Passenger profiling, an essential building block in the post-11 September security system, will fail unless carried through properly

Security's credibility took another serious knock when a passenger at Paris was able to get on board an American Airlines aircraft to Miami with high explosive in one of his shoes. This latest blow to passenger confidence will do nothing to help the airline industry recover from its deep slump.

There has been a totally new security challenge since the 11 September atrocities, and the USA has definitely reacted to that fact. Whether it has reacted appropriately remains distinctly questionable (Flight International, 11-17 December 2001 ).

The nature of the change is simple and opens up a whole new area that post-11 September security has to cope with. Now a new breed of terrorist is prepared to die in the belief that by killing large numbers of civilians in the air - and on the ground too if possible - some political or religious cause will be advanced. Suicide bombing was always a known risk, but until 11 September the bombs that had brought down aircraft - like Pan Am 103 in December 1988 - were placed in baggage that was checked in and then not accompanied. The fundamental security measure adopted as a result was the 100% baggage reconciliation or "bag matching" system, ensuring that if a bag is checked in and the passenger who owns it does not board the aircraft, the bag is identified and unloaded. Europe has had such a system in place for years now, but in most US airports the current system is still not able to provide it.

Europe, however, is still deliberating about what it should do in the post-11 September security situation, and has not yet come up with a cogent reaction, except to raise the level of alertness.

America may have reacted with some highly visible actions, but the recent Paris incident is the ultimate reminder that if someone gets a bomb on an aircraft and can detonate it easily, sky marshalls and a fortress cockpit philosophy are completely useless. The only thing that appears to have stopped this alleged terrorist from succeeding in igniting the explosive reported to have been in his shoe is that he did not have a slick detonation system for it, so his suspicious actions drew attention and he was overpowered while trying to make it operate.

Bombs were the first effective weapon used by terrorists against airliners, and notwithstanding the events of 11 September when a completely new method of attack was hatched with horrific results, the bomb remains the biggest threat. Stopping terrorists and their weapons - bombs or hand-held devices - boarding in the first place remains the aim, so the airport is still the security key.

Baggage reconciliation remains one of the cornerstones. Complete hold baggage screening - implemented in some countries like the UK - is highly effective but it will occasionally miss a bomb or weapon, so there has to be another layer of security to back it up. Passenger profiling is the other primary part of the system, and it is theoretically in operation everywhere. It worked at Paris Charles de Gaulle in that a man considered to be acting suspiciously and with a number of inconsistencies in his profile as a normal passenger was stopped and questioned. He missed his flight as a result, but then was cleared and boarded another, taking explosives on board in his shoe.

Passenger profiling by ethnic group, religious belief or anything of that nature is not impossible but is fraught with legal problems because of human rights issues. Other forms of profiling are easy, perfectly valid, and if combined with ethnic or religious information that puts the passenger in a profile flagged up by intelligence agencies, the clues trail can be strengthened. Anybody with a one-way ticket who does not check-in hold luggage for a long range flight at a holiday period warrants special attention. All these are believed to have applied to the accused man. So did the fact that, although he had a valid passport, his one-way ticket meant he needed a visa and he did not have one. American Airlines staff were worried and told the French authorities so.

This makes a mockery of passenger profiling. A man identified as needing special checking was not checked properly. Security agencies are loathe to reveal their checking systems, but in a case like this the man should not merely have been questioned, he should have been taken into a security system room where everything that he wore, and his person, were checked thoroughly.

If there are laws or operating cultures that prevent this, they need revision.

Source: Flight International