Mobiles: what passengers want I have followed the recent correspondence in Flight International about the use of mobile telephones in the air with interest. Under my responsibility, my company Arinc, with Telenor of Norway, is one of the groups developing and intending to implement the systems that will allow mobile telephone use on aircraft. Accordingly, we have over the past two years undertaken a great deal of activity, including extensive research to understand all aspects of such a system, be they safety, regulatory, technical, commercial or social factors. Results of independent market research with airlines and passengers clearly show that most passengers want to be able to use their mobiles in aircraft and that airlines (backed by their own research) also want to be able to allow this. More passengers say they would choose to fly on airlines offering this service than those that do not. We are keenly aware of the social/environmental issues that development of airborne usage could raise, and similar views to those expressed by your correspondents are reflected by a minority of respondents in our (and airlines' own) research. However there a number of actions that we are undertaking which will eliminate or minimise any potential disruption - for example, providing airlines with the ability to allow only SMS text messaging on all flights or nights flights or to deactivate the system at any time if required. Also, our solution will support the use of "silent" devices such as Blackberrys for email and internet access. Graham Lake Arinc Vice-president and EMEA Managing Director, Crawley, Sussex, UK
Nimrod lesson The BAE Systems Nimrod MRA4 has flown - years late and grotesquely over budget. I was the least of many who, in the early 1990s, argued that entirely new aircraft were well worth the measly £2 million extra each they would cost, partly because this would allow UK anti-submarine forces to remain at full strength while they were built and brought into service, but also because refurbishing old airframes was likely to - as in fact occurred - encounter problems that would introduce long delays and more than swallow the promised savings. These reasoned criticisms were never answered, merely ignored. And, importantly, much the same is happening now, to questions raised about the FSTA project. Such abuses of UK defence procurement arrangements are endemic, and will continue for as long as arrogant clowns are allowed to escape the consequences of their decisions. Noel Falconer Couiza, France
Plain speaking Your excellent article "Defining Moment" (Flight International, 31 August-6 September) highlights the difficulties caused by attempts to clarify the definition of a suborbital vehicle. Senator James Inhofe's proposed amendment threatens to do exactly the opposite. It is a common failing of politicians and law-makers to believe that the addition of words to a definition results in an increase of clarity. Such is seldom the case. Sir Ernest Gowers' definitive work The Complete Plain Words sums up the correct approach: "Use no more words than are necessary to express your meaning, for if you use more you are likely to obscure it and to tire your reader". Applying this principle to the original definition proposed and passed by the House, the removal of two words, rather than the addition of five, provides the solution. The words to be removed are "rocket-propelled", since these are irrelevant to the intended meaning. The definition then becomes "a vehicle, intended for flight on a suborbital trajectory, whose thrust is greater than its lift for the majority of the powered portion of its flight". Brian Matthews Forres, Morayshire, UK
Fokker icing You wrote the following about the Austrian Fokker 70 accident in Munich (Flight International, 3-9 August): "Late selection of engine anti-icing in the descent towards Munich airport led to ice breaking off the Rolls-Royce Tay engine fan blades, causing some of the ice impact protection panels....." These are not the facts discovered by the German accident investigation bureau BFU, which says the engine anti-ice equipment was operated according to procedures published in the respective flightcrew operating manual (FCOM). The time from selection of anti-ice equipment (aerofoil and engine) until the first engine problems were encountered is above 8min. Furthermore, the use of engine anti-ice equipment does in no way prevent the build-up of fan-blade ice. It is a known fact that fan-blade ice can form during various stages of engine operation, and will normally be shed automatically due to fan-blade torsion during power changes, when the critical mass of ice accretion is reached, or when a special procedure according FCOM is performed. However, this procedure is in no way linked to the operation of anti-ice equipment. It was also discovered that all of the ice-impact panels were found detached. Nevertheless, the investigation into this accident is ongoing. The BFU has published a recommendation to establish measures to prevent the effect of ice impact panels becoming detached from their assigned position. Capt Martin Scharitzer Manager Flight Safety, Austrian Airlines, Vienna
Source: Flight International
