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Aviation History
1999
1999 - 1493.PDF
In some cases it is difficult to believe that the pilots did not know the risks they were taking light aircraft should know, in any given situa tion, exactly what options are available simply because diey are few. All the nations which track GA safety are unit ed in the judgement that continuing into deteri orating weadier is the greatest cause of grief. In the corporate aviation accidents list, which records events involving more capable aircraft and, presumably, more experienced pilots, numerous aviators filed for flights under visual flight rules (VFR), presumably because of their qualifications or aircraft equipment. But soon after take off the same pilots came to grief in instrument meterorological conditions (IMC). In some cases, from die evidence, it is difficult to believe that the pilots did not know the risk diey were taking. The tables record nine acci dents involving weather as a major factor, widi 2 0 resulting fatalities. Controlled flight into ter rain (CFIT) killed 57 people in 11 accidents, and die weadier was not particularly bad in most of them, but IMC prevailed in them all. The concept of VMC at night, not espoused in all countries, is a trap which catches many aviators and ought to be reviewed. Good visibility exists only when diere is strongmoon or starlight, and even dien the visual clues differ in daylight. On 13 March last year (see list) an Aerospatiale TBM-700 pilot carried out a successful night global positioning system (GPS) satellite navi gation system letdown into the visual circuit. During the night circuit, although die visibility was technically about 15km, the aircraft hit trees on a low hill while positioning to land. There was overcast and moonlight, if any, would have been limited. GPS is a much used navigation aid in general aviation, but it can let an aircraft down into trou ble. In accidents like this it is tempting to ask whether, without GPS, the pilot would have elected to make the approach attempt or to divert to an airfield with precision runway approach guidance. NASA has been working on the concept of making use of new technology to make light air craft cockpits so intuitive and engines so reliable that accidents will decrease. The idea is ulti mately to provide die intuitive situational aware ness which is being introduced in airliners in the form of enhanced ground proximity warning systems integrated with a navigation display. As die airlines have found, however, mankind finds new ways of making mistakes when provided widi new technology - not only until it becomes mature, but until pilots have learned what its limitations are and have picked up user skills. Airline pilots are more or less bound by stan dard operating procedures widi any given level of equipment. They are less free to use a new piece of equipment, like GPS, in a way for which it was not designed. Private pilots have advice but are freer to calculate their own risks. Neidier is it so easy to persuade private pilots to learn about human factors so as to develop an awareness of dieir own weaknesses. Airlines and die military, meanwhile, invest in human factors instruction and concepts like crew resource management (CRM). The military has devel oped a version of CRM for single-pilot cockpits. The UK CAA, having expressed its muted pleasure at good 1998 GA safety figures, resorts to group human factors, providing a checklist of actions for individual private pilots and club instructors in its GA Safety Information Leaflet. The theme is to become part of a safety team for die whole industry by persuading odier pilots who are acting unwisely not to do so. The suggestions include persuading pilots: CORPORATE AVIATION ACCIDENT CAUSES 1998 Listed fatal accidents by No of Cause accidents Aircrew error CRT Weather Loss of control Engine failure/fire Structure/systems fail Operations error Maintenance Airframe/systems fire ATC error 33 11 9 15 2 23 2 1 1 1 No of fatalities 80 57 20 32 2 4 - - - 4 Note: There are 70 accidents, 29 fatal accidents, and 124 fatalities listed in 1998. Most accidents have more than one causal factor. The causes, as assessed at this stage, are the principal appar ent causes and major contributory factors in the accidents and may be subject to revision follow ing a full inquiry. The causes of some accidents are unknown. Aircrew error could be a direct mis take, failure to follow standard operating proce dure, inappropriate pilot strategic judgement, or pilot failure to intervene correctly to save the flight.Controlled flight into terrain (CRT) refers to collision with high ground or rising terrain, and to collision with level ground (eg: on approach) when the aircraft is fully under control. • to take refresher training if out of practice; • not to use out of date charts and planning data; • to get good meteorological data; • not to show off; • not to press on in bad weadier. Despite wordiy intentions, however, tech nology which brings improved situational awareness to GA pilots may now be die only way left to improve safety at anything more than a pedestrian rate. Using basically die same air craft with the same cockpits will tend to gener ate die same results as today. • So long as equipment remains much the same, accidents will remain the same - • # — ^ggjarffl Wm i-_^^3 If-H * J'TwlB&'.mmjm mi ——i *s^"" •^•••i EfiH ^ „„_ ^^^^^ s -- W • ~XT°S^IS^ : H M4BSA, _^—- m - ^e^^-H g~~~^~ j ~~T^j FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL 26 May - 1 June 1999 37
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