FlightGlobal.com
Home
Premium
Archive
Video
Images
Forum
Atlas
Blogs
Jobs
Shop
RSS
Email Newsletters
You are in:
Home
Aviation History
2004
2004-05 - 0010.PDF
HEADLINES AIR TRANSPORT DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW & DAVID LEARMOUNT / LONDON Spate of errors led to Linate crash Report into fatal runway collision highlights pilot mistakes and lack of safety management system at the airport The final report into the 8 October 2001 runway collision at fog-bound Milan Linate airport, in which 118 people were killed, criticises the pilots of a business jet that took the wrong taxiway for a series of mis takes and slams managers at the air port. Linate had no safety manage ment system, recurrent training for air traffic control personnel, aero drome operations manual or inci dent reporting procedure. Those who died included all 110 people on board a Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) Boeing MD-87 that was taking off, the four people in an Air Evex Cessna Citation CJ2 crossing the runway uncleared, and four people in an airport building. The report says several opportu nities to avoid the accident were missed owing to slack air traffic communications procedures and inadequate airport layout informa tion. It says the accident ultimately resulted from the Cessna crew's human error in taking an incorrect taxiway and straying on to the active runway. The Cessna taxied across several markers, including a stop line and an illuminated bar of red stop lights without communi cating with air traffic control. But the report stresses that, while the Cessna crew made the original error, basic inadequacies in airport signage and poor commu nication meant that opportunities to correct it were missed. "The obvious consideration is that the human-factor related act ion of the Cessna crew - during low- visibility conditions - must be weighted against the scenario that allowed the course of events that led to the collision," says the report. "Equally, it can be stated that the system in place at Milan Linate air port was not geared to trap misun derstandings, let alone inadequate procedures, blatant human errors and faulty airport layout." The Cessna crew landed the air craft about an hour before the acci dent, despite not being qualified to land in the low-visibility conditions, put at 50-100m (165-330ft). Before its planned departure, air traffic controllers instructed the CJ2 to follow the northern R5 taxiway from the front apron, but the crew mistakenly took the southern R6 taxiway that led to the runway. There were no identification signs for taxiway R6 along its length. Air/ground communications on the radio channels were in Italian and English, the report says, and phraseology used by pilots and air traffic controllers did not comply with International Civil Aviation Organisation recommendations. Control tower MD-87 R3X !M Cessna Citation Category 3 stop bar Holding points Cessna's actual path Cessna's instructed path N FLIGHT Crucially, while taxiing, the Cessna crew twice transmitted a position report to the ground con troller stating that the aircraft was approaching the "Siena 4" taxiway marking, which, while located on taxiway R6, was not shown on aero nautical charts and was not recog nised or understood by the con troller. The report says the Cessna crew was "not aided properly" by correct signage and lighting. Having not picked up on the Cessna's incorrect location, the controller remained "positively cer tain" that the Cessna was on taxi way R5 - heading for Linate's northern apron - and instructed the jet to continue taxiing. The Cessna crew, it points out, crossed several potential warning markers before reaching the runway, but did not advise controllers. "Before entering the runway the Cessna crossed a white 'Stop' mark ing, an ICAO type B holding posi tion marking, a bar of [illuminated] red lights, an ICAO type A holding marking and then followed the green taxiway centreline lights without any further radio commu nication," it says. The report says that required markings, lights and signs at Linate either "did not exist or were in dis mal order". DEFENCE STEPHEN TRIMBLE / WASHINGTON DC USAF recasts E-10A role to beat cruise missiles Cruise missile defence has eclipsed ground target sensing and aerial battle management to become the primary mission and chief selling point for the US Air Force's emerg ing E-10A platform. USAF leaders signed a directive in early February that recasts the E-lOA's roles and missions to emphasise the platform's unique capability to detect and track low- flying cruise missiles, industry sources say. The directive also reclas sifies two featured E-10A missions as subordinate roles - serving as a hub in the multi-sensor command and control architecture (MC2A) and eventually replacing the ground moving target indicator (GMTI) capability now provided by the Northrop Grumman E-8 JSTARS air borne ground surveillance system. The air force plans to spend $5.3 billion to develop and build five E-lOAs based on the Boeing 767- 400ER design. There are also pro posals to develop E-10 variants to succeed the Boeing E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System and an electronic warfare payload to replace the Lockheed Martin EC-130 Compass Call fleet. Cruise missile defence is now the "number one priority" for the E-10A, says Raytheon MC2A battle management command and con trol (BMC2) suite programme man ager Justin Monger. The elevation of cruise missile defence's status comes after USAF leaders scrambled in recent months to defend the programme from imminent budget cuts. Critics ques tioned the need to deploy a new GMTI sensor while the air force already spends billions to acquire the Space Based Radar and to oper ate and upgrade the JSTARS fleet. Unlike the E-lOA's proposed GMTI sensor and BMC2 hub, the military has no other aerial cruise missile defence system that offers a comparable capability. Secretary of defence Donald Rumsfeld has labelled it a key area of concern. The E-lOA's payload includes the Northrop Grumman-Raytheon multi-platform radar technology insertion programme, which pro vides upgraded GMTI functions and a focused airborne radar capability used for tracking cruise missiles. An initial design review for the widebody testbed is scheduled for June. A Northrop Grumman-led team leading the E-10A integration effort completed a systems require ments review on 5 February. 8 24 FEBRUARY-1 MARCH 2004 FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL www.flightinternational.com
Sign up to
Flight Digital Magazine
Flight Print Magazine
Airline Business Magazine
E-newsletters
RSS
Events
