Civil Aviation News . . . . .

a First Class Navigator's Licence. The minimum flying hours are 7,000 with 5,000 hours in command of an aircraft, and 1,000 hours on either marine or land aircraft whichever certificate is applied for. Flying hours must also include 2,500 hours as pilot in command of multi-engined public transport aircraft or aircraft engaged in some aerial work. It is therefore not restricted to airline pilots. An additional requirement is 500 hours' night flying which must include 200 departures or landings at night. The regulations appear in the 1937 amendments to A.N.D. 13.

Capt. J. Woodman.

MISHAP IN FAR EAST

NEWS has come from New Guinea that the Bristol Freighter G-AIMC, chartered by Qantas Airways from the Bristol Aeroplane Company, met with a mishap on Wau airfield one morning recently. It is understood that the aircraft landed safely on the airfield, which has a one in twelve gradient, and taxied to the highest side. After switching off the engines the aircraft ran backwards, gathering momentum as it careered out of control for a thousand yards. It finally dropped 26 feet over the lower edge of the airfield, crumpling the starboard wing and tearing off the undercarriage. Luckily, none of the passengers or crew were injured.

VIKING AND AEROVAN ACCIDENT REPORTS

THE Chief Inspector of Accidents has recently submitted two more reports of accidents involving civil aircraft. One report deals with an accident at Croydon Airport on May 23rd involving Viking G-AHPJ owned by Hunting Air Travel, Ltd. The crew, none of whom were injured, consisted of the pilot, Captain Walter Rogers, Navigator/2nd Pilot Captain R. W. L. Mulliner, Radio Operator Mr. M. D. Newman, and Flight Engineer Mr. J. E. Patten. On the morning of May 23rd the aircraft was loaded with fruit at Verona under the supervision of the pilot who stated he made constant reference to the slide rule C. of G. computor to ensure that the load was distributed correctly. At 14.00 hours the aircraft took off, and after 3 hours 15 minutes flying arrived over Croydon Airport with about 50-60 gals. of fuel most of which was in the rear tanks. The pilot stated that he made a normal approach to land on runway 120, and when the aircraft was 3 to 4ft above the ground at an air speed of 90 knots he throttled back the engines. The pilot's evidence of the subsequent movements was contradictory. He first stated there was no response from the elevators and that the aircraft struck the ground on all three wheels; his second statement implied that the aircraft gave a quick porpoise, then touched down and ran along on its landing wheels until the port undercarriage collapsed. A B.O.A.C. employee who witnessed the accident estimated that the aircraft bounced 30ft into the air.

An examination of the aircraft took place after it had been removed from the runway and there were indications that both undercarriages had collapsed in a backwards and upwards direction. The surface of the runway end was covered with "rod and bar" tracking and an inspection of the ground, which was recorded as "firm" at the time of the accident, revealed that both landing wheels had struck the runway 21 yards from the perimeter track. The imprint made by the port wheel showed that it had struck with considerable force: the tracking was bent ½in below the horizontal and embedded in the ground. The starboard wheel had also distorted the tracking, but to a lesser degree. The next points of impact were beyond the limit of the tracking, approximately 109yds and 117yds ahead and had been made by the port and starboard wheels respectively. The wheel imprints were 4½in and 3½in deep and indicated that after the first impact the aircraft had dropped from a considerable height after the bounce.

Summing up, the Chief Inspector of Accidents concluded that the cause of undercarriage collapse was due to an excessively heavy landing and that the maximum permissible all-up weight was exceeded by 189lb. The report also states that under the existing load conditions the pilot's handling of the fuel system was incorrect.

The second Accident Report concerns the Miles Aerovan Mark IV G-AJOB owned by the Ulster Aviation Company, Ltd., and chartered by Miles Aviation, Ltd., Northern Ireland. At the time of the accident it was engaged in flying a cargo of freight from Woodley Airfield to Newtownards, Northern Ireland. The accident occurred five miles S.E. of South Rock Lighthouse on June 27th at 18.07 hours. The crew, Captain B. N. Lyttle and Navigator Mr. L. G. Lewsey, were uninjured. Prior to the flight the pilot obtained a meteorological report and the aircraft movement was cleared by C.A.C. Uxbridge. When the aircraft left Woodley Aerodrome at 15.30 hours it had 70 gall. of fuel on board Good weather conditions prevailed. At 18.00 hours when flying at a height of 500ft the pilot heard a change in the engine note and at once proceeded to check all instrument readings, observing that the oil pressure gauge for the port engine was reading "zero." Captain Lyttle thereupon opened up the starboard engine to full revolutions, at the same time closing the port engine throttle. As height was being lost, the pilot sought to maintain altitude by flying at varying airspeeds. These attempts were unsuccessful, and thinking that possibly only the oil pressure gauge was faulty, he gradually opened up the port engine to 1,800 revolutions, whereupon extremely violent vibration occurred and it was necessary again to close the throttle. As the aircraft continued to lose height, the Captain instructed Mr. Lewsey to kick out the windows and endeavour to jettison the cargo. Immediately following this the aircraft lost safety speed, resulting in the pilot having to abandon his attempt to remain airborne. A ditching being imminent, Captain Lyttle closed the starboard throttle and selected flaps down, at the same time warning Mr. Lewsey that they were about to ditch. Owing to the glass-like surface of the sea, the pilot was unable to estimate his exact height and assumed that the aircraft hit the water in a tail-down attitude. After impact the aircraft turned over and settled on the water in an inverted position. Both the occupants were thrown clear and eventually took up station on the inverted mainplane. At 20.10 hours, approximately 2 hours after the crash, both were picked up by the S.S. *Colwith Force*.

It is considered that the primary reason for the failure of



FOR BUSH OPERATORS: The Dove seaplane during trials in Toronto Bay, Lake Ontario. There is likely to be a small but positive market for this version in certain classes of bush operation, since the basic characteristics of the design have always been in line with the requirements of such operators in Canada and elsewhere.