It looks as though the inevitable rationalisation of German aero-engine manufacturers is about to happen, with MTU merging with BMW Rolls Royce. Such an alliance would be a major step on the way to producing a single, strong, European engine company - but it will be no guarantee that such a company will ever come about.
The problem is that the European engine industry has two major epicentres: Rolls Royce and Snecma. The proposed merger gathers the German industry into the R-R fold by moving MTU out of the clutches of rival US manufacturer Pratt & Whitney. What would be far more difficult to achieve (even if it were judged worthwhile) would be to move Snecma away from the other great US player, General Electric.
Snecma's commercial-engines status has been tied up with GE for so long now as to be virtually married to it. Not only is it a 50% shareholder in CFM International, it is also a 25% shareholder in the GE90, as well as holding a smaller stake in the CF6.
Even were a European rationalisation encompassing both the Rolls Royce and Snecma camps to come about, however, the real problem of aero-engine over-capacity would be left unresolved. If a strong European engine company coalesces around an R-R or R-R/Snecma core, the world will still have too many large aero-engine companies chasing a diminishing number of new-airframe projects in the 21st century.
Outside the CIS, the mainstream airliner product is likely to be smaller in 20 years' time than it is now. Airbus may still have three ranges corresponding to today's A319/320/ 321, A300/310 and A330/340: there is a possibility it will have the larger A3XX as well. Boeing will still have the 737 and 777, probably an extension to the 747 and, possibly, a replacement for the 757/767. McDonnell Douglas, having successfully launched its MD-90, is still struggling to retain a future place in the wide-body market and to launch its MD-95. Its line-up in 20 years' time is more difficult to predict, but, on current evidence, it will be doing well to have more than two airframes.
Of the myriad real and proposed 50- to 120-seaters, perhaps three will have serious production status in the next century, depending on which international alliances are consummated. Beyond those projects, the only true unpredictable is the next-generation supersonic transport - of which there certainly will be no more than one type.
That is not a lot of airframes on the back of which to sustain three full-product-range engine manufacturers. The costs of new aircraft development continue to escalate far faster than do rates of inflation; but the airlines' ability to pay for new aircraft does not. To keep selling costs down, neither the manufacturers of airframes, nor of engines, will be able to offer engine choices on any but the larger airframes. Even for those airframes, manufacturers admit that it is all but impossible to make economic sense of producing three competing engines for a single aircraft type. The battle for Boeing 777 orders provides the evidence.
If that means that effectively there will be just two significant engine contenders in each thrust category, then two options are left to the engine manufacturers. Either they ultimately reconstruct themselves to form just two major full-product-range groups, or they each choose significant niches in which they can be number one or number two. The first solution implies a reconstruction of almost mind-boggling complexity; the second offers much more scope - especially as the significant niches available include those in the military sector.
While the mathematics of such a rationalisation, are easy to resolve, at least on paper, the politics are not yet the rationalisation must happen. The international industry cannot afford the resources to design, develop and build more engines than it needs. This Paris show may see a tacit acknowledgement of that - perhaps by the next one there will be an even more significant move towards matching resources to needs.
Source: Flight International