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Aviation History
1950
1950 - 0655.PDF
FLIGHT. 6 April 1950 423 latter included a cruiser, several destroyers and other light escort vessels, M.T.B.s and—in the air—-Bomber Command Lincolns from Upwood and a Naval Aviation strike and fighter force from Culdrose. The Sunderlands maintained their anti-submarine role throughout both phases of the exercise. By comparison with previous air-sea manoeuvres, little information was forthcoming concerning progress of the '' battle " ; an Admiralty ruling precluded detailed reports on either composition or movements of the forces engaged, in order to increase the realism of the exercise. Flight therefore welcomed the opportunity, afforded by the Air Ministry, of taking at least a glimpse of the theatre of operations—through the porthole of a patrolling Sunder- land. A member of the staff flew with Coastal Command on March 29th on an anti-submarine sortie from Pembroke Dock. The fact that our Sunderland flew for 13 hours (he writes) without contacting the '' enemy,'' despite vigilant watch- keeping; both visually and by radar, heightens one's re- spect for the long-range crews of Coastal Command. Their work demands protracted perseverance and concentration, and only rarely is rewarded by the excitement of sudden action. Our Sunderland 5 was captained by F/O. Witter, with F/L. Ramsden, A.F.C.—a recent "convert" from Trans- port Command Dakotas—as co-pilot. Navigator was F/L. Mockford, and running of the four Pratt and Whitney Twin Wasps was superintended by M. Eng. Corp and Eng. IV Lakin; Sig. I Charles, Sig. I Bate and Sig. II Clarke made up the complement of eight. In addition, we carried Mid- shipmen Baker and Chavasse, temporarily attached from the cruiser Ceylon. Following briefing and an early lunch, we took off at 1336 hr on Wednesday. During the initial climb, however, our No. 3 (starboard inner) engine de- veloped a fairly severe oil leak and had to be feathered forthwith. Before returning to- base, it was regrettably necessary to jettison some 800 gallons of fuel, to decrease our alighting weight. Back at Pembroke, we transferred rapidly to a second Sunderland and by 1410 hr were again in the air. Stores aboard the aircraft included eight 8J-lb practice bombs, to be dropped on submarines submerged to the tip of their "Schnorkels," flares, markers and sono-buoys. The latter carry small V.H.F. transmitters and are dropped in patterns to pinpoint the underwater position of a sus- pected submarine. Alternatively, they may be deposited in lines around a convoy to give warning of submarine activity within a varying radius, according to the pre- vailing condition of the sea's surface. During the first hour or so, as the Sunderland kept up a steady I3okt towards the patrol area, sunlight fell brightly through large gaps in the low strato-cumulus layer, so that we enjoyed an excellent view of the Atlantic 5,000ft below. Then the cloud thickened, and, descending to about 1,200ft, we found visibility further decreased by haze. Occasionally a small steamer came in view, but it was impossible to ascertain the source of every blip on the A.S.V. radar screen without extreme deviation from course. By this time, the drab scene below was of a barren, colour- less, almost motionless expanse, broken only by slowi)' spreading foam-patches—surely the most immediate re- collection of every wartime member of Coastal squadrons operating in the Bay of Biscay. " How we ev?r managed to find anything without radar is beyond me now," said one of the crew. At 1650 hr we reached our allotted position ahead of Task Force 51. In the absence of fresh orders from the Blueland Commander, our duty was to make a " creeping line-ahead" search for submarine or other activity in the path of the oncoming fleet. Our course for the next six hours therefore consisted of a series of parallel movements, spaced according to visibility, across the probable future track of the Task Force. As our patrol area lay in a major shipping lane, radar contacts were frequent, but proved to be strictly non-belligerent in origin. . During the inevitably monotonous patrol period, one appreciated in full the Sunderland's sizable interior, for there was room in which to enjoy a very warm, welcome and well-cooked supper, produced from the galley by one of the signallers. The end of an uneventful search came at 2305 hr. Mak- ing needless apology for the lack of activity, the captain expressed hope that submarines had at least been per- suaded to "keep their heads down." Such is often the vital but unspectacular function of Coastal Command's search squadrons. Almost exactly 13 hours after departure, at 0305 hr on Thursday morning, the Sunderland touched down on the Pembroke Dock flare-path. We followed a launch in to dispersal, where our crew set about refuelling in readiness for the next sortie—scheduled for mid-afternoon of the same day. -- • -.-.;.. , , • ....... HAS THE INTERCEPTER HAD ITS DAY? By W/C. E. COTON, D.F.C., A.F.C., A.F.R,Ae.S. IN 1939, it was widely forecast that the bomber wouldget the better of the fighter, yet, in the event, thefighter achieved a fair degree of mastery. It might seem rash to make the same prophecy again, namely that the fighter will become useless, but there is a very solid reason for thinking that this will indeed be the case. No practicable form of fighter can possibly cope with the jet bomber. If any last-war experience can be used to predict the outcome of the contest between the jet bomber and its contemporary fighter opponent, it is the success of the Mosquito night bomber against the Luftwaffe night fighters. In many ways, the jet bomber is better placed than the Mosquito was, even if day jet-bomber operations are compared with the night Mosquito operations. The factor which is likely to defeat the fighter is new in aerial combat—it is the handling ceiling. It exists because, at the heights at which jet aircraft can be expected to operate, stalling speeds are so close to the speed of sound that the amount of g which can be applied is limited by shock stalling. Were it not for this effect, g could be applied up to the point where the normal stall occurred. When this g limit is only just high enough to avoid gust stalling, and to allow the "minimum of essential manoeuvres, the aircraft is at its handling ceiling. As in all stalling matters, the wing loading has the biggest influence on the handling ceiling; and, to raise this ceiling by roughly fifteen thousand, it is necessary to halve the wing loading. The same must be done, if, say, 4g manosuvres are required at the operational height instead of ig manoeuvres. It is a characteristic of jet aircraft that maximum still- air range, and maximum working ceiling, require the same ratio of engine size to wing area. From the maximum- ceiling point of view, the handling and performance ceilings have to be made equal by suitable choice of the ratio. Any departure from the optimum ratio means that the handling ceiling is, say, raised by reducing.engine weight, and the performance ceiling is consequently lowered, or vice versa. The normal variations of weight due to con- sumption of fuel, and so on, affect the two ceilings equally. It is fair, then, to assume that well-designed bombers will attack at their handling ceilings, and the problem for the fighter designer is to get his handling ceiling high enough for the fighter to approach and attack them. The demand for g is going to be about double that of the bomber, implying that the wing loading must be no more than half. There is a handicap to start with, because the fighter has to be stronger and is (one hopes) smaller. Con- sequently, empty, it is heavier. Nothing can be gained by adding wing area, since this would upset the optimum wing area to engine ratio. The awkward fact is that the empty bomber already has the minimum attainable wing Continued on page 446)
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