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DASA's DAA 92 and 122 (above centre); the newcomers to watch. Well-established Fokker would challenge with its new derivative 80 (above)

r this decade will not see any dramatically
new advances in aircraft technology that
will be economically viable. The vital factor
of more efficient, quieter and cleaner en-
gines which is at the heart of DAA's
projects, says Fokker chairman-elect Erik Jan Nederkoorn, is as available to his aeroplane as anyone else's. He says he sees"...no sense in DAA spending more than it would cost Fokker purely to re-invent the wheel". Fokker is not for sale, he adds. Both the 130 and the 80 would draw heavily on Fokker 100 experience and technology, although the smaller aircraft's fuselage would actually be based on a minor stretch of the F.28 to avoid the structural weight penalties of "shrinking" the 100. Wing aerodynamics, engines and systems would nevertheless be 100-based.

Unlike DAA, Fokker is likely to launch
its larger aircraft first, partly because it is a relatively simple stretch and partly because "... it is economically more important to the company", says Nederkoorn. On the other hand, this may jeopardise the future busi-ness case for the 80 and some observers believe that, as a result, it will eventually be dropped. Nederkoorn says that the com-pany's continued repayments on Fokker 50 and 100 launch loans would ensure the availability of finance for both the 130 and the 80. The former might cost anywhere between $250 million and $500 million, the latter rather less. Even if he would prefer to find partners, Nederkoorn says both devel-opments could be supported by the com-pany alone. He does not rule out an eventual Asian or US partner, particularly^ the latter given the need the reduce dollar exposure. He accepts readily that there is not much choice if CATIC, Bombardier and .. CASA all take their anticipated shares in the DAA alliance.

The position of the existing Fokker 100 partners — MBB (a DASA subsidiary) and Shorts, part of the Bombardier group — remains delicate. "We cannot continue with a partner if he has a competing product

line," says Nederkoorn about MBB, though he suggests no alternative. "I would not presume to speak for Bombardier or Shorts," he adds, "but remember that we are one of Shorts' biggest customers. They will have to decide on their strategy."
McDonnell Douglas, not to be outdone in the growing morass of 80- to 130-seat twinjets, clearly wants to protect the MD-87 in this market and sees the forthcoming European challenge as strong enough to try to squeeze a little more juice out of the rapidly-drying DC-9 orange.
The MD-95, announced at le Bourget and which might be launched in early 1992, is a 105-seat (twin-class cabin) replacement for the many still-flying DC-9s. It certainly has a lot to do with Northwest Airlines, the world's biggest DC-9 operator, which is talking to all manufacturers about replacing 142 of the old machines, from the second half of this decade. Northwest is participat-ing in the MD-95 pre-launch evaluation and definition.

Although it is a shortened MD-87, pow-ered by either derated P&W JT8D-216s or Rolls-Royce Tay 670s rather than a member of the International Aero Engines V2500-powered MD-90 series, the MD-95 also seeks to shore up Douglas' MD-90-30 bid in the Chinese trunkliner competition. CATIC, which has now rolled 22 MD-80s out of its assembly hall under its existing co-production agreement, has been prom-ised progressive manufacture and assembly of the MD-95 "as a supplement to the Trunkliner programme", reveals Douglas executive vice-president John Wolf.
So Douglas is not going to stop selling MD-80s and -90s any more than Boeing is giving up the 737 line, Fokker its 100s and their derivatives or BAe its 146s and theirs. If there is room for new entries in the 80-to-135-seat market, the DAA consortium, with a very determined DASA and its government-owned partners in Aerospatiale and Alenia, looks like the operation to watch. •

the A319? (Airbus says the latter might cost $400 million). According to Schaeffler "...it's quite simple. First we have to fill the gap between the old and new turboprops and the present turbofans. Then we see if there is a market for a shortened Airbus."

BAe Commercial Aircraft managing di-rector Bob McKinklay is equally bullish about the NRA and almost as disingenuous, saying; "We are planning to go ahead, to sit underneath the A319 marker at the top end of the regional operators. We are sizing the 1'20-seat NRA to complement the Airbus aircraft. Our research in the marketplace shows there are two distinct market seg-ments. We support both aircraft." BAe faces the same funding pressures as DASA. If, publicly, executives support both the Air-bus and the home-grown product, privately they admit what Airbus and competitors anticipate: if the A319 is launched, the 146-NRA would be dropped.
Fokker — lonely and vulnerable, like BAe, without a partner — also has a product to protect in the market, so it is
pushing the advantages of combined state-
of-the-art technology, a derivative approach
and family benefits in its so-called JetLine
trio of Fokker 80, 100 and 130.
The Dutch company is convinced that

FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL 3 - 9 July, 1991 33