UK investigators have highlighted the value of crews’ practising motor skills after a co-ordination mix-up led a British Airways Boeing 777-200ER pilot to reject take-off after passing the V1 threshold.
The aircraft had been accelerating along London Gatwick’s runway 26L on 28 June last year when, upon hearing the automatic ‘V1’ call-out, at 160kt, the first officer inadvertently began pulling back the thrust levers instead of removing his hand and preparing to pull back the control column.
V1 is normally considered to be the threshold for committing to flight, to reduce the risk of overrunning during an aborted take-off.
But as the captain then called “rotate”, the first officer – who vocalised the error – momentarily advanced the thrust levers again before initiating the rejected take-off procedure, at about 2kt above V1.
The aircraft stopped safely on the runway before intersection GR. Firefighting personnel attended and extinguished a hot-brake fire on the right-hand main landing-gear.
None of the 334 passengers and 13 crew members was injured.
The aircraft, which had departed from the A1 intersection, reached a speed of 167kt before slowing. Weather conditions included an 11kt headwind and the runway was dry.
British Airways had, ironically, been reviewing its procedures relating to movement of critical controls, and issued a safety notice just four days before the incident.
The Air Accidents Investigation Branch says the carrier’s review had determined that “absence of cognitive thought and speed of execution” commonly featured during action slips – including mis-selection of flap or landing-gear.
British Airways had emphasised, in the safety notice, the need to “pause before execution” and “cognitively consider” the required action, the inquiry says.
“The operator described taking a cautious approach to publicising specific incidents to its crew, given industry experience suggests the act of discussing mis-selections might actually prime crew towards, rather than against, making them,” it adds.
Investigators found “no obvious reason” for the first officer’s being primed for the error, such as a recent change of aircraft type or relevant simulator practice.
The inquiry states that the captain of the 777 (G-VIIT) had “insufficient time” to assess the situation before the rejection, but he responded to the abort “calmly and methodically”, and the crew handled the event “effectively”.
It points out that the incident illustrates the “complex nature” of the take-off roll, with pilots carrying out a series of motor actions while also mentally preparing for a possible abort.
“Pilots can improve their individual performance by mentally rehearsing what might seem like routine parts of an operation, especially after time away from flying,” the inquiry adds, stressing the benefit on cognition and motor skills of practising so-called “armchair flying”.
