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Aviation History
1961
1961 - 0336.PDF
344 FLIGHT, 16 March 1961 THIS article, by an American correspondent, considers the relative posi-tions of the Soviet Union and the United States in what has become known as the space race. The opinions he expresses are his own and not necessarilythose of "Flight"; in particular, the reports quoted to the effect that the Soviet Union has attempted unsuccessfully to place a manned satellitein orbit are not accepted as factual by "Flight." IT is generally well known that the United States Government (foraccounting purposes) operates on a fiscal year which begins onJuly I and ends on June 30 of the following year. Accordingly, the late winter and early spring months of each year are spentplanning for next year's expenditures. One of the challenging problems facing those responsible for America's budget in this andforthcoming years is a decision as to how much money should be spent on space exploration. Similar problems must annually occupythe thoughts of the Russian planners. For the USA, which just over three years ago placed its firstsatellite in orbit, a major decision is required as to whether or not to continue the present rapid expansion of space-type activities.Not only is an increasing number of dollars being spent annually on this one particular scientific field, but an ever greater portion ofAmerica's scientific/engineering talent is being assigned to orbital and deep-space projects. With yearly "space" expenses, bothNASA and military, already exceeding one billion dollars and rising at an appreciable rate, it would seem appropriate to pauseoccasionally and re-examine America's goals in space. The new Kennedy Administration has indicated that it will make such astudy on a high priority basis. The Space Race BY DON ADAMS (New York) For the Soviet Union, which last month recorded anotherspectacular space "first"—the Venus launch—there is a question as to how to maintain its position in the spotlight on the world's stage.The drain on Russian scientific talent must be equally as significant as that in the USA and, with America's (i.e. NASA's) technicalplans for the next ten years in space already an open secret, the Soviets must weigh heavily the sacrifices necessary to remain ahead.And for those countries not yet deeply involved in the intricacies of space work, there is the problem of where, when and how to enterthe contest for world headlines and the acclaim that follows a successful firing. Each nation has its own unique problem. The Soviet space programme appears to be almost exclusivelycentred on maximum exploitation, for propaganda purposes, of the payload capability of their big ICBM booster. They have at theirdisposal, of course, other equipments and techniques, but it is clearly the booster which has given them the lead they possess.Grossing over one-half million pounds at lift-off and powered by some 850,000 pounds of thrust, the Russian space booster is theproduct of many years' effort to design a very conservative and consequently relatively reliable big rocket engine. As is charac-teristic of their approach to technical problems, it would seem that the Russians have concentrated on developing a straightforwarddesign. Hence we find the use of inefficient (by today's standards) but easily manageable rocket propellants. One can imagine that the same design of rocket was fired manytimes until it worked to perfection. Few changes were probably permitted in the early design stage—a condition undreamed of inUS circles—and the resulting successful booster design can be attributed to sheer perseverance. Realistically, one of the bestmeans of achieving reliability is to resist to a fanatical degree the inherent tendency of the designer to make his design, even if itworks, a little better. One can guess that this was the course pursued by the Russians. Numerous static firings must have been madeafter careful and lengthy countdowns, and only when faulty design practices were uncovered during static firings were design changestolerated. Ultimately, a very workable, if somewhat inefficient, booster was evolved. The most careful kind of pre-launch count- The Soviet Union: Sputnik 3 replica on show at Moscow exhibition The United States: Dr Wernher von Braun testifies before the Senate Space Committee in Washington. Right, model of Saturn fourth stage down was then conducted prior to actual firings. This philosophy produced results, and Russia is today capable of hurling seven-ton, man-carrying size payloads into Earth orbit. Russia also has an ICBM guidance system (probably radio-command). It is reportedly not as accurate as that of the American Atlas/Titan guidance system, but it is good enough to have guidedthe Soviet ICBM into orbit. Several other types of equipment must also exist in order to explain the Russian space successes. TheSoviets unquestionably possess a gas-jet stabilization system, which accounts for their ability to orient a vehicle in space to some pre-determined reference system. Infra-red horizon scanners are also suspected: these could be based on their IR air-to-air missile experi-ence. Given these tools and nor much more—and certainly nothing beyond today's state-of-the-art hardware in other fields—it ispossible to account for all of Russia's firings. The heavy Earth orbiters were the product of the big booster and1CBM guidance. The lunar shots can be similarly explained; the big booster was made to produce a "fast" lunar trajectory with amoderate payload. A guidance system that would not be tolerated in an ICBM could then produce a strike on the lunar surface.Guaranteeing a controlled near-miss on the Moon is more challeng- ing, but again within the capabilities of current guidance systems.Photographing the Moon's rear face would be accomplished by re-orienting the space vehicle to some lunar reference—the horizonscanner could effect this—or simply by keeping the vehicle Earth- oriented while it passed the Moon. If things went well and sufficientpictures were taken, it would be likely that some photographs would contain pieces of the lunar terrain. Transmitting the pictures backto Earth is demanding, but, when one has a large payload, an extra supply of batteries (and their high power output) can be used tomake up for electronics inefficiencies. Use of Parking Orbit The recent Venus launch could have been accomplished with thesame equipment. As has been known for some time, the use of a "parking orbit" for interplanetary launches has many advantages;the United States had not tried the scheme because she lacked a booster large enough to place a worthwhile payload in a parkingorbit. The Soviet Venus probe required a smaller guidance accuracy than would be required, for example, to return a space vehicle toa preselected point on the Earth's surface. Mr William H. Pickering, director of Caltech's Jet PropulsionLaboratory, said of the Venus probe: "This was not an engineering breakthrough, but it was a demonstration of a very nice, preciseoperation." Much the same comment can be applied to most of the other Russian firings. This is not meant in any derogatory sense. From a purely technical standpoint, the most significant of theSoviet space successes was the return of a payload from orbit. If indeed the miss-distance reported by the Russians in their landingon the Earth's surface was correct, the experiment must rank as a first-rate scientific achievement. There has been much speculation in the United States as towhether or not the Russians have already attempted, unsuccessfully, to orbit a manned space capsule. Rumours are prevalent, andBrig-Gen Don Flickinger, an important voice in American bio- astronautic activities who last year forecast that a manned Sovietorbital shot might take place as early as April 1960, is understood to have lent credence to reports that the Russians have evidencedseveral disastrous experiences with manned payloads. The latest alleged incident occurred in February of this year just prior to theVenus launch. Many reports suggest that this payload was manned. The Soviets have emphatically denied this. Prof L. Sedov of theSoviet Academy of Sciences has been quoted to the effect that the firing had two main goals—to place an object of that weight inorbit and, once there, to keep it in its planned orbit with exact precision. From a technical standpoint neither of these justifications seem;,logical. One simply does not hurl dead weight into orbit to confirm the simplest of analytical calculations. Certainly if the Russians arcto orbit a man shortly, they must be well beyond the point nt knowing that the booster can orbit a heavy payload. There is ••'.
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