Both Aeroflot and Russian civil air transport regulator Rosaviatsia have dissented over investigators’ conclusions regarding the fatal hard landing and fire which destroyed a Superjet 100 nearly six years ago.
Russia’s Interstate Aviation Committee says the Aeroflot crew had “insufficient knowledge and skills” to control the jet in direct law, to which it had reverted after being affected by “atmospheric electricity” about 5min after take-off from Moscow Sheremetyevo on 5 May 2019.
The crew returned to Sheremetyevo, conducting an approach to runway 24L, but the captain’s poor pitch control – including “repeated disproportionate alternating movements” of the side-stick – resulted in the aircraft’s bouncing and touching down hard three times. The second and third impacts caused structural failure, tank rupture and the ignition of spilled fuel as the aircraft slowed.
Forty-one of the 78 occupants, including one of the five crew members, did not survive.
Investigators attribute the crew’s lack of skill to the “ineffectiveness” of approved pilot-training schemes for handling emergencies, including the reversion to direct law – even though the training programmes met minimum federal regulations.
Along with failing to identify previous problems with piloting in direct law, the airline’s safety-management system did not detect errors in pitch control during landing – including occurrences in which the pilot moved the side-stick forward, pushing the nose down, during the flare.
The “significant increase” in the captain’s psycho-emotional stress, as a result of the effect of the electrical encounter and degraded flight-control law, led to his prioritising an emergency landing without being prepared to execute a go-around, the inquiry says. It notes that the crew did not carry out a go-around despite the activation of a windshear alert on final approach.
Investigators also point out instances of “unclear wording” in operational documentation about piloting techniques and activation of certain systems including air brakes.
Aeroflot has lodged a dissenting opinion, arguing that the airline’s training programmes are approved by regulator Rosaviatsia.
It claims the technical documentation provided for its programme does not contain much information on piloting in direct law, other than a recommendation to “smoothly control” the aircraft.
“The risks of ‘non-smooth’ control are not described,” the carrier states.
Aeroflot also rejects any failure to detect – and act upon – flawed piloting techniques in direct mode, insisting that three such cases were discussed at a working group in August 2015.
“Information was communicated to the flight crew,” it says, adding that pro-active measures were developed and the simulator training programme was modified to address direct-law piloting.
But the carrier says direct law substantially increases the pilot workload and these difficulties cannot be fully resolved even with regular training on simulators.
Aeroflot’s dissent runs to eight pages and covers a number of other operational and technical points.
But its detailed disputing of various contributing factors to the accident has not convinced the Interstate Aviation Committee.
The investigators say the carrier “proposes to exclude” from the conclusions “almost all contributing factors” relating to organisation of flight operations, the make-up of its safety-management system, and standard operating procedures.
Accepting the dissenting opinion, it says, would essentially mean accepting that the crew managed to control the aircraft without problems, before failing to correct deviations during landing “solely” due to stability deficiencies of the aircraft in direct law unidentified during testing.
The Interstate Aviation Committee says this position is “completely contradictory” to the objectively-established facts, and describes it as an “overt” attempt to “defend the honour of the uniform”.
Rosaviatsia has dissented over the inquiry conclusion remarking about inefficiency of the approved flight-training programme for situations where the aircraft switches to direct law.
It says the investigation established that, after the switch, competencies such as manual piloting skill and application of procedures were not properly demonstrated.
“Therefore the inquiry results revealed problems not in the content of the training programme,” it argues, “but in achieving the aim of developing an assessment of the necessary pilot competencies for the safe operation of the aircraft.”
But the Interstate Aviation Committee says its conclusion is based on data, and that “obvious difficulties” were observed in pilots conducting approaches to land under direct law – adding that its conclusion on the ineffectiveness of training programmes in the area being considered is “absolutely objective”.
