

health contracted on active service, and is permitted to retain his rank; Feb. 14.

Sec. Lieut. W. N. Jackson is ante-dated in his appointment as Sec. Lieut. (A.); May 6, 1918.

The name of Capt. W. G. R. Hinchliffe is as now described, and not as stated in the *Gazette* of Jan. 23.

The surname of Sec. Lieut. R. L. Cane is as now described, and not as stated in the *Gazette* of April 18, 1919.

The surname of Sec. Lieut. C. H. Friese-Greene is as now described, and not as stated in the *Gazette* of April 18, 1919.

The surname of Capt. F. Sharpe is as now described, and not as stated in the *Gazette* of April 4, 1919.

The surname of Sec. Lieut. G. N. Pask is as now described, and not as stated in the *Gazette* of April 8, 1919.

The surname of Flight-Lieut. V. H. Huston, M.C., is as now described, and not as stated in the *Gazette* of Jan. 23.

The Christian names of Lieut. Victor Lindeman Allan Burns are as now described, and not as stated in the *Gazette* of April 1, 1919.

The Christian names of Lieut. Leslie Albert Martin are as now described and not as stated in the *Gazette* of Feb. 4, 1919.

The notification in the *Gazette* of July 22, 1919, concerning Lieut. E. S. Noble is cancelled (notification in the *Gazette* of Sept. 23, 1919, to stand).

The notification in the *Gazette* of Dec. 2, 1919, concerning Sec. Lieut. (Hon. Lieut.) A. C. McKinnon, is cancelled.

The notification in the *Gazette* of July 8, 1919, concerning Lieut. W. R. Hudson (Manitoba R.), is cancelled.

The notification in the *Gazette* of Oct. 3, 1919, concerning Sec. Lieut. H. T. Barrett, is cancelled.

#### Administrative Branch.

Sec. Lieuts. to be Lieuts.:—C. E. Yates; Mar. 1, 1919 (since demobilised) (notification in the *Gazette* of June 27, 1919, to stand). J. G. le Brun; Mar. 8, 1919 (since relinquished commu.). G. W. Colebourne; May 8, 1919 (since demobilised). W. R. Fairbairn; June 3, 1919 (since granted short service commu.). H. H. Watson; June 20, 1919 (since demobilised).

Sec. Lieut. A. Ashby is graded for purposes of pay and allowances as Lieut. while employed as Lieut.; May 1, 1919.

Sec. Lieut. (Hon. Lieut.) H. D. Patterson to be Sec. Lieut. (Hon. Lieut.), from (T.); April 1, 1918.



## AVIATION IN PARLIAMENT

### Aeroplanes for Indian Outposts

In the House of Commons on February 16 Mr. Cairns asked the Secretary of State for War if aeroplanes were asked for by Fort Sandeman and other outposts since January, 1919, and, if so, why they were not granted; if the Government was offered aeroplanes after the armistice and when, and if and when they were accepted; and what number of aeroplanes were in India in January, June, and December, of 1919?

Mr. Montagu, who replied, said: I am unaware that any outposts asked for aeroplanes, which, I may remark, require landing grounds and aerodromes and other preparations to be made in advance. One hundred aeroplanes, were offered to the Indian Government in June, 1919, for civil purposes, and were at once accepted. No personnel was included in this offer. It was unnecessary to offer aeroplanes for military purposes, since the Government of India had already made known their requirements, and these have now been met by increasing the two squadrons of the R.A.F. which were in India in January and June, 1919, to six in December, 1919.

### British Somaliland. Successful Operations Against Mullah

VISCOUNT DUNCANNON on February 17 asked the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies if the Government had any information in regard to recent operations in Somaliland?

The Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies (Lieut.-Col. Amery): I hope that the satisfactory character of my reply will excuse its length.

Ever since the Colonial Office took over the administration of British Somaliland in 1905 the situation in the Protectorate has been one of great difficulty. From 1907 onwards hostilities by the Mullah have been continuous. Moving down from the Nugal Valley, the dervishes have raided and looted far and wide, and in 1914 even raided within musket range of Berbera itself. During the last five years their fighting policy became increasingly aggressive, and instead of limiting themselves to raiding parties on the friendly tribes, they established themselves permanently in forward posts consisting of stone forts of immense strength. Forts of this character were established at Tale, the main headquarters of the Mullah himself, at Jidali in the north-eastern part of the Protectorate among the hills overlooking the Gulf of Aden, and at Barau, east of Jidali.

To meet the dervish aggression steps were taken in 1914 to re-form and re-organise the Somaliland Camel Corps on an increased footing. This policy was completely successful so far as dealing with raiding parties was concerned, and the defeats inflicted on the dervishes at Shimber Berris in 1914-15 resulting in the destruction of the forts there, and later at Endow and the Ok Passes, cleared dervish raiding parties once for all from the western half of the Protectorate, which henceforward remained under settled administration. The position, however, still remained most unsatisfactory and precarious owing to the fact that the dervishes (who still held more than half of British Somaliland) were firmly established in the eastern part of the Protectorate, particularly at Jidali, where their fortifications enabled them to threaten the coast and the friendly tribe of Warsangeli, who suffered severely on several occasions from dervish raids. Thus, in 1916, it was found necessary to station a detachment of Indian troops at Las Khorai, the chief town of the Warsangeli, in order to protect the tribe from constant dervish aggression from Jidali and Barau.

During the last few years it has become increasingly clear that the situation which has existed ever since the rise of the Mullah in 1901, and which has inflicted untold suffering on the inhabitants of the Protectorate, could only be cured by the definite and final break-up of his power. During the War an expedition against the Mullah was obviously impracticable, but a few months ago the whole situation was carefully reviewed, in the light of the experience gained in the War. It was decided that the operations should take the form of an attack from the air, followed up, if successful, by advanced patrols of mounted forces with infantry supports. These operations have now been carried out.

The air attack opened on January 21, when aeroplanes attacked the fort at Jidali and the Mullah's camp at Medishe, inflicting heavy casualties and damage. Subsequent bombardments on January 23 practically destroyed the camp and set it on fire, the dervishes fleeing to the hills to the north and north-west. On January 28 Jidali was occupied by the Camel Corps, which had moved up from Elafweina, the garrison having previously escaped northwards into the hills. Meanwhile, on January 24, a force of King's African Rifles from Las Khorai had occupied Barau (most of the dervish garrison being killed), and destroyed the fort. Aeroplanes co-operated throughout by reconnaissance work and by bombing the dervish forts and parties wherever found.

Information was subsequently received that on January 28, the Mullah, together with his personal following and the dervish leaders, left the hills north-west of Jidali making southwards. The Camel Corps took up the pursuit from Jidali on January 30. On January 31, aeroplanes located the Mullah's party east of Elafweina and, descending to 100 ft., bombed and machine-gunned them to good effect, scattering the party and stampeding the riding animals. Simultaneously, a tribal levy, 1,500 strong, under the command of a British officer moved eastwards up the Nugal Valley towards Tale.

On February 6 the tribal levy intercepted the Mullah's party which had been disorganised by the aerial bombardment, capturing large quantities of stock and rifles as well as the Mullah's personal effects and his office. The Mullah himself escaped into the fort at Tale. This position (which was in fact a

walled town surrounded by 13 forts) had already been bombarded and set on fire by aeroplanes on previous days. It was now surrounded by the tribal levy, and in spite of the enormous thickness of the fortifications and the walls, was captured by them on February 9. The Mullah himself, with a small party of about 70 horsemen, escaped, but the rest of the dervishes in the forts either surrendered or were captured, and large quantities of stock and arms were seized.

In the meantime the force of King's African Rifles who had occupied Barau and Naval landing parties from His Majesty's ships have been rounding up the dervish parties scattered in the hills north and north-west of Jidali and have destroyed the smaller forts established in the hills and on the coast. Here also considerable captures of rifles and of stock have been made.

The result, therefore, of the operations, which have now been concluded, is that in the course of less than three weeks the power of the dervishes in British Somaliland has been entirely destroyed and that no organised resistance remains. The Mullah himself with a few personal followers is a fugitive, having lost the whole of his force, all his stock, and all his belongings. He may succeed in escaping his pursuers in the desert, but his prestige and his power of endangering the peace and security of Somaliland are, I believe, at an end.

It is important to note that this remarkable achievement has been secured without bringing in large numbers of troops to the Protectorate, and I might add, in view of statements which have been made, without the co-operation of any Foreign Power.

A battalion of King's African Rifles borrowed from East Africa was the only military force specially despatched to Somaliland to reinforce the troops already serving there, *i.e.*, the Somaliland Camel Corps and a detachment of an Indian Army battalion.

The fact that it was possible to secure these results with the comparatively small number of troops employed in a period of less than three weeks, with practically no casualties and with a minimum of expenditure, is due to the co-operation of a unit of the R.A.F. The moral and material effect of the aerial bombardment of the dervish positions was the vital factor in the success of the operations, without which the subsequent operations of the ground troops could hardly have been effective. For the first time, in fact, the aeroplane has been deliberately employed as the primary striking instrument, and not merely as an ancillary weapon, and the result is, I venture to think, as suggestive as it is satisfactory.

Col. Wedgwood: Can the hon. member say whether this puts a stop to any prospective co-operation between us and the Italian Government in warlike operations in East Africa, or are there any further operations contemplated?

Lieut.-Col. Amery: The general operations, involving a number of different arms, were under the conduct of the Governor of the Protectorate. The Air Force was in command of Capt. Gordon. In reply to the hon. and gallant member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Col. Wedgwood), I am not sure that any further operations will be required unless there is a possibility of the Mullah escaping.

### Germany's Zeppelins

SIR W. DAVISON on February 18 asked the Prime Minister whether the Government are now in possession of indisputable evidence that the seven Zeppelins which should have been surrendered by Germany under the Peace Treaty have been deliberately destroyed; what steps are being taken in the matter; and whether the attention of the German Government has been directed to this and other instances of the wilful destruction of German national assets, in connection with their application to the Allied Governments for a reduction in the amount of the indemnity imposed on Germany by the Peace Treaty?

Mr. Bonar Law: No information has been received by His Majesty's Government with regard to the matter referred to in the first part of the question. The second part does not, therefore, arise. As regards the last part, any action by the German Government which is likely to result in a breach of the Treaty of Versailles and which comes to our knowledge is at once brought to the notice of the Council of Ambassadors, with whom it lies to warn the German Government.

Sir W. Davison: Will the right hon. gentleman ascertain whether there is any ground for the suggestion in the Press that these Zeppelins have been destroyed?

Mr. Bonar Law: There is a Commission at Berlin, on which the Air Force is represented, to deal with this kind of case. I think we can trust to it letting us know if there is any foundation for such a statement.

### Germany's Aeroplanes

LIEUT.-COL. LOWTHER on February 19 asked the Prime Minister whether the Supreme Council is satisfied that the number of war planes (if any) countenanced by the Peace Treaty has not been exceeded by Germany.

The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Churchill): Under Article 198 Germany is not allowed to retain any war planes.

Viscount Curzon: Can the right hon. gentleman define what is a war aeroplane?

Mr. Churchill: There is a complete definition, but of course an army aeroplane would be capable of being converted.

Lieut.-Col. Lowther: Are civilian aeroplanes allowed to be constructed at present in Germany?

Mr. Churchill: Yes.