Paul Phelan/CAIRNS
System weaknesses at Qantas, shown up following a Boeing 747-400 runway overrun at Bangkok in 1999, have prompted the Australian flag carrier to reorganise several operational areas. It has doubled its safety department size, overhauled flight and cabin crew training, and changed its operations management structure.
The changes follow the release by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) of a highly critical report analysing the 23 September 1999 event. No-one was hurt in the landing, which took place at night in a rain storm, but the aircraft was almost written off.
The ATSB report says that the principal factors in the accident include:
lack of runway condition information. The wet, un-grooved runway caused aquaplaning; loss of visibility in heavy rain as the aircraft descended through 200ft (60m); airspeed was 15kt (28km/h) above target at the runway threshold, and the aircraft was 32ft (9.8m) higher than profile, but this was still within company tolerances; the flaps were set at 25° (a low setting) and the engines after touchdown were only selected to idle reverse. These are company cost-cutting practices; the captain decided to conduct a go-around from 10ft above the runway in a sudden heavy shower, but then to abort it after the wheels contacted the runway. In the resulting confusion the crew did not select reverse thrust. They also inadvertently disarmed the auto-braking system by failing to retard one power lever fully to idle.The report comments: "In such conditions and without reverse thrust, there was no prospect of the crew stopping the aircraft in the runway distance remaining after touchdown."
The aircraft touched down 636m beyond the target point on the 3,150m runway and overran the 100m stopway at 88kt, stopping 220m beyond it.
Also criticised were deficiencies in the Civil Aviation Safety Authority's surveillance of airline and cabin emergency procedures.
Source: Flight International
