canard design, or Chengdu Aircraft Industrial Corporation. The IAI prototype of the PLAAF fighter is due to be flown in early 1996, a decade after the Lavi was first flown. The aircraft will have an in-service date of just after the turn of the century. While based on the Lavi design, the prototype is said to look different. Its avionics sys tems, however, are claimed to be almost exactly the same as those developed for the Lavi. The air craft may also be equipped with the Elta EL/M-2035 multi- mode pulse-Doppler radar. When the Lavi was cancelled in August 1987, Israel had already spent $1.5 billion on the programme, some 50% of the contracts going to US compa nies. It remains to be seen how the US Government will react publicly to having inadvertently been involved in the develop ment of a new combat aircraft for China. The three Lavi prototypes were powered by the Pratt & Whitney PW1120 turbojet, with the digital flight-control system (FCS) devel oped by Lear Siegler/MBT. The powerplant for the PLAAF prototype combat aircraft is not known, although the production aircraft will have a Chinese engine. The extent to which the Lavi FCS is used in the "new" air craft is uncertain. IAI has continued to fly the third aircraft, prototype B-3, as a technology-demonstrator aircraft. It now seems likely that some results of flight testing from this aircraft will have been fed into the Chinese programme. At one level, Israel may be merely trying to recoup some of the investment it had originally made, apparently fruitlessly, in the Lavi programme. There were also those in the USA who lobbied determinedly for the cancellation of the Lavi programme, pushing for the Israelis to purchase US combat aircraft instead. Israel may also be signalling its political independence from the USA in pursuing defence relationships of which its erst while guarantor does not neces sarily approve. The USA has previously blocked Chinese attempts to replace its obsolescent combat fleet of Xian J-7 interceptors, Nanchang Q-5 Fantan strike/attack and Shenyang J-6 attack aircraft. Grumman's involvement in the Peace Pearl upgrade project for the J-8 II Finback air-superiority fighter collapsed following US governmental ire over the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, as did its work on the Super- 7 upgrade programme, intended for export. Since then, China has been courting Russia, with a deal con cluded in 1991 to purchase the Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker counter-air fighter. So far, it has bought 26 aircraft, with negotiations contin uing on a follow-on batch. Negotiating the second ship ment has proved difficult, howev er, with Russia unwilling effectively to "barter" the aircraft for goods, and instead demanding hard currency. Such difficulties have almost certainly reinforced China's desire to manufacture, if not design independently, its primary next- generation fighter. While there may be those in the West whose "knee-jerk" reaction will be to condemn the Israeli move, it reflects no more than the new world disorder brought about by the end of the Cold War. Such collaborative military pro grammes are likely to become more, rather than less, common. • FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL 9 - 15 November 1994
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