Politics are an expected, if not accepted, element of military procurement battles, but Canada's MHP places politics on a different level

Canada's inability to select a maritime helicopter to replace its 35-year old Sikorsky CH-124/A Sea Kings is a sorry tale, in which political manoeuvring is playing a greater part than any technical or financial problem.

The Canadian Forces' requirement should be relatively simple: a shipborne helicopter able to meet a range of maritime roles, 28 machines are needed, and C$2.9 billion ($1.9 billion) has been set aside. To complicate matters for the competitors, however, the Maritime Helicopter Programme (MHP) is split into an airframe battle and a further competition for the mission system. Critics argue that this will add C$400 million to the cost.

But the real problem is that the competition is embroiled in the middle of a political face-saving exercise. One of the first things prime minister Jean Cr‚tien did on coming to power in 1993 was cancel a C$5.8 billion contract with EH Industries for 50 EH101s (35 machines were intended to replace the Sea Kings, the remainder for search and rescue). The order was signed by the previous administration and Crétien had spent the election campaign decrying the deal as unnecessary and too expensive. As a result of abandoning the contract, Canada handed over C$500 million to AgustaWestland's EH Industries venture in compensation. And in the end the Canadian Forces ended up acquiring 15 EH101s for the rescue mission, although they were called AW520 Cormorants during the competition.

The 1993 cancellation is now seen by many associated with MHP as the biggest stumbling block to onward progress. It can be seen as ill-advised politically to order helicopters for a deal that has already been declared unnecessary, particularly when the Canadian Forces have a number of pressing procurement priorities. Industry officials in Canada are now predicting that MHP will not substantially progress until Crétien retires, which he plans to do in February 2004. This makes it unlikely the new helicopters will be delivered before the Sea King retirement date is reached. If this happens the Canadian taxpayer will be faced with the additional cost of maintaining and operating outdated equipment for longer than planned or budgeted for, and the Canadian Forces will almost certainly be faced with reduced capability as some of the remaining 29 Sea Kings are retired because they need major overhauls or are required as spares "Christmas trees" for the remaining rotorcraft.

Additionally, the EH101 is seen as a leading contender - it has already won the competition once, albeit not against the NH Industries NH90 and Sikorsky S-92, and AgustaWestland can point to potential savings from a single helicopter type for the maritime and rescue missions. There is some feeling that the competition has been artificially skewed against the helicopter, and indeed last year EHI placed an advertising campaign in an Ottawa political newspaper accusing the government of watering down the specification to give the competition a better chance. In 2000, EHI demanded a public hearing claiming that the process had been rigged against the EH101 to prevent political embarrassment.

Politics is part-and-parcel of arms procurement competition - there is no country that does not suffer this malaise. Understandably, during a high-profile campaign, where billions of taxpayers' dollars, euros or pounds are to be spent, there are many government departments that will seek to influence the outcome, and plenty of elected representatives - with both eyes firmly fixed on the next election - that will strive to ensure companies in their constituencies are the beneficiaries of the national largesse.

Take a typical competition in the UK. As well as the Ministry of Defence, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Treasury will have a say, and depending on the procurement, other parts of government such as the Home Office or Foreign and Commonwealth Office may also have an input. But on the whole they are fighting for a specific brief - MoD wants the best kit, DTI strives to ensure the best outcome for UK industry and the Treasury seeks the minimum-cost option.

In the USA, to take another example, the efforts of senators and representatives to ensure their states and districts receive the maximum amount of Department of Defense dollars are legendary.

These examples are, if not the acceptable face of politics, only to be expected when a government is handing out billion-dollar contracts. To forestall a contract and potentially damage a nation's defences to "save face" can never be seen as acceptable.

Source: Flight International