The demise of the 757 shows that Boeing must take the production efficiencies promised by the 7E7 and apply them to the rest of its lines
Boeing's decision to end production of the 757, following Continental Airlines' decision to cancel orders for the narrowbody twinjet, highlights the importance to the US manufacturer of the 7E7, which is intended to replace both the 757 and the widebody 767. The revelation that Boeing plans to use Airbus-style air delivery of components for the 7E7 shows how serious it is about breaking the mould with its latest airliner. And reports that Boeing's board has given limited approval to offer the 7E7 to All Nippon Airways (ANA) and Japan Airlines System (JAS), ahead of a formal go-ahead, increases the likelihood the 7E7 will be launched.
In an ideal world, Boeing would have preferred the 757 to have soldiered on until the 7E7 entered production. But the air transport world is far from ideal these days. And the 757, deliveries of which began in 1982, was looking increasingly uncompetitive, particularly against Boeing's own Next Generation 737. This is underlined by Continental's decision to convert its last six 757-300 orders to 737-800s, sounding the death knell for the 757. In today's cost-critical airline environment, operating more 737s is cheaper than adding 757s.
But the 757 has been a success. After a slow start, the programme picked up pace in the 1990s, and when production ends next year Boeing will have delivered just over 1,060 aircraft. That compares favourably with the 1,010 707s delivered, although if falls short of the 1,831 727s built and pales beside the total of more than 5,300 737s that Boeing has sold so far. The 757 has narrowly outsold its stablemate, but the prospect of a 100-aircraft tanker lease to the US Air Force looks likely to guarantee the 767's survival.
With the 757 going out of production and the 767 going into the military, a decision on their replacement is becoming critical. Boeing is to present its business case for the 7E7 to the board by the end of the year, but confirmation that the aircraft is being formally offered to ANA and JAS is a positive sign. Flight International revealed in May that the two airlines - JAS is the holding company for the merged Japan Airlines and Japan Air System - were the likely launch customers for the twinjet. Since then, Japanese industry has strived to secure production of up to 35% of the 7E7 airframe - a campaign that would almost certainly be clinched by launch orders from ANA and JAS.
Boeing has insisted, since before the high-speed Sonic Cruiser gave way to the super-efficient 7E7, that it would not be business as usual when it came to building its next airliner. So far, the company has stayed true to that strategy: choosing composites for the airframe, courting risk-sharing partners, opening the final-assembly location to competition and, now, adopting air delivery of components. For a company that has often ridiculed the way Airbus shuttles aircraft sub assembles between European plants in a fleet of oversize transports, the fact that Boeing is prepared to embrace the idea speaks volumes about its willingness to do anything to reduce the 7E7's cost.
Ironically, Boeing's conversion to the concept of air delivery comes as Airbus abandons the practice in favour of surface transport, as least in the case of the ultra-large A380. The European manufacturer was forced into using air delivery when surface transport of components of the very first Airbus proved impractical, and it has made a virtue of necessity. Starting with propeller-driven Super Guppys, Airbus took the expensive step in the early 1990s of converting A300-600Rs to Super Transporters, otherwise known as Belugas. Now Boeing plans to perform similar surgery on 747-400s to support the 7E7, if it is launched.
Airbus did not abandon air delivery easily with the A380, but the components are too big for the Belugas. The company considered using larger Belugas or a heavylift airship, but settled instead on surface transport - at least for now. Boeing, meanwhile, has been driven to air delivery by its need to bring the large, integrated subassemblies to be produced by its partners together "just in time" on the streamlined final line planned for the 7E7, where assembly will take just days, not the weeks now required.
The 757's demise is a wake-up call for Boeing, and for the industry, and a sign that it is time for change. The production efficiencies promised by the 7E7 are desperately needed, by manufacturers and customers alike. Manufacturers must embrace good ideas, whoever conceived them. But the state of its order backlog shows that Boeing must not stop at the 7E7 when it comes to breaking the mould, and eventually its full line of aircraft must incorporate the latest technology and be built in the most efficient way.
Source: Flight International