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Aviation History
1967
1967 - 0359.PDF
International, 9 March 1967 355 AFVG PROGRAMME DETAILS Questions and Some Answers from the Commons Debate on Defence MORE INFORMATION on the Anglo-French variable geometryaircraft was divulged in the Commons on February27-28 by the Secretary of State for Defence, Mr Denis Healey, and the Minister of State, Ministry of Technology, Mr John Stonehouse. Mr Healey and the Opposition defence spokesman, Mr Enoch Powell, discussed the aircraft during the two-day defence debate, and Mr Stonehouse gave further details in answers to questions on February 28. Opening the Defence Debate on February 27, Mr Healey stated; "So far as the equipment programme is concerned, our greatest effort has been devoted to new aircraft. We hope shortly to conclude a fixed-price contract for an initial order of the P.I 127, now known as the Harrier, which will be the first V/STOL aircraft in service with any air force in the world. We have already ordered our full requirement for the Maritime Comet, the HS.801, and it will be the first jet specialist maritime reconnaissance aircraft in service anywhere in the world. "Despite an anxious moment, our collaborative programme with France is now going well and smoothly. The Martel will be in service before the end of the decade, the Jaguar will be in service in the early 1970s and the variable-geometry aircraft in the middle 1970s. At my last meeting with M Messmer we reached agreement on a new family of British helicopters to come into service in the two countries at various dates over the next ten years. Our aircraft industry, as a result, now has a firm base of military work on which to plan its future during the 1970s. . . ." MR ENOCH POWELL said that the Secretary of State for Defence had sought to give the impression that the Anglo- French variable-geometry aircraft was a firm project. On January 16, Mr Healey had said "The agreement we have reached provides an assured future for the industry in both of our countries on the basis of the co-operation which will extend into the mid-1970s," and had also reportedly said "The difficulties which dogged the project a few weeks ago have disappeared, I think, for good." Misleading Impression Mr Powell continued: "I charge the right hon Gentleman with having been carried away by his own enthusiasm and, I believe unintentionally, having given a wholly misleading impression of the status of this project and its firmness. I hope, indeed, that the project may come to fruition and succeed, but to say that it is assured is an assertion which is completely misleading." The AFVG had been described by the Government as both operationally and industrially the core of our long-term air- craft programme; yet the French Minister of Information had said that the principal hurdle, i.e., the financial barrier, was situated at the end of 1967. Engine and airframe information was to be submitted on March 1 and it was hoped that the Governments would be able to decide at the beginning of April that the studies might continue. The French Minister had added: "We hope that the studies will be sufficiently advanced that in the course of December 1967 one may decide whether or not to start with the prototype in the following year." Mr Healey intervened to stress that it was impossible to decide on the prototype before the specification was completed, and continued: "It is impossible, after the prototype is decided, to go into production before it is seen how the proto- type goes. We are no less determined than the French Government to ensure that there is a possibility of considering Progress at every appropriate stage. This is the only protection we have against a runaway escalation of costs. . . ." Mr Powell next considered the fble of the AFVG. "As for jne role of our Air Force around this long-term core, no one "as yet succeeded in ascertaining the kind of operations in which, east of Suez in the later 1970s, aircraft of this kind would operate, unless it were in a nuclear role. Here are aircraft which have a radius of action of, at the very least—I imagine that these figures are under-stated—1,000-1,500 miles— the distance, for instance, from London to Moscow or from Singapore to Hanoi. "We are told that these are strike aircraft which are going to strike the enemy forces at a distance. We have never yet had any explanation of the kind of operations, the kind of strategic setting and what other forces, ours or of any other nation, would be involved that would require a British force East of Suez to be striking the enemy in the later 1970s with an aircraft with a radius of action of 1,500 miles. Such an operation as that implies the involvement of this country in vast operations in all three elements of a character such as the party opposite has entirely and radically forsworn." Replying for the Government at the end of the Defence Debate, Mr Healey said that the AFVG would take six or seven years to design and develop before production began and delivery to the British and French services started. The pro- gramme would be reviewed at regular intervals like any other long-term project. But without this programme there would be no design work for the British aircraft industry after Concorde, and without that design work there would be no future for the industry—not only in Britain but in Europe. "That is the sense in which this is the core of our long-term aircraft programme." Reconnaissance Role The role of the AFVG, as stated in successive White Papers, was that of succeeding the Canberras and V-Bombers, com- plementary to the F-111K, in the middle 1970s. Its role was much the same as that of the TSR.2. Probably the most important role was reconnaissance. The other role was as a tactical conventional strike aircraft—to deter the escalation of a local conflict and to deter intervention by other Powers in a peace-keeping operation by our own forces. The AFVG, and to some extent the F-111K, would replace the capability of the strike carrier in the maritime air strike role. These aircraft were not intended only for commitments East of Suez: the French wanted the AFVG for Europe, and the planned role for the TSR.2—which the F-111K and the AFVG would replace—was also essentially European. In reply to questions on the AFVG on February 28, Mr John Stonehouse said: "Preliminary studies are near completion and the detailed project definition stage is due to begin in April, lasting for about six months. Full development, including the manufacture of prototypes, is planned to start early in 1968 so that the aircraft can enter service with the RAF in the middle 1970s." On the question of design leadership and the organisation of the AFVG programme, Mr Stonehouse said: "The Ministry of Technology will be the Executive Agency for the airframe, letting the contract to a joint British Aircraft Corporation/ Dassault company registered in the United Kingdom, while the French Government will let the engine contract to a joint SNECMA/Bristol Siddeley Engines Ltd company registered in France. Precise proposals from all four companies for the efficient management of the development programmes are expected shortly." Mr Neil Marten (Conservative, Banbury) and Mr Trevor Fortescue (Conservative, Liverpool Garston) pressed the Minister of State on the Government's plans should the French decide to withdraw from the AFVG programme. Mr Stone- house replied: "Of course, there must be contingency plans for all contingencies but, as I have already said, there is no doubt in our minds that this agreement is going through—we have had that assurance from the French—providing that all the preliminary tests are successful."
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