Fatal crashes of aircraft are always a tragedy, but lessons can be learned. By careful investigation and analysis, the cause may be illuminated and, possibly, avoided in the future. If there has been mechanical failure, parts or systems can be fixed. In the event of pilot error, new techniques can be applied.
The 9 April crash of a US Air Force Bell Boeing CV-22 Osprey in Afghanistan will yield no such lessons. Due to an inexplicable failure by Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), the deaths of four crew members and passengers may never be explained convincingly.
When the accident investigation board convened by AFSOC to probe the crash released its findings on 16 December, it delivered a shock. The independent crash investigators could not definitively explain the cause. Board members theorised a mechanical problem led to the crash. That theory, however, clashed with that of the AFSOC commander, who decided the cause was pilot error after reviewing the same data.
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© USAFShould the powerplants be redesigned? |
Most news reports focused on this rare display of public disagreement in a high-profile accident investigation. That is a legitimate line of questioning, yet misses the real scandal at the root of the dispute.
The cause of the crash remains a mystery because AFSOC failed to recover the CV-22's flight incident recorder. It was not recovered because AFSOC's crews were unaware the recorder was aboard the aircraft. That omission was the result of a mistranslation when AFSOC rewrote the Marine Corps' instructional manuals for the V-22 using air force terminology.
As a result, neither the public nor other CV-22 flight crews can be confident that pilot error alone led to the fatal crash on 9 April. If there is a fundamental mechanical problem with the aircraft, there will be no requirement to address the cause of the problem.
There have already been five fatal crashes in the V-22's troubled past, claiming more than 30 lives. The difference is that previous incidents led to real - if expensive - changes. The aircraft's susceptibility to vortex ring state became fully understood. Hydraulic lines and electrical wiring were redesigned and improved.
The reliability and safety of the V-22's engines have remained a concern even as the aircraft has deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. If the board's theory is ever validated, it may provide impetus to redesign the engines with the same thoroughness that was applied to the airframe several years ago. Alas, the missing flight incident recorder makes firm action impossible.
Source: Flight International
