It took four attempts to get it off the ground, but all those involved can be rightly delighted to have Europe’s latest Earth observation satellite, Sentinel 1-B, safely in orbit following a successful Soyuz launch from French Guiana. In the rocket launching business, after all, the alternative to a good outcome is usually very bad.
Launch delays are not unusual but this flight – VS14, indicating the 14thflight of a Soyuz launcher from Europe’s spaceport – was notable for suffering two setbacks owing to weather. Originally set for liftoff at 18:02 local time on 22 April, launch operator Arianespace called a 24h delay at the T-5h point, before fuelling had to begin; the problem was high winds at altitude, which in the event of malfunction and destruction risked blowing debris back over populated areas.
The same scene played out on 23 April – highly unusual at arguably the world’s most geographically advantageous launch complex which generally enjoys the added blessing of good weather. Then on the 24 April, the countdown turned up a problem with the launcher’s inertial guidance system. Replaced in time to resume schedule a day later, all went to plan, finally, at 18:02 on 25 April.
All in all, VS14 – and 2016 activity to-date – highlights the strengths of Europe’s independent launch capability. The Guiana Space Centre (CSG) can hardly be topped as a base of operations: nearly on the equator and with over-sea flight paths to the North and East, launch operator Arianespace runs a typically flawless regime, European industry supplies reliable hardware in the heavy Ariane 5 and light Vega launchers flown from CSG, and Arianespace’s partnership with Roscosmos to operate the mid-weight Soyuz from Guiana clearly delivers. As for the European Space Agency’s marshalling of all these resources, look no further than a string of 71 Ariane 5 launch successes (dating to 2002), six perfect flights of Vega, introduced in 2012, and now 14 Soyuz missions.
And as a trip to CSG to watch VS14 confirms, preparation for some dramatic evolution of this industrial machine is well underway. Two facets of transition appear to be well in hand: the introduction from 2019 of a new family of launchers, as well as the development of a working relationship between ESA and the European Commission. Both define Europe’s response to a third facet, which is the launch of the industry’s changing global competitive landscape.
That competitive challenge, as anyone who’s spent any time around the launch industry over the past decade knows very well, is not about rocket performance; it is about responding to US start-up SpaceX, whose Falcon 9 launchers have undercut prices and proved mostly reliable in service. Ariane series rockets have orbited some 525 satellites since 1980, including more than half the world’s telecommunications satellites, but while the Ariane 5 is hugely reliable, it is vulnerable on price; the launch cost is about €150 million ($170 million) per flight, and Arianespace would lose money without public subsidy. Falcon 9 is smaller so direct comparison is difficult, but a flight can be bought for as little as $70 million.
Europe’s response, Ariane 6, can be summed up as a flexible, modular system able to replace both Ariane 5 and Soyuz, and fly a dozen times yearly for €70 million per flight. Tied to that is an evolution of Vega, Vega C, which will be built from the same solid motors that will serve as Ariane 6 boosters. Vega C’s maiden flight is on track for 2019 and Ariane 6’s for 2020, with Ariane 5 phased out by 2023; Ariane 6 launch facilities are now in construction at CSG.
The critical element, though, is a new Ariane industrial structure designed to streamline the programme by consolidating design, manufacture and operation under one commercial roof. Airbus Safran Launchers (ASL), a joint venture formed in 2015 and conceived by ESA member states – especially traditional launchers leader France – is to draw a line under Europe’s politically-driven approach to big programmes, which has aimed to spread work through all countries which contribute to the ESA launchers budget, and replace it with a design-build-operate industrial structure built for cost efficiency.
A key plank in that streamlining platform is ASL’s acquisition of a controlling interest in Arianespace, by buying the heavy third of shares held by France’s space agency, CNES. The European Commission surprised earlier this year when it initiated a review of that deal, on competition grounds. Speaking at CSG on the eve of the Sentinel 1-B launch, Arianespace chief executive Stéphane Israël said he expects to know “soon” if the Commission will approve the CNES stake transfer. And, Safran last week indicated in its first quarter report that the matter could be resolved “within weeks”.
Israël says that a “non” from Brussels would have no bearing on operations at CSG – the duties of launch operator Arianespace and owner-manager CNES are very clear – but what is at stake is ASL’s plans for Vega C and Ariane 6 exploitation. It is a question, he says, of plans for “industrial optimisation”, which may need adjustment.
“Ariane 6,” he says, “is not only a new launcher – it is a new governance.” The transfer of CNES shares is part of this. The competitive issue that concerns Brussels is in the market for launch services. Israël notes that, today, Vega solid motor maker Avio owns 3% of Arianespace but has no special rights for exploitation of the small launcher. Under ASL, which includes Arianespace’s role in selling launch services, Avio could reasonably ask for a guarantee that there will be no preference given to Ariane 6. But, Israël stresses, Ariane 6 and Vega C are not competitive, they are complementary and so the issue should not have any practical implications.
In any case, Israël expects to start making Ariane 6 launch proposals to customers by year-end, assuming the launcher passes its upcoming preliminary design review.
In the longer term, the pressing issue is that of Europe’s space strategy. The 2007 Lisbon Treaty required the EU to take a role in space, a domain that had previously been the sole concern of ESA as guided by its member state governments. Concerns that ESA and the Commission would be at loggerheads over who does what have probably been overstated; ESA sees its job as managing the technical practicalities of a European space strategy. But that strategy remains incomplete.
EU strategy is clear enough in two areas. The Galileo satellite navigation system is a priority, and ESA has been given the money to fast-track it into orbit; Brussels makes it clear that Europe must have independent control of this critical technology. And, Sentinel 1-B is just one element in an extensive programme, known as Copernicus, of space- and ground-based sensors designed to make Europe a leader in civil Earth monitoring, for safety, security and environmental management.
Speaking for the Commission at CSG last week, Jaime Silva – an adviser to the directorate general for the internal market and industry – said that as the “owner” of the major Copernicus and Galileo infrastructure, the Commission decided this year to “take stock” and devise a proper space policy in light of its Lisbon Treaty obligations. The goal, he said, was to help Europeans enjoy growth, jobs and a better quality of life, and greater security, by ensuring industrial competence in Earth observation and climate change monitoring.
The details remain to be worked out.
Israël notes that the EU is our “first customer”, so its space strategy is of key importance. The “good points”, the “two pillars”, of this strategy are Galileo and Copernicus. But, he adds, industry – Arianespace, anyway – wants the EU to commit to being competitive and ambitious with missions, and to buy European. Critically, there is no equivalent of the “buy American” legislation that all but ensures US institutional launches are placed with US providers. For Ariane 6 and Vega C, he says, there is a commitment to buy European launches, but it is not explicit.
The competitive implications are serious. In the USA, says Israël, institutions such as NASA, the military and weather service NOAA spend some €5 billion per year on launch services. In Europe, that institutional spending is €500-600 million. That order-of-magnitude gap means, simply, that European launch services must be competitive to survive.
The 2020s plan for CSG is to launch Ariane 6 a dozen times yearly, and make another four or more Vega C flights: a minimum of 16 launches, maybe 17, compared to 12 this year and last. Since Arianespace spends some €200 million yearly on maintenance, it needs to maximise the launch rate to cover fixed costs: “The more we launch, the more competitive we are, here and in the industry.”
To that end, “it would be premature” to assume Soyuz will be phased out with the introduction of its direct equivalent, Ariane 62. See, for example, the next scheduled Soyuz launch at CSG – it has been accelerated from 2017 at the customer’s request; evidence, says Israël, that we are “very satisfied with the partnership with Roscosmos”.
That natural market of European institutional demand does more than set a baseline launch rate, as topped up by commercial deals; it will also play a huge role in determining Europe’s eventual response to rising interest in reusable rocket components.
SpaceX has made headlines with its attempts, recently successful, to recover a Falcon 9 main stage with the intention of refurbishment and re-launch. ASL, and indeed US rival United Launch Alliance, are also working hard on reusable systems. Reusable systems have the potential to save significant costs, but given the challenges of recovery, refurbishment and reliability, those savings, if they even prove positive, are far from certain.
Israël says that in late 2014, Arianespace asked customers about the issue, and the answer was “very clear”: Ariane 6 has to be modular and as cheap as possible, and open to innovation.
After SpaceX made its successful recovery earlier this year of a Falcon 9 booster stage, he says, the same conversation turned up the same answer: stick with the strategy and don’t be a “me-too company”.
Broadly, he says, it simply isn’t known if SpaceX or others can make economic sense of reusability, or if reusability can be successful in the European context of a limited institutional market. Reusability may or may not be part of an evolved Ariane 6, but what is not in any doubt is that the system must be cheaper and more reliable.
“Ariane 6,” says Israël, “is not the end of a story. It is the beginning of a new story.”
Source: FlightGlobal.com
