UK investigators have found that an Airbus A320 captain, having initiated a go-around on touchdown at Corfu, cycled the thrust levers forward and back after realising reverse-thrust had already been selected.
Although the first officer had been flying the night approach, to runway 34 at Kerkira airport, an early and long flare meant the jet landed at the end of the touchdown zone.
Perceiving that the EasyJet A320 had landed beyond the zone – and knowing that company policy required a go-around in such cases – the captain took control of the aircraft and advanced the thrust levers to full power.
But the first officer, who felt the landing was within the zone, had already engaged reverse-thrust, and this realisation left the captain facing a crucial decision.
“[He] experienced startle and surprise leading to hesitation as to whether to continue with the go-around or reject the take-off,” says the UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch.
Airbus flight manuals direct pilots not to start a go-around if thrust-reversers have been engaged.
The startle effect was exacerbated by a master warning, which sounded because full thrust had been commanded while full flap was still deployed.
Hesitation led the captain initially to pull the thrust levers back to ‘maximum reverse’, before advancing them again to go-around power, and finally pulling them back to reverse. He called “stop” and applied braking.
Concerned that the aircraft had not been responding to go-around power, and that it might overrun, the first officer also called “stop” – about the same time as the captain – and separately started braking.
“While he could not recollect doing so, the recorded data showed [the first officer] also applied a nose-down input on the side-stick at the same time,” says the inquiry. “This input was nulled because the [captain] kept his sidestick priority button pressed after taking control.”
The pilots’ mental models “re-aligned” when the lack of perceived acceleration caused them each to “question the viability” of continuing the go-around, says the inquiry.
The aircraft stopped about 340m from the end of the 2,314m runway. None of the 180 occupants was injured during the incident on 19 June last year.
Neither the cockpit-voice nor flight-data recorder information was available to investigators. The Greek authorities delegated responsibility for the probe to their UK counterparts.
While the precise touchdown point could not be determined, analysis of the landing indicates the jet’s main wheels made runway contact about 660m from the threshold, which was “on or just after” the final touchdown zone marker, says the inquiry.
The thrust levers were then quickly retarded to the ‘idle reverse’ position and the thrust-reverser doors opened.
After the captain took control and cycled the thrust levers forward and back twice, the aircraft was travelling at 132kt groundspeed with 915m of runway remaining. Maximum manual braking was applied until the jet came to a halt.
“While he had not flown a baulked landing go-around in an A320-family aircraft before, the captain had previously practised them in the A320 simulator, including ones initiated after mainwheel touchdown,” says the inquiry.
“He observed that…he had likely not detected the selection of thrust-reverse by the [first officer] because his attention had been focused outside on assessing whether the landing would be achieved within the [touchdown zone].”
Airbus carried out a scenario analysis to examine the outcome if the go-around had been continued. Its model indicated the A320 would have lifted off 600m from the runway end and cleared the first relevant obstacles on the flightpath by 250ft.
