The terrorist alert at London's airports - particularly Heathrow and Gatwick - on 10 August 2006 provided a never-to-be-forgotten image of how not to organise security arrangements at major international airports. The chaos affected all locally based and foreign airlines for more than a week, and the cancellation of hundreds of flights saw some travellers delayed for up to three days.
But lessons learned from this incident could have a positive influence on the long-term future of aviation security, bringing greater effectiveness without necessarily increasing the hassle, says the International Air Transport Association.
Obscured behind the extensive news coverage of this travellers' hell was the encouraging fact that a major intelligence operation had successfully identified several cells of would-be terrorists who apparently intended to bring down, simultaneously, several flights from the UK bound for the USA. The UK police had apprehended members of these cells and recovered material they were intending to use. This is how security should work, IATA agreed - the threat should be identified by intelligence agencies before it gets as far as the airport.
Apart from this intelligence coup, IATA identified a benefit that arose from the chaos created in UK air terminals. The security state had suddenly been upgraded to the highest level, specific items were banned from hand baggage with no warning to passengers, and no planning had been done or resources set aside for such an eventuality. But when governments and their transport departments were presented with this visible proof of a precise, co-ordinated type of terrorist threat to aviation and the likelihood that other such groups exist with similar plans, they arranged for their specialist representatives to meet to agree jointly how to counteract it.
Within three months, the decision on common standards for cabin baggage and the specifications for containers of fluids that may be taken on board had been put into practice throughout Europe and the USA - and is now becoming an international standard. This was an amazingly speedy reaction considering that the principle of standardisation had been recommended by IATA and agreed internationally through the International Civil Aviation Organisation and its regional bodies within a year of the 11 September 2001 terrorist outrages in the USA, but never actually put into practice.
Nevertheless, the standardisation agreement was a reaction to an event. IATA is calling for greater proactivity in standardisation across the board for all aspects of aviation security, in the cargo arena as well as those concerning passengers and their baggage. IATA says there is too much localised unilateral decision-making on security practices, resulting in travel disruption rather than security effectiveness.
The association points out three small, but important, aspects of non-standardised security practice at screening points: should shoes be removed and X-rayed or not? Should laptop computers be screened separately or in their carrying bags? Should duty-free produce bought airside at the original departure airport or on board an aircraft be allowed to be transferred to an onbound flight at an airport where the passenger is interlining?
At present, says IATA, some airports allow duty-free products through during interlining, but at others they are confiscated. "Governments must harmonise the requirements for duty free," it says. "Otherwise the airlines will face the double-whammy of paying for their own security and, because airports and airlines are losing valuable revenue from duty-free sales, airlines will pay more for their user charges." Whether this will happen within the next year is not clear, but if it does not, it will not be for want of lobbying by IATA.
Although the European Commission has formally declared that states are responsible for the cost of countering the terrorist threat to aviation, there is no sign yet of whether that judgement will be turned into reality, and no sign either of governments preparing to set aside a budget for it. The International Federation of Airline Pilots' Associations (IFALPA) has added countermeasures programmes to protect aircraft against attack by man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS) and other projectiles to its wish-list of security measures that should be completely government-funded in those cases where the risk justifies their provision. IFALPA also recommends more work on the NASA-researched fly-by-wire throttle-only control system to enable damaged aircraft that have had their aerodynamic controls disabled by a shoulder-launched missile to land safely.
But it looks unlikely that 2007 will see a resolution in favour of unconditional government aviation security funding in Europe. Change, if it comes, will take longer than that.
Source: Flight International
